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IRAQI STATESMAN

A Portrait of Mohammed Fadhel Jamali

by Harry J. Almond



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IRAQI STATESMAN:
A Portrait of Mohammad Fadhel Jamali

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To my beloved wife, Beverly,
and our daughters, Anne and Betsy,
who share my love for the people of the Middle East.

Preface

This book is offered as a portrait of an Arab statesman, an Iraqi. It is not intended to be a definitive biography but to provide a picture of a flesh and blood person with a real faith. He is no doubt outspoken on controversial matters, perhaps overly blunt on matters of deep conviction, but he is nonetheless a fair sample of his age. He is ever a teacher and a devoted father, a crusty, feisty man with a redeeming sense of humor.

There have been biographies of Arab heads of state, but there is almost nothing published about people on the level of cabinet minister, those who served their countries year in year out, sometimes merely trying to implement the desires of their superiors, sometimes daring to differ. So I chose to write of Jamali, a long-serving cabinet minister, because he is typical of a generation that should be better understood. He spans a wide period of history. From the post World War I era he has been active in his country's affairs. He signed the United Nations (UN) Charter and was one of the initiators of the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung in 1955. Imprisoned and condemned to death by the 1958 Revolution, he was pardoned and exonerated by the Iraq Government in 1961. He lectured at the University of Tunis until retirement in 1987, and at 89 he continues his writing and speaking.

I suggested writing his biography several years ago, and he offered the unpublished manuscript of his *Memoirs*, 687 typed pages. This when sorted provided a chronological outline and notes. All references to these *Memoirs* are indicated by page numbers in parentheses. This outline has been supplemented with other material from the indicated publications and the *New York Times*, the Netherlands Foreign Ministry, the British Public Record Office, the Records of UN Proceedings, the National Archives of the United States, and my own notes.

Many have helped this enterprise. Mrs. Edward Perry, a longtime friend of the Middle East donated a computer. Ambassador Richard H. Nolte gave his encouragement and a copy of his own monograph about Jamali. Professor Walid Khalidi of Harvard has been generous with his advice, correction and support. Dr. Dick van Tetterode of the Hague deserves special thanks for his labors of love both in the basement files of the Dutch Foreign Ministry and in translating that material into English. My colleague and friend Michael Henderson deserves special appreciation for editing and other helps. I am most grateful for the cheerful cooperation of the Jamalis all, who have graciously granted permission to use personal material.

Harry J. Almond
Egremont, Massachusetts
1993

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Son of a Shi'a Sheikh

In Mecca, above the Red Sea on the Western slopes of the Arabian peninsula, Jamali forebears were known in the time of the Prophet Mohammed at the turn of the seventh century, AD. They belonged to the *beni Sheiba* clan of the Prophet's own Qureish tribe. The *beni Sheiba* were entrusted with the key of the *Ka'aba*, a pagan shrine which became Islam's Holy Place and focus of the *hajj*, the annual pilgrimage.

Family tradition relates that one of the *beni Sheiba* was rude to the Prophet prior to Mohammed's move with the first small band of Muslims to Medina in AD 622. Twelve years later Mohammed returned triumphantly to Mecca. His cousin and son-in-law Ali recalled the *beni Sheiba*'s slight to Mohammed, and he took the key of the *Ka'aba* by force from Othman bin Talha, one of the *beni Sheiba*, in order to enter the shrine and destroy the idols, which had been objects of superstition and worship as well as a source of considerable profit. Ali's taking the key in this way gave occasion for the revelation of this verse to Mohammed: "Allah commands you to give back the trust to its owners..." (*Qur'an*, "The Women," IV:58).¹ Thereupon the Prophet ordered Ali to return the key and that it should remain with the *beni Sheiba* "until the end of time."²

Just as English names like Taylor, Smith or Weaver evolve from an occupation or trade, so it often is with Arab names. Thus the Jamali ancestors, the Sheibis, were also known as Beni Abd ed-Dar, "Sons of the Servant of the House" – the *Ka'aba*. In the critical Battle of Uhud they were also standard bearers for the Qureish.

One branch of the Sheibis, who were of course Sunnis, migrated to Mesopotamia centuries later. There, finding themselves in a largely Shi'a society, they eventually joined that community as did most of the other Arabian tribes who settled along the banks of Iraq's twin rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates. But this was generations before Sheikh Abbas al-Jamali and his two sons, Mohammad Fadhel and Abdur Rasoul, appeared on the scene.

The Jamali family have in their keeping a *firman*, or decree, from the Caliph in Istanbul dated in the month of Muharram, AH 1020 (AD 1611). It grants the care within the Kadhimain mosque of the shrine of Imam Abu Yusuf, the seventh Shi'a Imam, to Jamal ed-Din bin Mullah Ali, the Jamali ancestor. "Jamali" thus became the name for those Sheibis who were the descendants of that particular Jamal ed-Din.³ Two other branches of the beni Sheiba also migrated to Iraq: one in Kadhimain is headed by Sheikh Kalid-dar, a Persian name meaning "keeper of the keys"; and the other, al-Bu'ajini, settled in Nejef.⁴ Imam Musa al-Kadhim, Abu Yusuf, the care of whose tomb under one of Kadhimain's twin domes was entrusted to the Jamalis, was born about AD 745, and he died about AD 799.⁵

The tomb of Imam Abu Ja'fer Mohammed ibn Ali, also known as Mohammed at-Taqi (the God-fearing) lies under the second golden dome and is in charge of another branch of the beni Sheiba clan. The name Kadhimain simply means the two Kadhims, the two forbearing or restrained ones, and their remains are buried there. Imam Abu Ja'fer, the ninth Imam, is the grandson of Imam Musa al-Kadhim. The present shrine dates from the early sixteenth century, and the domes were first tiled in gold in 1796.⁶

After World War I and the defeat of the Central Powers the Arab people of the Middle East, newly liberated from Turkish rule by British and Arab troops, were not given the immediate and full independence they felt they had been promised by Britain. Instead, they found themselves under the League of Nations with independence promised, but only eventually. Britain was designated to exercise mandatory power over the area that is now Jordan, Iraq and Palestine, while France exercised her tutorial powers over Syria, which then included the districts we know today as Lebanon.

On 3 September, 1932, the 52 members of the League of Nations admitted Iraq, the first Arab state under mandate to be so recognized.⁷ This, in principle, ended the mandate given to Britain under the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. Nonetheless, British Advisors stayed in Iraq through the Second World War.⁸ By the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne, Iraq was detached from the Ottoman Empire, but modern Iraq had already been born in 1921, when King Feisal, son of Sherif Hussein of Mecca and the outstanding fighter for Arab independence, was enthroned.

In the West King Feisal is known for his exploits against the Turks with T. E. Lawrence as his advisor. Feisal was first enthroned in Syria, and his elder brother, Emir Abdullah, was thought by many, including himself, to be the natural candidate for the throne of Iraq. However, the French had been given the mandate over Syria, and they forced Feisal to leave Damascus. He eventually became King Feisal I of Iraq when on 11 July, 1921, the Council of State, persuaded by British High Commissioner Sir Percy Cox, passed a unanimous resolution declaring Feisal king of a constitutional, democratic monarchy. He was crowned on 23 August, 1921, and his first Council of Ministers met on 10 September that same year.⁹

A major contender for leadership of the new state, Sayid Talib el-Naqib, had been forcibly removed to Ceylon by the British before the plebiscite took place.¹⁰ Abdullah was disappointed, and, although he became Ruler, Emir, of what was

then Transjordan and eventually King of Jordan, he never forgot his earlier hope.

Both Iraq and Transjordan were then poor, but Iraq had the priceless assets of water from the Tigris and the Euphrates, with their port city of Basra, and, eventually, oil. Good relations between the two countries, in spite of Abdullah's disappointment, rested on the family tie, which was strong. That it stayed so was due in no small measure to Feisal's generosity of spirit towards his older brother.

Many young Arabs who had studied in Istanbul at the Turkish Military Academy prior to World War I came home in 1916 when Sherif Hussein of Mecca sent his sons, Abdullah, Zeid and Feisal, to fight alongside the British against the Turks. They joined the Arab Army under Feisal, and many moved on with him to Syria and Iraq. They had been active in secret Arab nationalist societies during their days with the Turkish Army, and the call to rise up under the Hashemites was for them a call to freedom. They were for the most part Syrian and Iraqi, but an Egyptian, Aziz Ali al-Misri, also played a leading part in promoting Arab patriotism among their ranks.

Jamali, in common with many others, regards the liberation of Damascus in 1918 by the Arab Army led by Emir Feisal as the first fruit of the Arab Revolt against the Turks. Feisal then became the first and only King of Syria. In March, 1920 at a Conference in Damascus presided over by Hashim al-Atassi the unity of Syria and Iraq was declared.

In the Arab view two agreements had been made which broke Britain's promises of independence: One was the Sykes-Picot Treaty between France and Britain by which they secretly agreed to divide Syria, Palestine and Iraq between themselves. This came to light when the Russian papers were made public by Lenin after the Revolution. Russia had been a third party, but the Revolution intervened, removing Russia as a participant. In accordance with the terms of that secret Treaty and by the authorization of the San Remo Conference of April, 1920, the French were awarded the mandate for all of Syria. The Arab Kingdom headed by King Feisal came to

an end that same year after considerable resistance. The King had to leave and went to Baghdad, but many Syrians cherished fond memories of him.

The second unjust agreement was the Balfour Declaration of 1917 in which the British government

view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.¹¹

The latter clause, rarely quoted, is a misleading reference to a long-established community which then made up close to 90 percent of the population and which owned well over 90 percent of the land. The Jews of Palestine then numbered about 55,000.

The League of Nations put Syria, which included what we now know as Lebanon, under French Mandate and Iraq, Trans-Jordan and Palestine under the British. In 1920 the Iraqis revolted. Britain finding it costly to rule so turbulent a country, yielded to the wishes of many, although by no means all, Iraqis, and in 1921 King Feisal, the ex-King of Syria, was enthroned as Iraq's first King. One of the young, Turkish-trained officers who accompanied Feisal was Nuri es-Sa'id. First appointed Chief of Staff, he became the dominant figure in Iraq politics for the next thirty seven years. Ja'afer al-Askari, also Turkish-trained, was the first Minister of Defense. Jamali, then eighteen years old, was an elementary school teacher.

During World War I, as the British forces moved North from Cairo into Palestine with the Mediterranean on their left flank, the Arabs under Feisal formed the right flank in the desert area east of the Jordan. Feisal's Arab army had joined the British under Allenby in fulfillment of the Arab part of Sherif Hussein's and British High Commissioner Sir Henry McMahon's agreement that the Arabs would be assured independence in return for their help against the Turks.¹²

Feisal personified the ideal of Arab nationalism for that generation. When he came to Baghdad he brought with him two well-known Arab nationalists; Sati' el-Hasri, who became Director General of the Ministry of Education, and a Sorbonne-educated Lebanese, Rustam Beg Haidar, who was appointed Head of the Royal *Diwan* (Court). These two men, along with the Turkish-trained Iraqi officers who had fought with Feisal against the Turks, did much to promote the cause of Arab nationalism in Iraq. Ancient Mesopotamia, now known as Iraq, had been a province of the Turkish Ottoman Empire like the rest of the Arab world since 1514.

With the coming of King Feisal and his entourage to Iraq, the idea of liberation and Arab unity made a deep impression on young Jamali. Such leadership inspired in the next generation a patriotism whose aim was the eventual liberation and unification of all Arab lands. Young Arabs were not happy to find themselves separated from one another by the frontiers drawn on maps by Europeans at the Versailles Conference.

Into this kaleidoscope of history, intrigue, betrayal, courage and idealism Mohammed Fadhel Jamali was born in 1903 in the holy city of Kadhimain, known for its imposing mosque, four miles upstream from Baghdad on the west bank of the Tigris River. Baghdad's population was then about 140,000 people: by 1987 there were nearly four million. His father, Sheikh Abbas ibn Hajji Mohammed al-Jamali, was a religious leader in the Shi'a community. He had been born in Kadhimain and had spent twenty years in religious studies at Nejef, a respected scholar some of whose disciples eventually became Fadhel's teachers. Fadhel's mother, Alawiya Khadija, was the daughter of a famous woman mullah from Hilla, Sayyida Zahwa, who was also a poetess. She was a personality for whom people rose when she passed. As a child Fadhel was often known as "the son of Mullaya Zahwa's daughter." Alawiya Khadija herself was regarded by the community as a saintly woman whose prayers were answered by God. She conducted special rituals for the women and gave them threads to be hung around patients' necks, inspiring hope of recovery. Young Fadhel therefore grew up in a strict Shi'a

Muslim home where Arabic was the family language, the language of the Holy *Qur'an*, while Turkish was the language of government.

The family lived near the golden domes and minarets of the Kadhimain mosque where Sheikh Abbas was often consulted by the pilgrims who came from all over the Muslim world. Entrance to the mosque is through an arched gateway fifty feet high and covered with glazed tiles of turquoise blue and pink. There are six other arched doorways, each with a long chain hung from its peak and gathered in loops to each side. Young Fadhel regularly went there with his father for prayers and Qur'anic instruction, and he tagged along when visitors were shown the shrines.

There was never much money, but here Fadhel quotes a proverb: "An honest *alim* (religious scholar) has little money." When his father and mother quarreled the boy was usually on his father's side. When Fadhel's mother became old and infirm his father married his cousin Bahiya, a young widow with two daughters. Fadhel's mother died in 1938, and Sheikh Abbas died in 1941. Bahiya lived until after 1962 when Fadhel and Sarah had gone to Tunisia. Of the seven Jamali children only two survived, Mohammed Fadhel and his brother, Abdur Rasoul, who was born in 1910, seven years after Fadhel. With his parents so highly regarded in the community Fadhel was assured a boyhood typical of a strictly conservative Shi'a home. It was an upbringing rich with superstitions and quite rigid in matters of religion.

As a young man he listed the habits and attitudes acquired in childhood which he had to overcome later in life. These included:

... a negative attitude toward Sunni Muslims, believing that God would send them to Hell; the feeling that he had to go daily to the Kadhimain mosque to pray; that he must not look at women's faces or even listen to their voices except for members of his own family; the obligation to pay respect to great religious personalities, kissing their right hands on meeting; a negative attitude toward

government officials, believing that, since they were Sunnis, they could not be honest people.¹³

Jamali recalls with remarkable frankness that as a child he used to play in the street with the children of the neighborhood, learning the filthy words and dirty habits a boy could acquire there, but which he never practiced before his father for fear of a beating. He delighted in being one of the gang and joined the neighborhood children in throwing stones at intruders from other parts of the town. Recreation consisted chiefly of playing in the outer area (*sahan*) of the mosque and in walks in the gardens or along the Tigris embankment.

He watched the bands of men who marched beating their breasts once a year in *Ashura* (the first ten days of the month of *Muharram*) when they lamented the martyrdom of the younger grandson of the Prophet (Hussein ibn Ali, on the tenth of *Muharram*, AH 61, or 10 October, 680 AD). Fadhel writes:

I used to attend *Ashura* gatherings for men where the story of the martyrdom of Imam Hussein and his family was recited and people wept and cried. Every night for the first ten nights of *Muharram* I used to see the procession of mourners and torchbearers coming to the Holy Mosque. On the tenth day of *Muharram* we saw the drama of Kerbala performed in the outer yard of the mosque.¹⁴

This religious commemoration is a unique tradition of the Shi'a sect. The name "Shi'a" means party, and a member of the sect is a "Shi'i," or partisan, because they were and are partisans of the line of the Caliph Ali. The Shi'is continue today to follow the succession of Ali's descendants or *Imams*, as they call their leaders, although differences in their ranks occur over the question of whether there have been seven or twelve rightful *Imams*.

The Sunnis, or traditional Muslims, are the vast majority in Islam. They follow the line of Caliphs chosen by consensus, beginning with the defeat of Ali's sons at Kufa and Kerbala near the Euphrates River in the year 680. Abu Bakr,

Omar, Ali and Othman are known by both Sunnis and most Shi'is as the "rightly guided Caliphs."

Sheikh Abbas, as a religious leader, was primarily supported by the local Shi'a community, but his brother, Abdul Karim al-Jamali, was also generous to the family. When Fadhel was four his father went to Najaf to continue his studies in theology, and young Fadhel was entrusted to the home of his uncle and aunt, Abdul Karim and Alawiya Sukna al-Jamali, who treated him as they did their own son. Their house was in another section of Kadhimain, and there he says he had "a much more peaceful life" and was educated in "better social and personal habits. I was deprived of street contacts altogether and had as examples before me my cousins."¹⁵

The cousins, Abdul Karim's and Alawiya's children, were Abdul Amir, Sadiq and Zahra. Their father, uncle Abdul Karim, was in charge of two big bath houses in Kadhimain, one for men and one for women and together called *Hammam al-Jadid* or "new bath." Abdul Karim was also registered as a "Servant of the Holy Mosque"—a title of some honor. Others of the Jamali family also served the Kadhimain shrine in various capacities while some were business and professional people.

His boyhood home was near the mosque in a neighborhood of narrow, unpaved and winding streets where the houses of relatives clustered together. It was a patriarchal community where married sons and their families lived together in the father's house, and the children played together. The Jamali house actually belonged to Fadhel's mother. The household was unusual in that Fadhel's father and mother kept separate kitchens, each holding to his or her own way. The young lad seems to have known how to get the best from both sides. Also there was "Mama" Attiya, a next door neighbor who with her sister, *Jidda* (Midwife) Kumi, frequently looked after Fadhel when his mother went to recite selections from the *Qur'an* or to give other traditional readings during *Ashura*.

The Jamali home was entered from a small entrance on the street, where a few steps led up to the courtyard off which there were three rooms. Under the courtyard was the *surdab*, the underground room which was cool in the summer heat. *Shenashil*, wooden bay windows with blinds, projected over the street in front. They caught any little breeze and offered a discreet view of comings and goings. Thick, mud-brick walls retained their coolness in summer and absorbed heat from the charcoal braziers, *munqalas*, in winter. These thick exterior and interior walls were bridged with closely spaced poles which were in turn covered with several thicknesses of mats woven from date fronds. On this was poured a thick layer of clay mud mixed with straw for binding which kept out summer heat and winter rain. If a leak occurred, it was a simple matter to pour on more mud and straw mix over the offending crack. This flat roof made for comfortable sleeping in the summer when the northerly *shemal* wind prevailed. Homes were interconnected by passages, and special dishes were shared among the houses. The Jamali family was well-known for delicious cooking. The old family house in Kadhimain was sold after the death of Sheikh Abbas. Jamali sums up his boyhood life as follows:

I can say that I opened my eyes in an old and stereotyped society, with rigid religious and superstitious practices on the one hand and good-hearted, cooperative and patriarchal kinship on the other. And until I went to school my questioning of the *status quo* was not to be dreamt of.¹⁶

Fadhel's schooling began at the Kadhimain mosque when he was seven. There the boys learned to read the *Qur'an*, to write and to do elementary arithmetic. They sat cross-legged on palm mats spread over the floor in front of the teacher, who perched on a high bench with sticks handy to beat the feet of students who misbehaved. There was even a "dungeon room with ankle shackles for pupils guilty of a great misdemeanor."¹⁷ Fadhel could not have been a model student, even if he was the son of a sheikh, for he writes that he once blew his nose on the Persian boy who sat opposite him. For

this his feet and legs were beaten until they bled. Understandably he ran away, and never returned.

A modern, private school had been established in Kadhimain by the Society of Union and Progress. This Society was founded by the "Young Turk" nationalist movement of Istanbul, and it drew many Pan-Islamist Arabs. There were military and civil officials among its members. His father belonged to this Society and was chairman of the board of its school which no doubt helped Fadhel's admission.

Fadhel entered the first grade of that school and began learning the alphabet and the opening chapter of the *Qur'an*, which was the "first reader." Nearly eight years of age then, he had "a grand time enjoying the relatively great liberty" in his new school.

His father used to visit the school and sometimes attended Fadhel's class. One day he advised his son to keep his eyes on the book when the teacher read to them. The boy unwisely told his father that it was not necessary since he found the reading easy. However, when Fadhel was called on to read that same passage, he stopped and stumbled several times. For failing to heed his advice his father gave him such a slap that Fadhel's face hit the desk and his mouth started bleeding. The boy remembered, for he says that ever since he has tried to concentrate in class and to pay attention to his teachers. Sheikh Abbas showed great interest in his son's development from the very beginning, and hard punishment was soon changed to rewards. Fadhel developed a desire to excel.

The Arabs had been under Ottoman Turkish rule from the beginning of the sixteenth century, and the "Young Turk" nationalist movement drew many like-minded Arabs. However, when they realized that the Turks really wanted to "turkify" them, they became disenchanted. In any case, the School of Union and Progress survived only one year because of financial problems.

After some hesitation over the choice between a government school called the Ottoman School and a private Persian school, Sheikh Abbas decided to put his son in the Persian

school. His reasoning was that, although the Persians were of a different nationality, they were at least Shi'is, whereas the government school was run by Sunnis. Fadhel was put in the first grade and soon picked up the Persian language. He was promoted regularly, his sense of Arab superiority fueling his natural desire to excel. As an Arab he simply could not let any Persian do better than he. He fought his way to the top even to the point of injuring his health. The weekly reassignment of seats was according to scholastic standing, and he soon was able to hold the top seat for himself most of the time.

He spent five years in this school, and was greatly influenced by the principal, Hajji Ali Akbar Arabi. Hajji Ali was a Persian-speaking Turk and an exponent of the Pan-Islamic movement. He helped his students to see their own backwardness, and he showed them how western imperialism took advantage of their ignorance, superstitions and internal dissensions. He aroused in the boys a sense of their own responsibility as future leaders to awaken the nation and save it from the danger of western rule. Under Hajji Ali's tutelage, Fadhel's horizons expanded. Sectarian ideas of Shi'i-Sunni differences began to give way to thoughts on the larger scale of Pan-Islamic unity. By this time World War I was being fought in the Middle East as well as in Europe. Baghdad was still under Turkish rule, and there was an atmosphere of hostility toward the Allies, an attitude officially encouraged by songs and drama. In this school he was also exposed to a critical attitude toward religious leaders.

The Persian school was obliged for financial reasons to lower its standards and began hiring less qualified teachers. Completing the fifth grade in 1916 at the age of thirteen, he transferred to a government school called The Model School. Instruction there was in Turkish while Arabic and French were also taught.

The war worked its hardship in Baghdad as it did everywhere, and there were food shortages. Fadhel and his schoolmates had to be content with very simple lunches of bread and dates. His two cousins, being older, were taken into the

Turkish Army, and their father, Fadhel's uncle Abdul Karim, died only a few months before Baghdad was occupied by British forces. All these events had a deep effect on Fadhel. He calls the fall of Baghdad into British hands a great catastrophe for him. He felt as if the whole Muslim world had fallen victim to a non-Muslim power. With tears he watched the British troops march into Kadhimain. For a few months the schools in the city were closed. It seemed the end of the world to the young schoolboy, but the British authorities soon opened a few elementary schools and began a short course for training much-needed teachers.

At this point he had to make career decisions. Sheikh Abbas, who had become head of the family after the death of his elder brother, would normally have been the one to whom Fadhel, his brother and their cousins looked for help. However, Sheikh Abbas agreed to support his son only if he would follow his father's steps in a religious career. Since Fadhel did not want to do this, he had to find other means of supporting himself.

His first thought was to enter the teacher training course, although at that stage he looked down on teaching. This was not easy, for he was not yet fifteen years old and therefore too young to be admitted to the Teacher Training College. The Director there, Mohammed Abdul Aziz Sa'id, was the first Egyptian he had met, and he had a lasting effect on the young man's future. Jamali expressed his appreciation in these words:

I owe much . . . to him, for he helped me continue my education, which later enabled me to get out of the medieval society in Kadhimain. (339)

After much pleading and in view of his excellent record he was accepted for the six-month session, but he had to sign an agreement not to be employed immediately after graduation. He was delighted to discover at the end of the term that he was the second student in the class, and for a time he worked in the office of the Director. Then, in spite of the agreement about employment and after persistent efforts, he

was appointed as assistant to the physical education teacher in the Kadhimain elementary school with one third the regular salary.

Fadhel, a lad of 15, was not only self-supporting, but he continued his studies. He took lessons in religion and Arabic in Kadhimain at the Khalisi Institute in the early morning, and studied English and mathematics in Baghdad in the evenings in addition to his duties at the school. His studies at the Institute were under its head, Sheikh Mohammed al-Khalisi. This extra study eventually entitled him to become a full-fledged elementary school teacher and qualified him later to be sent to the American University in Beirut.

Then again he had to choose between a religious and an educational career:

... I figured out that in five or six years I might make a *mujtahid*, the highest clerical position in the Shi'a sect, after which I might play a role as a reformer. At the same time my desire to continue the study of modern learning had never ceased, and I came to discover more and more that honesty and straight-forwardness among the clergy did not work very well. I found that young men of lower standing in the knowledge of religion and classics but with a better knowledge of how to act politically and hypocritically would surpass me. (559)

He decided to try again to enter the Teacher Training College which was now a two year course, and he was admitted to the second term of the second year. He graduated in 1920 at the top of his class. Finally at the age of seventeen he received his appointment to teach in an elementary school. In his own words he "entered a new era of self-support and independence."

His thirst for further education was still not satisfied, but there was nothing available in Baghdad, and with his meager salary it was out of the question to study abroad. By 1919 he had boldly petitioned the government either to send him abroad or to open an institution of higher learning in Baghdad. There were no half measures in this able young man.

After a year of thought the government decided to send six students to Beirut.

He was called to the Ministry of Education and told to prepare himself to accept a scholarship to the American University in Beirut, which then was known as the Syrian Protestant College. He did not tell his father this wonderful news until preparations were complete and he had signed a contract with the government. Sheikh Abbas was shocked at the idea of his son going to a Christian institution. Apart from fatherly reluctance to have his son leave home, he felt that his own social standing would be undermined. Seeing Fadhel's determination, however, Sheikh Abbas's last plea was for his son to gain the consent of the great *mujtahid*, Sheikh Mahdi al-Khalisi, whose word was taken as absolute sanction. Sheikh Mahdi refused at first. He argued that Fadhel would imbibe Christian ways and learn to accept Christian authority. Fadhel had difficulty convincing the Sheikh that his departure would be of service to Islam, but at last Sheikh Mahdi signed a *Fatwa*, a binding religious opinion, which stated that there seemed to be no danger in Fadhel going to a Christian institution with the aim of serving Islam in the future. Leaving this valuable document with his father, Fadhel left for Beirut with the other five young men late in December, 1921. They were the first educational mission Iraq had sent abroad.

Jamali's life thus spans that key sector of history from the latter days of the Ottoman Empire through the Iraqi monarchy to the bloody military coup in which he nearly lost his life. He had an early sense that there might be a bridgebuilding role in the future for which he was destined, and as a young official in the Ministry of Education he wrote, "My life history is a typical example of complete transition from one civilization into another, from one culture into a new one."¹⁸

Notes

- 1 "Sharq al-Awsat." 26 March, 1988. Article by Sheikh Jad al-Haq, Rector of al-Azhar University, about Islam's holy places. Also:

- W. Montgomery Watt. *Companion to the Qur'an*. Allen Unwin Ltd., London, 1967, p. 65.
- 2 Sarah and Fadhel Jamali. Letter to author. Tunis. 16 February, 1988.
 - 3 Jamali. Letter to author. 1 June, 1988.
 - 4 From author's notes of interview. Zurich. September, 1988.
 - 5 Moojan Momen, *Introduction to Shi'i Islam*. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1985, pp. 39 and 43.
 - 6 *Ibid.*
 - 7 British Public Record Office, Foreign Office Archives: FO-624/60.
 - 8 The King-Crane Commission, sent by Pres. Woodrow Wilson to discover the wishes of the people in the area liberated from the Turks, reported that they wanted independence now, as promised; but, if there had to be a trustee power under the Mandate system, they overwhelmingly preferred that it be the United States. At this point American isolationism overwhelmed Wilson's international idealism, and Congress refused both to join the League of Nations and to accept tutorial responsibility under its mandate system.
 - 9 British Public Records, Foreign Office Archives: FO-624/60.
 - 10 Phebe Marr. *The Modern History of Iraq*. Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1985, p. 36.
 - 11 George Antonius. *The Arab Awakening*. Khayat. Beirut, 1938. pp. 266f.
 - 12 *Ibid.*, Appendices, pp. 413ff.
 - 13 Mohammed Fadhel Jamali. "An Arab Faces the Modern World," *Asia* magazine. September, 1935, p. 556.
 - 14 Jamali. Letter of June, 1988.
 - 15 Jamali. *Asia* magazine. September, 1935, pp. 556f.
 - 16 *Ibid.*
 - 17 *Ibid.*
 - 18 *Ibid.*

2

University in Beirut and New York

From its commanding situation on the northern slope of the Ras Beirut peninsula the American University in Beirut (AUB) looks northward along the coast to Lebanon's snow-capped coastal range. The shaded campus is beautifully landscaped and runs a steep half mile down to the rocky sea coast. It was a contrast in every way from the arid flatland of Baghdad, and all six of the Iraqi students must have been thrilled at the setting. Besides Fadhel in that first student mission were Mohammed Deshti, Halim Feddu, Hassan Jawad, Muhyudin Yusuf, and Yusuf Zainal. The University had been teaching for 56 years and was accredited in America through the Board of Regents of the State of New York. It had been founded under the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions and had opened its doors with sixteen students on 3 December, 1866.

The University's aims were set forth in the words of its first President, the Reverend Dr. Daniel Bliss, on 7 December, 1871 when he laid the cornerstone of the Main Building, known as College Hall:

This College is for all conditions and classes of men without regard to color, nationality, race or religion. A man, white, black or yellow; Christian, Jew, Mohammedan or

heathen, may enter and enjoy all of the advantages of this institution for three, four or eight years; and go out believing in one God, in many Gods, or in no God. But it will be impossible for anyone to continue with us long without knowing what we believe to be the truth and our reasons for that belief.¹

The journey from Baghdad to Beirut in 1921 was an eye-opener for Fadhel after his sheltered life in the heart of the Shi'a community of Baghdad. Reliable overland links to the West across the Syrian desert to Damascus had not yet been established, and, of course, air travel was virtually unknown, so it was with a great sense of adventure that on 21 December, 1921, the six young men boarded the train to the port city of Basra. From there a steamship took them to Karachi, Bombay, Aden, Port Sa'id and Haifa. While in Port Sa'id they visited Cairo briefly before continuing to Haifa. There they boarded a narrow gauge steam train which ran on to Beirut. The six young Iraqis arrived on 29 January, 1922: the journey from the golden domes of Kadhimain to the campus towers in Beirut had taken 39 days.

The world was opening up for Fadhel and the others. On the very first day of the journey he put on western dress and shaved his beard for the first time. On the excursion from Port Sa'id to Cairo they were welcomed by the former Baghdad Teachers College Director, Mohammed Abdul Aziz, to whom Jamali owed so much. The group was duly impressed by Cairo's cultural and historical riches, and for the first time in his life Fadhel attended an Arabic theatrical production and saw an Arabic operetta. He also called on the well-known Iraqi poet, Sheikh Abdul Muhsin al-Khadhimi, a close friend of his father.

He writes that he had

left home as a vigorous, orthodox Muslim. My prayers were performed on time, and my attitude towards non-Muslims was one of abhorrence. This continued for the first two years at the AUB. I attended the required chapel with a tense feeling. Whenever the hymns were sung I either refrained from singing or I substituted Mohammed or Allah for Jesus or Lord.

Two big factors helped in changing my attitudes. The first was the Brotherhood Society, an interreligious organization, where I learned that the realm of things in which we share is vastly larger than that in which we differ; and the second was the study of science and especially zoology with its emphasis on the theory of evolution under Dr. Van Dyck, who had a most important influence on my life. Gradually I developed a spirit of tolerance, of open-mindedness and critical-mindedness. I began to look at our life at home more critically and to reexamine our social institutions.

After the study of the history of modern Europe and after the recent political developments at home, the political link of Pan-Islam which had meant so much gave way to the more modern bond of nationalism. Thus I, Fadhel, the relatively fanatic Muslim, the Pan-Islamist and the warrior, gave way to a new Fadhel who cherished the brotherhood of man, who was a pacifist and at the same time a nationalist. Great aspirations for developing Iraq in particular and the Arabic world in general began to dominate my whole life.²

The six new Iraqi students were taken in hand by President Bayard Dodge. He brought them up to the required standard by creating a special class for tutoring in English, history and algebra. That special class began work in January at the Beirut campus and continued right through the summer in the mountains in Aley. They finally entered their freshman year in September, 1922. Jamali was a joiner and took part in the activities of various clubs and campus organizations. He says, "I was trying to experience everything."³

Friendships formed in those undergraduate years were lasting. One colleague, Dr. Constantine (Costi) Zurayk, was asked in 1954 by the President of Syria, Adib Shishakly, to serve as Minister of Foreign Affairs. At that time there was instability in Syria and mistrust between Syria and Iraq. Both Jamali and Zurayk had worked to overcome this strained relationship, and so Zurayk sought his friend's advice on whether or not to accept the post. He assured Jamali that, if he accepted, Syria's policy toward Iraq would undergo a fundamental change. Jamali advised him against taking the

position, saying that it was too late, and that there was no hope of a reversal under Shishakly. Zurayk went on to become Professor of History at the AUB and a well-known writer on Arab nationalism.

Another of his classmates was Eliahu Epstein (hebraicized to Elath after 1948). Elath came to Baghdad years later to discuss with Jamali his doctoral thesis which was published under the title, "Israel, Iraq and the UN". He served as Israeli Ambassador to Great Britain, and to the United States and then became President of the Hebrew University. The late Isma'il al-Azhari, who became Prime Minister and President of Sudan, was just behind Jamali at the AUB, and they were good friends. Charles Malik of Lebanon frequently represented his country at UN meetings where he and Jamali worked in close cooperation. Shukri Shammas, another classmate and friend, went on to become co-founder of the Contracting and Trading Co. (CAT) in Beirut with the late Emil Bustani. Most of the other Iraqis in that first group went into education, except Halim Feddu who studied agriculture and was eventually put in charge of a government farm.

As the slightly senior member of the group Fadhel had been appointed to watch their behavior, and he noted that one had slipped away briefly from the group already in Basra for private reasons which Jamali certainly regarded with suspicion. All the Iraqis were fine students in Fadhel's recollection, but "Beirut didn't look after their private lives."⁴

Fadhel joined a student group led by Harry Foot, a physical education instructor, for a trip to Syria in the Easter vacation early in his university career. On the way from Beirut they stopped at Maysaloun to pay homage to the martyrs who were killed there while defending Lebanon against the French invasion. A lasting impression was made when they discovered there the grave of Emir Abdul Qadir al-Jaza'iry, the hero of Algerian nationalism whose remains were eventually transferred to his homeland after its independence was won from France in 1962. The Emir's struggle was an inspiration to the young Iraqi patriot.

The presence of French forces everywhere saddened Jamali's nationalist heart. Syria was in revolt against the French, and there was barbed wire at street junctions with French soldiers on guard, but the cities seemed calm. Travel required a pass from the French officer responsible for each district. Jamali usually acted for the group in getting the necessary permit, and he translated for Mr. Foot at public functions. They visited Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo and were generously entertained by the Syrians who were friendly to the University because of graduates they knew. The party spent a night in a Bedouin camp near Aleppo and introduced soccer football to the tribesmen, presenting them with the ball as they left.

He learned to love Syria and to feel as much at home there as he did in Iraq. He admired the Syrians' fight for freedom, and he began to understand that an Arab, beside belonging to a particular province or region, also belonged to the whole homeland extending from the Gulf to the Atlantic—a feeling not unlike that which Americans must have experienced as their allegiance to one colony expanded to include the new nation.

Two incidents in his sophomore year had great, but quite different effects. His health broke down and tuberculosis was diagnosed. He was obliged to spend a year at a sanatorium in the mountains above Beirut run by American missionaries. The woman in charge, Mrs. Hoskins, turned out to be the mother of Harold Hoskins and the aunt of John Foster Dulles. Fadhel later became a good friend of Harold Hoskins who visited him in Baghdad, and through the family he came to know Secretary of State Dulles.

While recovering in the mountains overlooking the Mediterranean he spent his idle hours enjoying books and nature and composing love poetry. A friendship developed with the head nurse, a bright Muslim girl, who soon returned his love. Her people, however, objected to her marrying a man whom she had met in a way contrary to Muslim custom. It was hard for them both to yield to tradition. However, his young heart healed quickly, and he fell in love again with a young

Christian girl from a nearby village. This was a hopeless affair from the start. The walls which then separated Muslims from Christians were too high, and that second experience ended when she married a rich relative.

Entering his third year in Beirut, he changed his course from medicine and science to education and biology. At this point he and the other Iraqis found that they had unwittingly become Lebanese citizens. Turkey and the Allies had signed the Treaty of Lausanne which stipulated that all subjects of the former Ottoman empire would become citizens of the territory in which they were located at the time of signing. They re-established their citizenship on the basis of being in Lebanon on an Iraqi government mission.

He hiked frequently in the Lebanese mountains, climbing most of the higher peaks with friends. One day he and a classmate from Iraq, Hassan Jawad, went to al-Arz (the Cedars). When they asked a villager how long it would take to reach the top, he replied, "About an hour." They started off in shirt sleeves and without food or water. After three hours of steep climbing they still had not reached the peak, and they were cold and hungry. They sucked snow to relieve their thirst, and Fadhel collapsed from exhaustion on the way down. Hassan went to a goat-herd they had noticed some distance away to get some milk, but there was nothing in which to carry it. So Hassan and the mountain lad brought an animal over to where Fadhel was lying. The goat was placed over his head and milked directly into Fadhel's mouth. He revived and was able to come down safely, a wiser young man.

In 1923, his freshman year at the AUB, he had two leaflets printed, and he carried them home where they were distributed by students in the streets of Kadhimain.

They contained a challenge to the public to take up modern education, to change its stereotyped mode of living and to educate the girls, since that is the basis of improving our lives. After two days these pamphlets were carried to the clerical circles. The opinion was that I had grown into a heretic; this opinion began to spread rapidly

among the masses, and I was cautioned to leave the country soon in order to avoid the possibility of danger to my life. I ran back to my college, and through a long series of letters the matter was straightened out.⁵

After graduation in 1927, he had his first experience of travel in the West. He was delegated to represent AUB students at the International Students Service Conference in Switzerland. Travel was tightly budgeted, and he was given only 35 pounds sterling for his expenses, to which he added 15 pounds out of his own pocket.

By the time he arrived in Venice on his way home he had very little money left. Thinking he had to go to Trieste to catch his ship, he went to the Thomas Cook travel agency in Venice where he discovered he could not afford the extra travel. However, the Cook's agent told him that his ship was in fact stopping at Venice, and so he was able for three Iraqi dinars (pounds) to buy a steerage passage and have enough left over for a few provisions for the voyage.⁶ While waiting he met a party of Americans at St. Mark's Cathedral, and when the ship sailed he discovered that his new friends were aboard, but in first class. They were delighted to see him and rented a deck chair for him so they could be together.

One day on deck his friends, who were unaware that he was a Muslim, spoke critically about Islam. They made what Jamali calls "some ordinary missionary attacks on Islam and about the Prophet Mohammad." Later, when they discovered he was a Muslim, Jamali had a chance to explain to them, and they apologized. His reply was that it was not their fault, since that was what they had been told.

For his meals he went below to the galley and bought food from a friendly cook. With these economies he returned to Beirut with new friends and two dinars still in his pocket. At the University he picked up his accumulated government stipend and was able to go on home to Baghdad. This first travel experience outside the Middle East further expanded his horizons and helped to confirm his ideals.

Changing his major subject to education as he began his junior year proved wise, for as soon as he had received his BA

he was appointed to the Teachers Training College in Baghdad. He rented a home on Abu Nawas Street on the bank of the Tigris in the Bustan Kubba quarter from where he enjoyed rowing on the river with friends. At the College he conducted courses in education and psychology and occasionally worked on the Ministry of Education's textbook and curriculum committee. While he was on summer vacation in Lebanon the Education Ministry asked him to help in selecting Lebanese teachers to teach in Iraqi schools.

Sati' al-Husri, a formative personality in Iraq education, was a strong influence on Jamali at this time. The young Beirut graduate helped al-Husri with his monthly magazine, writing and translating articles.⁷ Along with these duties Jamali also supervised the studies of Crown Prince Ghazi who later succeeded his father, King Feisal I. From 1927-1929 he found himself in the unusual position of teaching his own younger brother, Abdur Rasoul, then studying in the Teachers College. Abdur Rasoul later became an Inspector of Education.

With recommendations from President Dodge of the AUB and from Lionel Smith, Advisor to the Iraq Ministry of Education, Jamali was granted a Macy Fellowship by the International Institute of Teachers College in New York. This gave a stipend of \$1000 a year, and so Fadhel was able to go to New York and work for his Ph.D. in education at Columbia University. Dr. Paul Monroe, a prominent member of the Teachers College faculty, was President of the Institute and became Jamali's faculty adviser. As a result of his association with Prof. Monroe, Jamali moved beyond the elitist philosophy of Sati' al-Husri to a more democratic view. As he was about to leave Baghdad for New York, Rustum Haidar, King Feisal's Secretary and Chief of the Royal *Diwan*, asked him to give his full time to teaching Crown Prince Ghazi; but the appointment to Columbia had come through, his mind was made up, and he traveled to New York in 1929.

He took the opportunity to visit several European countries on the way and attended two education conferences, one

in Geneva, Switzerland, and the other at Elsinore in Denmark. Writing in a 1935 article he notes,

The changes in my ideas from the time I left the Near East until I returned as an Iraqi government Attaché to the Monroe Commission of Educational Enquiry and later became Supervisor-General and then Director-General of Education in Iraq . . . were immense.⁸

Even today, suddenly to be transported from Baghdad on the Tigris to New York on the Hudson is a quantum leap; it was much more so in 1929 when Jamali began his studies at Columbia. This son of an Iraqi Shi'i Sheikh was already becoming a world citizen, but he never lost his affection and concern for his homeland.

His doctoral dissertation was entitled, "The New Iraq: Its Problem of Bedouin Education." It is a forward-looking document in which his Pan-Arab views become apparent as he discusses one of his aims for tribal education: "broader civic loyalty." In concluding his dissertation, Jamali says,

The fact that the civic loyalty of the Bedouin does not extend beyond his own tribe and even his own section of the tribe has been referred to. It has been shown that the tribes are actually analogous to nations which have their own prejudices and rancor toward each other.

One of the fundamental objectives of education should be to broaden civic loyalty. This loyalty should not be concentrated on Iraq only. All the Arabic countries should receive an equal share. The tribes should be taught the importance of bringing into existence that Arab federation which is the hope and goal of intelligent Arab leaders throughout the world.

Nationalism is, of course, a tool that may be used for good or for evil. Among the tribes, education must develop that nationalism which cherishes more and more cordiality and friendship toward minority factions and neighboring nations. This seems to us to be the easiest of all educational tasks, for the Arab is known to be a "good mixer," and racial prejudice, in the Western sense, is practically unknown.⁹

Jamali's own faith appears in the emphasis he puts on "The development of the religious life" in his dissertation. He wrote:

No educational scheme can succeed which does not take cognizance of the religious life of the people. It should be one of the fundamental objectives of education to make religion a dynamic force in the development of the people rather than an agency toward dissension, fanaticism and superstition Citizens of the same country, whether they be Moslems, Christians, Jews, Sabiites or Baha'is, should learn to live together in peace and harmony, each respecting the others' creeds while following his own.

He was ahead of his time, or certainly in the vanguard, in his advocacy of women's rights. He claimed that "it should be one of the main objectives of education to raise the status of women and give them the emancipation which is their right."

He was also a pioneer in the area of land reform. He put forward the idea of "A model village as an educational means" and pointed out that Iraq had tremendous opportunities in the vast tracts of government land to be developed and the large numbers of people wanting to settle. He asked:

Why not induce one of the tribes tending toward settlement to build a model village with its homes properly designed, its health conditions well attended to, its agricultural methods the best that are suitable to local needs, and its economic and civic life complying with the best social order desired for all the tribes? Once such a village is established and proved to be successful, it may be used as a great educational agency to which tribal bodies may be brought for visitation and according to which all rural life in Iraq may eventually be reconstructed.¹⁰

It was over two decades later that Gamal Abdul Nasser's revolution in Egypt abolished the feudal structure under which the land-owning *pasha* served as the *seigneur* upon whose sense of *noblesse oblige* the peasant farmers depended for life and security. Nasser's Social Council, under the lead of men like Dr. Abdoh Salam and Fouad Galal, had the vision to replace the *pasha* by creating village centers with mosque, medical, social, educational and agricultural services which were remarkably similar to those suggested by Jamali in his dissertation.

He relished life in Columbia's International House where there were students from 68 countries, and he was soon elected head of its Student Association. Among the Arab students were Habib Kurani, Emil Dumit, Emet Said, Helen Hawi, Michel Haddad and Rafiq Asha. The youngest member was Abdel Majid Shuman of Lebanon. But friendships were also formed with students from many other countries.

At the Saturday night dances since he could not dance, he stood and watched. One night a girl came over to him and asked, "Why aren't you dancing? What's the matter?" He said, "I don't know how." She replied, "Come let's dance!"

He says, recalling the incident,

This was long before I was married! So—I took her and began to rush up and down the floor, jouncing up and down. She asked me, "What is this dance?" and I said, "Here you dance the Fox Trot, but I am doing the Camel Trot!" After that the girls came to me at those dances and wanted me to teach them the Camel Trot. Years later an English lady danced with me at the Alawiya Club in Baghdad. She was asked, "How do you like dancing with Dr. Jamali?" Her reply was, "It's as strenuous as a tennis game."¹¹

Just as the "Brotherhood Society" and other student associations at the AUB had affected his attitudes and thinking, so the years at Columbia served still further to broaden his views and to teach tolerance and understanding. Among lasting friendships formed was that with an Egyptian educator, Dr. Amir Buqtor, who became Professor of Education at the American University of Cairo, and Editor of the magazine, *Et-Tarbiya al-Haditha* (Modern Education).

Jamali was President of the Arab Student Association at International House. He was also nominated to represent the students on the Board of Directors for International House, of which the founder, John D. Rockefeller, was Chairman. At a Christmas party given by Rockefeller at his home each student was given a wallet. Some opened their gifts immediately and looked to see whether there was any money in it. Rockefeller noticed their curiosity and remarked, "I gave it to you

empty so that you will work to fill it!" The emphasis was on the word "work."¹² Years later, when Jamali as Minister of Foreign Affairs was leading his delegation to the UN General Assembly in New York, he was guest of honor at a Sunday dinner given by David Rockefeller. His host asked him what preparation he had for his present position. Jamali's reply was, "None whatsoever, except for my life at International House."¹³

After receiving his doctorate from Teachers College in 1932 he was again appointed to the Ministry of Education and travelled to various Arab countries in search of textbooks and curricula. On such missions his AUB and Columbia friendships provided an invaluable basis of contact and trust. One particular friendship was formed with a young candidate for a master's degree in literature at the University of Chicago where Fadhel took summer courses, Miss Sarah Powell. Sarah, an American girl from a well-known Minneapolis family, had been born while her family were in Weyburn, Saskatchewan, in Canada but had kept her American citizenship. She and her four brothers lived in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area of Minnesota. One of them was President of the Federal Reserve Bank there. She had received her BA from the University of Minnesota in Minneapolis and was finishing her work for an MA in English at the University of Chicago. Fadhel was taking summer courses there, and they met at a tea given by the Cosmopolitan Club in Ida Noyes Hall, the student union building.

Friendship developed into something more, although Sarah perhaps loomed larger in Fadhel's mind than he did at that point in hers. In any case when the Cosmopolitan Club sponsored a picnic in the dunes beside Lake Michigan Fadhel watched as the list of those signing up for the picnic grew. When he saw "Sarah Powell" inscribed, he quickly added "Fadhel Jamali," and so they were at the outing together. Sarah says, "I only remember someone with a lot of "ali's" in his name."

After that Fadhel began coming to the Library to walk me home, and there was a dear old flat-footed biddy in charge of the rare books. In a very motherly way she

advised me to have nothing to do with that young man—to no effect! We used to go for walks, to organ concerts in the chapel, and then he went back to Teachers College, Columbia.¹⁴

Sarah got her Master of Arts degree in English from Chicago and went on to Columbia Teachers College where she earned her second MA in Educational Guidance Counseling. She felt that Chicago was not for her since they seemed to feel that “anything after Shakespeare was not really literature.” The dunes picnic in Chicago must have made some further impression, because Fadhel recalls that during the next academic year in Columbia they saw a good deal of each other. He enjoyed meals that she prepared in her apartment, and they took part together in activities at International House.

After receiving her Master’s degree from Columbia in 1931 Sarah accepted a teaching post in Prospect Park, Pennsylvania, near Philadelphia. On one of Fadhel’s visits there they went to the University Museum to see artifacts from Ur of the Chaldees, situated not far from Iraq’s port city of Basra. They wanted to get married, but Fadhel felt he must return to Iraq and serve his country.

The Educational Survey Commission to which his Ministry had appointed him was headed by his mentor, Dr. Paul Monroe, and Fadhel traveled back to Baghdad with them, sightseeing in Marseilles and Naples.¹⁵ The group also stopped in Egypt where Jamali spoke to a Cairo University Student Assembly on the educational situation in Iraq, underlining the need for education to serve the rural and tribal sections of the population which were the majority in the country. He insisted that education should prepare them for a richer and more productive life. His words had an enthusiastic reception. Once they had arrived in Iraq, it took Dr. Monroe and the Commission about three months to complete their survey of the education system.

Although he completed the work for his doctorate in 1932 including his dissertation on Bedouin education, he did not have the money to print the required number of copies for deposit with the Library before the actual diploma could be

awarded. When his mother discovered this, she took from under the mattress thirty gold Ottoman lira she had saved to help him build a house and gave them as an advance wedding present. With that gift the printing was done, and the required copies were deposited. With all requirements now met he received his diploma as Doctor of Philosophy in Education in 1934.

Soon after Fadhel's return Sarah had a letter from him asking if she would like to come to Baghdad to teach in the Women's Teacher Training College. He wisely felt that they should be sure she knew what she was getting into before they thought seriously of marriage. He consulted his friend, Abdul Hussein Chelabi, the Minister of Education, about the possibility of a position for Sarah to teach. The Minister agreed, and a post was arranged with suitable lodging in the Home Economics School. Sarah and the Headmistress, Miss Beuna Hickson, each had a room and shared the services of a Persian servant woman. Sarah recalls:

Life was very pleasant. I could come and go to school and the market and shop with friends in the *arabanas*, the carriages that served as taxis. There was quite a number of teachers from Lebanon and Jordan. People were accustomed to seeing teachers coming and going. We visited homes; we went on hikes; we went on picnics, but we could not go to hotels. Some of my teacher friends taught me Arabic. So, after a year I found I liked Baghdad.¹⁶

Sarah's parents were not in favor of the marriage. Her father said he would rather see his daughter married to a Muslim Arab than have her go to Hollywood. Her mother was concerned, not surprisingly, about her going so far away. She wrote to a well-known missionary who replied, "I'd rather see my daughter dead and buried than married to a Muslim." Mrs. Powell then turned to another missionary who lived in Baghdad to ask about their proposed marriage. She replied that she had met Fadhel Jamali and that he seemed an upright young man. Sarah notes: "This annoyed

my Mother, who asked, 'What kind of a missionary is that?'" Sarah says,

My parents warned me against marrying, but there were no threats or crises. My father was neutral, but my mother did everything to point out the dangers, which was nothing against her. It was quite right for a mother to do that.¹⁷

After four months the young couple had made up their minds, and at a New Year's Eve party at the end of 1932 Fadhel and Sarah formally announced their engagement. Six and a half months later, on 11 July, 1933, they were married, and Sarah's parents sent out their announcement:

Mr. and Mrs. Harvey Oliver Powell
announce the marriage of their daughter
Sarah Hayden
to
Dr. Mohammed Fadhel Jamali
on Tuesday, July the eleventh,
nineteen hundred and thirty-three
at Baghdad, Iraq

The marriage formalities were traditional with friends, men and women, invited to the home of their good friend, Abdul Karim al-Uzri, who later was Minister of Finance in the Jamali government. Sheikh Ali Sharqi, President of the Shi'a High Court in Baghdad and a poet of some renown, was Fadhel's agent, and Fadhel's father, Sheikh Abbas, acted on Sarah's behalf. His participation was a touching gesture in view of his earlier concern about Fadhel's going to Beirut for a Western education.

The bride and groom were asked separately by their respective agents if they agreed to marry. The answers were affirmative, the agents announced their agreement to the company, and sherbet (a sweet drink) was served. The celebration of the marriage was modern. A small party of men and women dined together at the Tigris Palace Hotel, after which Fadhel and Sarah made their home in his rented house overlooking the Tigris on Abu Nawas Street, Bustan Kubba, Baghdad.¹⁸

Since Fadhel belonged to the Shi'a community, he went to register the marriage at the Shi'a religious court in Baghdad. The *qadhi* or religious judge was a follower of the great Shi'a *mujtahid*, Sayid Abul Hassan al-Isfahani, who permitted Muslims to marry Christians only by temporary marriage, or *muta* as it is known in Arabic. This Fadhel refused to do, and so he went to the Sunni court, which was more open in its views, and registered the marriage and himself, therefore, as a Sunni of the Shafi'i branch.¹⁹

Jamali writes,

This registration was a formal act and had nothing to do with my personal religious tenets. I am a believer in universal Islam, and I respect all leaders of Muslim schools of theology. I shun denominational quarrels and squabbles, so I cannot be called Sunni or Shi'a. I am purely and simply a Muslim.²⁰

The newlyweds carried on their work, Sarah teaching at the Women's Teacher Training College and Fadhel continuing his responsibilities as an official at the Ministry.

In 1935 their first child, Laith, was born, and so according to Arab custom Fadhel is known to his friends and family as "Abu Laith" — father of Laith. Their second son, Usameh, was born in 1936 while the family were in Broumana in Lebanon, one year after Laith. Three years later in the summer Sarah took Laith and Usameh to visit her parents who were then living in Regina, Saskatchewan, in Canada near her birthplace. The *Leader-Post* of Regina dated 24 July, 1939, writes of how fascinated the brothers, aged three and four, were with real working tractors. The paper also reports that Laith had a pet gazelle at home, that he was coaxing his parents to get him a mongoose, and that seeing the fireflies in the eastern states, swimming in lakes, riding street cars and going up elevators had delighted the lads.

After their return to Baghdad late in 1939, both Laith and Usameh, his younger brother, contracted measles. With Laith there was the complication of encephalitis. His brain development was arrested, and as the years went on Fadhel and Sarah had to find a place where the needed care could be

given. They eventually made a satisfactory arrangement through friends in Scotland for a place near Edinburgh. This sadness has given them great compassion for others who have mentally handicapped children.

Sarah writes:

My first experience with mental retardation came when my eldest son suffered from encephalitis (virus infection of the brain) following measles . . . the year was 1940 It became apparent as time went on that his brain was damaged, and that ordinary school was out of the question for him. What could I do? Employ a private teacher? No one wanted to work in a private house. Too menial. Put him in a special school? None existed. Establish a school for him? People said, "That's up to the government." The government said, "Our first duty is to normal children."

I struggled with the situation, but could find no way out of it. One day an American missionary had lunch with us, and I told him about my misery and frustration. He said, "You will find a way in God's own time." This seemed to calm my spirit, and I settled down to wait.

When my son was ten years old I was able to take him to Scotland put him in a Rudolf Steiner school where he was happy and well looked after. I longed to have my son back with me in Baghdad, and I still hoped to start a school for mentally retarded children. Eventually all the necessary elements (for such a school) fell into place.²¹

That first school was named the Ramzi School after the first child to be enrolled. Many schools for the mentally handicapped followed. In 1962 when the Jamalis moved to Tunisia, Sarah, nothing daunted, began again. Today there are forty centers for the mentally retarded there.

After receiving his BA at the AUB, Usameh got his MBA at Columbia and then a Ph.D. in International Economics from the Fletcher School of International Law and Diplomacy. Usameh, his wife Meysoum and their two daughters lived until the Gulf War in Kuwait where he worked with the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC).

The third son, Abbas, named for his paternal grandfather, was born in Baghdad in 1943. He studied agriculture at the AUB and earned his Ph.D. in plant physiology in America. He lives in Algiers with his wife and four children and teaches there at the University.

Notes

- 1 Douglas Rugh (editor). *The Voice of Daniel Bliss*. American Press. Beirut, 1965, facing p. 1.
- 2 Jamali. *Asia magazine*. September, 1935, p. 60.
- 3 Jamali. Author's notes from interview. Zurich. 1 September, 1988.
- 4 Jamali. Taped interview. Zurich. 31 August, 1988.
- 5 Jamali. *Asia magazine*. September, 1935, p. 56.
- 6 Jamali. Taped Interview. Zurich. 4 September, 1986.
- 7 Jamali. Interview by author. Zurich. 3 September, 1988.
- 8 Jamali. *Asia magazine*. September, 1935, p. 56.
- 9 Jamali. *The New Iraq: Its Problem of Bedouin Education*. Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, New York, 1934, pp. 108ff.
- 10 *ibid.*, p. 118.
- 11 Jamali. Interview taped by author. Zurich. 3 September, 1988.
- 12 Jamali. Interview taped by author. Zurich. 31 August, 1988.
- 13 The Jamalis. Letter to author. June, 1988.
- 14 Sarah P. Jamali. Interview taped by author. Zurich. 31 August, 1988.
- 15 *Educational Survey Report*. Educational Survey Commission, Iraq Government Press, 1932.
The Commission was composed of Professor Paul Monroe of Teachers College, Columbia University, Professor Chandler Bagley, also of Teachers College, Professor Edgar Knight of the University of North Carolina, Dr. M. F. Jamali, Iraq Government attaché to the Commission, and Jeannette Monroe, secretary.
- 16 Sarah P. Jamali. Interview taped by author. Zurich. 31 August, 1988.
- 17 The Jamalis. Letter to author. June, 1988.
- 18 Jamali. Letter to author. Tunis. 16 February, 1988.
- 19 *Ibid.*; also Jamali. Letter to author. Tunis. 1 June, 1988.
- 20 *Ibid.*
- 21 Sarah P. Jamali. Interview taped by author. Zurich. 31 August, 1988.

3

Educator

By 1942 Jamali had become Director General of Education. It was a formative period for the fledgling nation, and his influence was lasting. In spite of Iraq's admission to the League of Nations on 3 October, 1932, her supposedly independent course was very much directed by Britain. Some cabinet ministers still had British advisors, as did some directors general. The British ran the port of Basra and the railways. They monopolized the export of dates of which Iraq produced more than any other country.

Textbooks for the English language were those recommended by the British, although when Jamali joined the Ministry most of the English teachers were either Egyptian or Indian. He proposed having British instructors to teach their own language. In an amusing footnote to this recommendation he suggests they be Scots for three reasons: 1. The Scots mix better – they are more sociable. 2. The Scots have well-trained teachers. 3. The Scots enunciate more clearly than the English teacher who puts his pipe in his mouth so you cannot understand him.¹

In the summer of 1932 Dr. Sami Shawket, then Director General of Education, and Dr. Jamali, Supervisor General, went to Syria and Lebanon to hire teachers. As it happened,

the majority of teachers they engaged were Lebanese. At a luncheon given for them at the Iraqi Consulate in Damascus Jamali was seated between Dr. Abdur Rahman Shabandar, a graduate of the AUB and a prominent spokesman for Arab nationalism, and Ma'arouf Arnawut, a well-known author and journalist. During the conversation Ma'arouf Arnawut asked, "What has Syria done against you?" Jamali replied, "Nothing at all. On the contrary."

"But why, then, do you avoid employing Syrian teachers and pick only Maronites from Lebanon?"

Jamali retorted, "We have never differentiated between Syrian and Lebanese candidates, nor between Muslims and Christians in choosing teachers. Our choice depends solely on academic and professional qualifications."

Nevertheless, a telegram was sent to King Feisal complaining that Shawket and Jamali were biased in their selection of teachers and that they favored Lebanese and Christians. This incident underlined for Jamali the sectarian and political differences between Syria and Lebanon, and it later helped him understand why the Lebanese are so jealous of their own independence and why they fear any Syrian encroachment that might result from a Syria-Iraq federation. (12f)

When Rashid Ali al-Gailani was Prime Minister in 1933, Jamali submitted a proposal for an élite school in which English would be the language of instruction. It was to be a school, not necessarily for those from prominent families, but for students chosen purely on the basis of scholastic ability. Reeva Simon notes that Jamali,

the Shi'a Director General of Education, ordained that all student communal identification be removed from school records and that no sectarian propoganda be practiced in the schools.²

He proposed that the top five students from each of the *Liwas* (provinces) be selected for admission. Rashid Ali approved the innovation, and an English headmaster was appointed. The British advisor disapproved of the school,

called King Feisal I College, and it was abolished after he insisted that Nuri get Jamali out of Education in 1941.³

Another change Jamali made in the interest of social justice was to order that all talented students, whether graduating from a secondary school or from the Teacher Training College, should have the opportunity to go abroad for university study. Previously students from poor families had gone to the Teacher Training College and children of the well-to-do attended secondary schools. Making overseas scholarships available to Training College students as well as to secondary school students opened new possibilities for people from poor backgrounds and did much to equalize educational opportunities.

When King Feisal went to Europe in the summer of 1933 at the invitation of the French government, he intended to press his hosts for Syrian independence. He had been asked to do this by Syrian students and political leaders. The President of the Syrian Parliament, Subhi Barakat, awaited him in Paris, but Feisal's untimely death en route in Bern, Switzerland, on 8 September, 1933, made the expected discussions impossible.

Feisal was succeeded by his son, Ghazi, who was killed in 1939 in a motoring accident. Ghazi's son, Feisal II, at age six became King, with Queen Mother Alia's brother, Crown Prince Abdulillah, as Regent. Always loyal to the throne, Jamali continued efforts for Syrian independence and eventual confederation with Iraq as a nucleus of the Arab unity so close to his heart.

There were, in spite of contrary allegations, Syrian teachers employed in Iraq. One was Dr. Farid Zainuddin, who later served as Chief of Mission at the United Nations. Some Syrian teachers joined a nationalist club, the Muthenna, formed in 1934 with Jamali as a founder. One Syrian member was the noted poet, Badawi al-Jabal. He composed and recited at the Club a verse which went like this in translation: "There is no frontier between Iraq and Sham (Syria): May Allah demolish the frontiers which 'they' erected!" (The "they" referred to the participants at the

Versailles Treaty Conference.) Jamali comments, "The echo of this verse rang in the ears and hearts of all Arab nationalists all the time, and I was no exception." (13)

During his years in the Ministry of Education many students were brought to Baghdad for teacher training and for the Army Officers School. He noted that the Iranian government had schools in Kadhimain, Kerbala, Baghdad and Nejef, while Iraq had none in Iran. He told Teheran that, although Iran had no right to have schools in Iraq, such schools would be acceptable if they would reciprocate and let Iraq have schools in Iran. Teheran agreed and Iraqi schools were opened in Ahwaz, Abadan, Khoramshahr and Teheran.⁴

In the years before World War II Arab resentment was strong against British domination. The British, however, considered their influence to be a continuation of their tutorial responsibility under the League of Nations mandate, which had legally ended in 1933 when Iraq became a member of the League of Nations. Resentment was further inflamed by the breaking of Britain's promises to the Arabs of Palestine. Here British assurances of independence for the Arabs in the McMahon correspondence conflicted with the secret Anglo-French Sykes-Picot Treaty as well as with portions of the better-publicized Balfour Declaration of 2 November, 1917.

Distressed by such duplicity, some Arabs accepted the dangerous philosophy that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend," and gave their support to the Axis. Iraq was, like other Middle East countries, torn between the two sides. It is in this context that one must view British allegations made against Jamali in 1942. In spite of the efforts of US Minister Loy Henderson and Col. Hoskins, the mud once thrown tended to cling. (See Chapter 4)

Hajji Amin al-Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem, was one whose resentment toward the British did indeed lead him to public association with Hitler in Berlin. Obligated by the British to leave Palestine, the Mufti stayed in Beirut until Britain and France declared war on Germany on 3 September, 1939.

After bribing a police official, on 13 October, 1939, he fled to Baghdad dressed as a woman.⁵

Because of the Mufti's high religious office protocol demanded that he be welcomed in Iraq as an honored guest, and indeed many Iraqis regarded him as heir to Feisal I because of his leadership of the new Arab revolt. He was therefore entertained at official banquets, offered accommodation and given a subsidy. (271) But the Mufti's presence was nonetheless an embarrassment to the Prime Minister, Nuri es-Sa'id, whose friendship for Britain was well known.⁶ Axis subsidies to the Mufti also began while he was in Baghdad. This was at a time when the British, early in 1940, were executing Palestinian Arab "rebels."⁷ Although the Mufti had been appointed to his position as a religious judge by the British in 1921 after he had promised to work with their government in Palestine, he nevertheless led what amounted to an underground movement for independence, and he envisioned an eventual Pan-Arab, Pan-Muslim state of which Palestine would be part.

The men in Baghdad who gathered with the Mufti discussed the possibilities of further Arab-Nazi collaboration.⁸ Rashid Ali al-Gailani, the former prime minister, was one of this group, and he eventually led the ill-fated revolt against the government in the spring of 1941. Dr. Amin Ruwayha was honorary physician to the German Legation in Baghdad and the link between Herr Gruber, who represented the Nazi government, and Iraqi leaders.⁹ Iraq by that time was allied with Britain. The new nation, less than ten years old, thus had to contend, not only with the domestic problems of education, development and the creation of a national personality, but also with the maelstrom of events that spun off into the Middle East from World War II.

The Revolution in 1941 was led by four colonels who installed Rashid Ali al-Gailani as Prime Minister.¹⁰ The expected German help did not arrive, and the rebellion ended after British-led troops from Transjordan and Palestine entered Baghdad on 29 May and Gurkha troops landed in Basra. Rashid Ali fled the country via Iran and Turkey to

Berlin. After the war he took refuge in France, Lebanon and Syria, and finally in Sa'udi Arabia where he invoked the time-honored tribal tradition of asylum (*dakheel*). So strong was this Bedouin custom that the Sa'udis refused an Iraqi appeal for extradition, a refusal which was also compatible with the traditional Hashemite-Sa'udi rivalry over the sovereignty of the Hijaz. (315f) Following the accession of King Sa'ud to the throne and his visit to Baghdad in 1953 to celebrate the coronation of Feisal II, Rashid Ali became dissatisfied with the financial treatment accorded him in Ryadh and went to live in Cairo. After the Iraq Revolution of 1958, however, he moved back to Baghdad where he spent the remainder of his days, eventually in prison for his opposition to Qasim. His departure from Ryadh removed one obstacle to trust between the Sa'udis and Iraq. (323)

To put the Rashid Ali revolt of 1941 in perspective it must be noted that Rashid Ali was no unknown conspirator: he was a respected former prime minister from a distinguished family. Prior to the revolt he had served as Chief of the Royal *Diwan*. Nuri es-Sa'id, also a man of strong nationalist credentials, was a realist. He understood that emerging countries like Iraq could not stay neutral in global conflicts, and he therefore aligned himself and Iraq with Britain. Rashid Ali, equally a patriot, reasoned that it was in Iraq's interest to go along with the Axis: the Germans were, after all, at the gates of the Middle East in Egypt, in Greece and in the Caucasus. The US was not yet fighting. Rashid Ali and his group picked the loser in that war, and Nuri picked the winner. That choice eventually cost Nuri a terrible death at the hands of an angry mob in 1958. Rashid Ali died in Baghdad of natural causes, a bitter and disillusioned man. These were painful choices, and none were lightly made.

Philip Mattar remarks in this connection,

By focusing on alleged Arab-Nazi ideological "affinity" writers have misrepresented the central goal of Arab nationalist cooperation with the Axis: the defeat of a common enemy—the basis for the American and British alliance with Communist Russia during the war.

The leaders of the Revolt were Arab nationalists, patriots who shared the sentiment of one of the four colonels, Salah as-Sabbagh (one of the leaders of an earlier coup attempt): "I do not believe in the democracy of the English, nor in the Nazism of the Germans, nor in the Bolshevism of the Russians. I am an Arab Muslim."¹¹

Later other third world nations found themselves in a similar dilemma. Jamali tried to work out a third way, for which he paid a high price in 1958. This was because he took a strong anti-communist stance, although he was equally severe in his criticism of the West. For Arab patriots the enemy was not free enterprise, nor Nazism nor Communism: these were problems for the West. Zionism was and is, in the Arab view, the immediate evil. For any Arab patriot Zionism is simply a new expression of Western imperialism. With World War II raging the Arabs felt compelled to choose sides in their own nationalist context. Nuri and Jamali and many others chose the West. Some, like Nasser, were at first pro-West, but then became disillusioned and turned to communism for the help they felt the West had denied them. The decision Jamali took in this painful dilemma nearly cost him his life in the Revolution of 1958.

Archibald Roosevelt, former Assistant Military Attaché in Baghdad and more recently an Arabist with the CIA, makes relevant comment on this Arab dilemma:

During the period of 1956-1958 we (in the CIA) tried, most unsuccessfully, to stem the course of nationalism in the Arab world . . .

Our policy makers constantly confused the sources of this conflagration with communism, with the machinations of the Soviets, who were indeed trying to exploit the forces unleashed by Nasser. But they never gained control of them.

The distinction between communists and the nationalist extremists has not always been understood by the "wise men" of Washington.¹²

Jamali had introduced the teaching of both German and French to the school system, and he had hired a German, Dr. Huber, to teach that subject. English, as the language of the

tutorial power, was already being taught. His introduction of German language study was viewed with concern by the British educational advisors. After the 1941 coup attempt, the British controlled the schools and took out all foreign languages other than English. They removed mention of Germany, Japan, and Italy from textbooks. With World War II raging in Europe British authorities had naturally viewed with misgiving Jamali's earlier innovations.

All this compounded a false impression already created by a case of mistaken identity. An Iraq Army Colonel named Mahmud Fadhil Janabi was responsible for para-military training modelled on Hitler's *Jugend*. He had taken a group of students to Germany to attend the Olympic games. At the same time Dr. Mohammad Fadhel Jamali had been deputized by the Ministry of Education for a solo mission to settle difficulties between Iraqi students and their Legation in Berlin. Following the successful mediation of the problem he toured Europe in search of textbooks and to study curricula. Colonel Janabi, meantime, was photographed shaking hands with Hitler, and the picture appeared in the press. Unfortunately the Iraqi in the picture was mistakenly identified as "Jamali" who was perhaps better known.

The rumors were repeated a few years later in the Israeli paper, *Ha'aretz*, dated 2 March, 1946 while Jamali was giving evidence before the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine at the Mena House meetings in Cairo, Egypt. This article compounded inaccuracy by alleging falsely that Mrs. Jamali was German, that Fadhel was educated in Britain and the USA and that he had ordered Hitler's picture hung in Iraqi schools.¹³

A British Intelligence Summary in which such suspicions and allegations were gathered was sent in December, 1942, to the American Legation.¹⁴ Later that same month Lt. Colonel Harold B. Hoskins came to Baghdad on a mission for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A "Strictly Confidential" communication from T. M. Wilson of the US Legation in Baghdad, #123 dated 23 December, 1942, reports that Hoskins made several unaccompanied visits to talk with Dr. Jamali, that he had been

favorably impressed and that Col. Hoskins, "was not at all inclined to accept without question the British claims that Dr. Jamali is pro-Nazi."¹⁵

Wilson was obviously unaware that Hoskins and Jamali had been friends since AUB days, when Hoskins' mother had nursed Jamali through his tuberculosis (See Chapter 2). The confusion remained nonetheless until US Minister Loy Henderson saw to it that the record was set straight.¹⁶

Mr. Henderson, who arrived at his post in 1942, immediately invited Jamali for tea. He had done his homework, which presumably included reading Col. Hoskins's report as well as the British allegations, and was evidently certain that the allegations were quite unwarranted. Jamali says that Henderson eventually got the correct facts to the British Embassy where they were accepted, and the record thus was set straight.¹⁷

Soon after the Rashid Ali coup Jamali was sent to Egypt to recruit 400 men and women teachers for Iraq's schools and colleges. He spent two months at that task and also gave lectures at the University of Cairo and to the Teachers Association. He had an instructive visit in al-Azhar University where he met with His Eminence, Sheikh Mustapha al-Maraghi, the Sheikh (Rector) of al-Azhar. Jamali writes,

We discussed the condition of Islamic education and the need for achieving Islamic revival and unity through Muslim education. Sheikh Mustapha was an enlightened and progressive religious leader. He told me about his plan to introduce the Shi'ite school of theology into al-Azhar, in addition to the four schools of Sunni theology, so that Islamic unity might be preserved and the separation between Shi'i and Sunni Muslims could be overcome. This I felt might be a great progressive step in Islamic learning. (343)

On his return to Egypt the next year he dealt with Dr. Taha Hussein, the Cultural Counsellor in the Ministry of Education and an international figure. Jamali credits him for the success of their negotiations which produced the first Educational and Cultural Treaty between Egypt and Iraq. (343)

During his ten years in the Education Ministry Jamali sent hundreds of young people abroad for university study, offering others the opportunity that had been given to him. Many of those scholars rose to responsible positions in government and private spheres.

Notes

- 1 Jamali. Interview notes by author. Zurich. 31 August, 1988.
- 2 Reeva S. Simon. *Iraq Between the Two World Wars: the Creation and Implementation of a Nationalist Ideology*. Columbia University Press, New York, 1986, p. 65.
- 3 Jamali. Interview taped by author. Zurich. 3 September, 1988.
- 4 Jamali. Taped interview. Zurich. 2 September, 1988.
- 5 George E. Kirk. *A Short History of the Middle East*. University Paperback, Methuen, London, 1956, p. 187; and Philip Mattar. *The Mufti of Jerusalem*. Columbia University Press, New York, 1988, p. 89.
- 6 Philip Mattar. *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 6, Number 4, pp. 268-270.
- 7 *Ibid.*, p. 277.
- 8 Majid Khaduri. *Independent Iraq: 1932-1958*. Oxford University Press, London, 1960, p. 164.
- 9 *Ibid.*, p. 165.
- 10 Jamali wrote from his home in Tunis on 10 November, 1990, "When Gailani plotted against Abdul Karim Qassim, the leader of the 1958 Revolution, he was arrested, brought to trial before the Military Tribunal, condemned to death and brought to our unit in the prison in Baghdad. There we became friends. He confided to me that he was not a Nazi, but that he was forced into it (the 1941 revolt of which he was the figurehead).
- 11 Mattar. *loc. cit.*, p. 276.
- 12 Archibald B. Roosevelt. *For the Lust of Knowing: Memoirs of an Intelligence Officer*. Little, Brown, Boston, 1985, p. 433.
- 13 *Revue d'Histoire Maghrebine*, Numeros 13-14, January 1979, pp. 211-214.
- 14 United States National Archives, Washington, State Department Records. 16 December, 1942.
- 15 *Ibid.*, 811.20290B/14, p. 2.
- 16 Jamali. Interview taped by author. Zurich. 9 September, 1985.
- 17 Author's notes of interview of Jamali. Zurich. August 31, 1988. This was confirmed by Loy Henderson to the author at a memorial service for Jamali in the National Theater in Washington on or about 15 July, 1958.

4

Career Switch

Jamali's transfer from the Ministry of Education to Foreign Affairs was ordered in 1943 by Nuri es-Sa'id. Jamali refused an appointment to the Embassy in Washington as Counsellor, sensing that it was a move to get him out of the way. He was then appointed acting Director General effective as of 19 July, 1944, and made permanent a month later. On 22 February, 1945, he was promoted in his Civil Service Grade to Minister Plenipotentiary, effective as of 2 January. The change from Education to Foreign Affairs did not please him at first because education had been his special field of study. He calls it his "first love." Even when he was Minister of Foreign Affairs, he kept his hand in teaching by giving lectures on moral philosophy and Plato's *Republic* at the Higher Teacher Training College. After release from prison in 1962 he returned to education as a lecturer at the University of Tunis. In 1987 he published a book there in Arabic whose English title was *Horizons of Modern Education in Developing Nations*.

When asked why he was transferred, he says, with a grin, that perhaps the British advisors were concerned with what effect a man with alleged Nazi sympathies, however

unsubstantiated, might have on the youth of Iraq. In 1956 when Richard Nolte asked the same question the reply was,

British influence. It was during the war, remember; and the British had just had a lot of trouble in Iraq putting down the violently nationalist Rashid Ali revolt. I was a strong nationalist myself, you see. Still am. Having me in Education was not thought to be wise.

Of course what Prime Minister Nuri Sa'ïd said to me was, "We need you in Foreign Affairs. We need a man of your qualifications."¹

In the spring of 1941 Rommel was attacking in the Libyan desert, and a breakthrough to Cairo seemed imminent. Greece was occupied and Crete invaded. To the northeast other German *panzer* divisions were streaking across the south of the Soviet Union in a desperate attempt to capture the strategic oil fields near Baku in the Caucasus and thus replenish Hitler's gasoline supplies. Ironically, this thrust failed when the Nazi columns ran out of fuel just short of their goal. The battle for Crete had blunted the German thrust from Greece. The revolt in Baghdad had been timed to blow up the middle ground between those three points of the claw — Crete, Alamein and Baku. The British had built their largest base on the Iraq-Kuwait frontier at the port of Umm Qasr as a contingency evacuation port in the event that the German forces might have broken through both at Alamein and in the Caucasus. The huge staging area in Shu'aiba west of Basra at the head of the Gulf was connected to the Umm Qasr port by rail lines for speedy embarkation. Rashid Ali and his colleagues were understandably nervous. When they launched their revolt in the Spring of 1941, the Regent and other leaders who had aligned themselves with the Allies fled the country and took refuge in Jordan. Thanks in no small measure to the urging of the American missionary educator, Dr. John Van Ess, the British had moved Gurkha troops from India to the port city of Basra in a matter of days before the revolt occurred. Van Ess, whose mission school in Basra dated from Turkish days and who was a pioneer of modern education in Iraq, made two trips that spring to see the British

Ambassador in Baghdad, Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, before convincing him of the danger. At first the British response was, "Thanks, but our information is otherwise." Whatever the British sources may have been, the network of graduates of the Basra Boys School covered the country, and Van Ess knew what he was talking about. Confirmation soon came from other sources, and the Gurkha units arrived from India.

The Jordan Arab Legion, led by General Sir John Bagot Glubb, "Glubb Pasha," made a remarkable march across nearly 600 miles of desert from Amman, approached Baghdad from the northeast and took the rebels quite by surprise. The German Minister, Herr Gruber, and the Italian Minister, Signor Gabrielli, withdrew to Kamechle in Syria.² Baghdad fell at once, "saved" for the Allied cause, "lost" for the rebels and the Axis. For an Arab nationalist, however, foreigners were still in control.

In October, 1942, fortunately for the Allied forces, the tide turned at el-Alamein in Egypt's Western Desert, the fuel shortage stopped the German advance in the Caucasus just short of the Baku oil fields and the offensive in Greece was halted. The claw never closed.

The Regent and the other leaders who had gone to Amman returned on the first of June. They found that, while the opposition had been defeated, their own army was humiliated and in disarray. The throne was in fact supported by an occupation army and a clever British Ambassador, Sir Kinahan Cornwallis. Cornwallis in his Review of the Events of 1941-1943 reported the following as the British government's objectives in Iraq:

- (a) To secure full facilities for our war requirements
- (b) To root out pro-Nazis and bring about a change in public feeling, . . . by making people realize the advantage of alliance with us.
- (c) Unofficially and in the hope of helping to create greater stability, to influence the administration as far as possible, but not to the extent of causing a crisis and so jeopardizing (a) and (b).

Owing to my personal knowledge of the working of the government and my old friendship with Ministers, sheikhs and others, I happened to be favorably placed for this.³

In this context even unsubstantiated allegations that Jamali had entertained Axis sympathies became extremely serious. Given the misunderstanding about him that arose from the Berlin confusion of names and noting Cornwallis's (b) objective, Jamali's transfer to Foreign Affairs is no surprise. It seems clear that Cornwallis was at that time satisfied with Nuri's adherence to Britain's program, for in 1942 he wrote to his Foreign Office:

In the implementation of the Anglo-Iraqi Alliance it must be recorded that the present Administration has been exemplary . . . a considerable number of the more virulently anti-British officials and others were consigned to the concentration camp at Fao.⁴

Further light on Jamali's transfer and insight into Nuri's relationship to the British is given in a dispatch from US Minister Paul Knabenshue to the State Department:

British Ambassador last night allowed me to read memorandum of Nuri's promised policy, the various points being replies to Ambassador's direct questions.

One. Nuri promises fully implement Anglo-Iraq Treaty, particularly in respect of British defense measures and communications.

Two. He will purge Iraq Army of pro-Axis elements and strengthen it for maintenance internal order . . . leaving out tribal elements (this will gain him popularity with the tribes.)

Three. He would prosecute strong action against Rashid Ali Gailani and his more responsible followers.

Four. He will dismiss all pro-Axis Government officials and intern in concentration camp all potentially dangerous persons.

Five. He will bring about reforms in Ministry of Education, dismissing pro-Axis teachers and replacing inflammatory textbooks (it was anti-British propaganda disseminated by students which was most effective and damaging.)

Six. (reforms in other ministries) . . .

Seven. Close Vichy-French and Japanese missions.

Eight. Not raise Palestine or Pan-Arab questions during war . . . there are elements in his programme which might easily lead to dissension in the Cabinet and which might draw attempt at his assassination of which he seems fully aware.⁵

The reference to "elements in his programme . . . which might draw attempt at his assassination" was a grisly forecast of the events in July, 1958.

Given Nuri's undertaking to the British that he would dismiss pro-Axis teachers and reform the Ministry of Education, and given the unfortunate mistaken identity mentioned above, Nuri's transfer of Jamali to Foreign Affairs is all the more understandable, although why anyone suspected of Nazi sympathies would be more removed from influence by a transfer from Education to Foreign Affairs is a puzzle. What the British felt about his transfer is not documented.

Nuri's promises notwithstanding, the British soon became disenchanted with him, and by 1944 Cornwallis had written to Sir Alexander Cadogan in the Foreign Office that "his (Nuri's) lack of interest in the administration is deplorable and may be dangerous."⁶

Cadogan's reply repeated more of the evaluation Cornwallis had made and revealed the extent of British frustration with "their man:"

Do you agree that Nuri is making a mess and possibly a dangerous mess, of the administration of Iraq — whether the reason is ill-health, lack of interest and absorption in Pan-Arab questions, inability to form a good Cabinet and in particular to get on with younger men, or possibly as combination of all three?

. . . do you really regard the chances of improving matters by getting rid of Nuri as so hopeless that it is better to go on as we are?⁷

Cornwallis left Baghdad in February, 1945, and he was replaced by Sir Hugh Stonehewer-Bird shortly after victory in Europe.

In contrast to Nuri's inability or unwillingness to "get on with younger men" two contemporary comments on Jamali's later brief tenure (1953-1954) as Prime Minister are worth noting. One is from the *Iraq Times* of 19 September, 1953:

Dr. Fadhel Jamali's 17 member Cabinet installed on 17 September sets a new precedent in the history of Iraq for size. No Prime Minister in this country has come to office with as many colleagues, with as many newcomers to ministerial ranks. The latter, 11 in all, Dr. Jamali has taken for the most part from Parliament, including with them a number of officials. The feature of Dr. Jamali's Cabinet is its "new generation" color.

The other is from the *Daily Telegraph*, London, of the same date:

Apart from his own personality the chief interest of Jamali's appointment is that he has opened the way for new men to attain Cabinet rank. It has for years been a charge by the younger generation in Iraq that the older politicians kept the jobs for themselves denying the young blood a chance. Dr. Jamali is moving with the times.

Cornwallis's disenchantment with Nuri soon led to serious concern for future developments and no little frustration. He reported this in a prescient paragraph dated 30 March, 1945:

The real trouble lies not with us, but with the rulers themselves, who obstinately refuse to give up any of their privileges or prerogatives to others. There are now signs that they are becoming apprehensive for their future, and I and my staff continually do the best we can to stimulate their apprehensions; a violent clash between the "haves" and the "have-nots" is inevitable in time.

The fact that Britain had failed to develop adequate leaders after exercising her tutorial authority for more than twenty years does not appear to have entered Sir Kinahan's mind.

An Iraqi diplomat, Dr. Mudhaffar Abdullah Amin, summed up this period of Iraq's history as follows:

This type of leadership was a burden both to Iraq and to the British Embassy although for very different reasons and with different effects. Britain's main preoccupation was the maintenance of a friendly government, but the quality of the existing politicians clearly made the task difficult if not impossible. The British Ambassador was put in the unenviable position of assembling politicians to form a Cabinet that would be sufficiently responsible to run the country without provoking incidents which might end in a return to direct British rule.⁸

It is true that Jamali was one of the few well-educated Iraqis with considerable overseas experience, which made him a logical choice for appointment to the Foreign Affairs Ministry, especially since the British were so disappointed with Nuri. While some of the older statesmen around Nuri es-Sa'id also had vast experience, it was for the most part limited to the Middle East and Europe. Jamali, with five years in the AUB's Western atmosphere and three more years at Columbia University in New York, was quite at home in the West, and in America.

For whatever reasons, the transfer came about in 1943, and he was soon appointed Director General of Foreign Affairs, hardly the post to which anyone as sympathetic to the Allied cause as Nuri Pasha would assign a man about whom there were rumors of Nazi leanings. Over the next fifteen years Jamali served his country faithfully in the field of diplomacy. He was eight times Foreign Minister, and, for two very brief periods in 1953-54 he served as Prime Minister.⁹

However regretfully he may have left his work in education, once his transfer to Foreign Affairs was effected he immediately set to work to implement his Pan-Arab and patriotic convictions. In his new position he could make sure that the Iraqi government spared no opportunity to convince its British and American allies of the urgent need for the liberation of Syria and Lebanon from the French mandate. General Sir Edward Spears for the United Kingdom and Minister George Wadsworth representing the United States did their best to promote the independence of these two states. Tahseen Qadri, Iraqi Consul General and later Minister to

Lebanon and Syria, was in constant touch with the political leaders in his area to see that, following the downfall of the Vichy regime, the Free French recognized Syrian and Lebanese independence.

Notes

- 1 Richard H. Nolte. "Dr. Jamali Speaks Out." American Universities Field Staff letter from Beirut, 26 April, 1956, p. 3.
- 2 British Public Record Office, Foreign Office: FO-624/60.
- 3 British Public Record Office. Cornwallis to S. S. for Foreign Affairs. 30 March, 1945. FO-371/45302/E2431.
- 4 British Public Record Office. Foreign Office. Cornwallis to S. S. for Foreign Affairs. 8 March, 1942. FO-371/31371/E2596.
- 5 United States National Archives. Knabenshue to State Department. 15 October, 1941. USNA 890G.00/601.
- 6 British Public Record Office. Foreign Office Archives. FO-624/67. 30 September, 1945.
- 7 British Public Record Office. Foreign Office Archives. FO-624/67, p. 5.
- 8 Mudhaffer Abdullah Amin. "Jama'at al-Ahali: Its origin, ideology and role in Iraqi Politics; 1932-1946." Thesis submitted to the School of Oriental Studies, University of Durham. April, 1980.
- 9 Khadduri. *Independent Iraq*. Appendix II, p. 372.

5

Foreign Affairs

Although he had watched developments in Palestine with deepening concern for some time, it was after his transfer to the Foreign Ministry that the question of Palestine became a major matter on the international agenda, and he became more active on behalf of his "Arab brothers."

Looking back on his career from Tunis in 1974 at the age of seventy-one, Jamali wrote in his *Memoirs*:

No one problem has ever occupied time, energy and thought in my life equal to the Palestine problem. As a student, as a teacher, as a member of national and social organizations, I have always sympathized with my brethren, the Arabs of Palestine, in their suffering due to the grafting onto the Arab world of a foreign body which has so far been most poisoning to the health and vitality of the Arab nation. (173)

Although he was obliged to use a pen name, "ibn al-Iraq (son of Iraq)," because of his position as Director General of Foreign Affairs, he began in 1944 to write a series of newspaper articles to warn the public of the Zionist threat. These were eventually collected in pamphlet form and printed in Cairo under the title *The Zionist Danger*. The Arabs, like the rest of the world, had their attention primarily focused on

World War II, and Jamali felt that his people were insufficiently alert to the aims of the world Zionist program.

King Abdul Aziz ibn Sa'ud of Sa'udi Arabia and Crown Prince Abdulillah on behalf of King Feisal II of Iraq wrote nearly identical letters to President Roosevelt. Jamali translated the Crown Prince's letter into English, and he reconstructs its message in his *Memoirs*. (175) The letter reminded the American President of Arab friendship, and referred to the Covenant which the Caliph Omar ibn al-Khuttab addressed to his Muslim army when they undertook the conquest of Palestine in early Islamic history. In that Covenant he commanded his conquering army to treat the Christians in a just and humanitarian manner.¹

The Sa'udi and Iraqi letters emphasized that Palestine, having passed through so many historical developments, belonged to its legal inhabitants, the Arabs. They asked President Roosevelt to uphold the principles of the Atlantic Charter of which he himself was co-author. Mr. Roosevelt's reply, dated 12 April, 1944, included the following:

In the view of the Government of the United States no decision affecting the basic situation in Palestine should be reached without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews. (175f)

Jamali felt as did most Arabs that, although the tacit admission of equality between Jewish and Arab rights in Palestine was already an injustice, at least their rights were given weight equal to the claims of the Zionists. He was saddened when even this implicit equality of rights was ignored by President Truman in his speedy recognition of Israel following the 1948-49 War.

In December 1944 Jamali as Director General had submitted a memorandum to his Minister which laid out a plan to present the Arab cause in the United States through a network of information offices. Later, the Arab League, having heard Jamali's proposal, resolved to establish Arab Offices for Palestine in Britain and America under the direction of Musa al'-Alami. In New York the Zionists were worried about the

venture, and their protests eventually prompted police inspection of the Arab Information Office premises. Jamali protested vigorously to the US Embassy in Baghdad at this infringement of Arab rights and threatened police inspection of US Information Offices in Iraq if such a breach of diplomatic immunity were repeated. It never was.

Only Iraq and Syria supported the venture financially, and Syria stopped her contribution after the first year. Iraq carried the support alone until war broke out in Palestine after the Partition Resolution had been adopted by the UN. This lack of financial support forced the closing of those offices at the moment when they were most needed.

Iraq also worked hard to make sure that Syria and Lebanon were invited to the 1945 San Francisco Conference for the organization of the United Nations. As the Conference opened the French were bombarding Damascus, and Jamali denounced the assault on that unfortified and ancient city, asking the French if the attack was consonant with their principles of liberty, fraternity and equality. The Lebanese delegation included Charles Malik, his old friend and classmate from Beirut days. There were more graduates from the AUB than from any other university in the world at the San Francisco meeting: Jamali felt right at home.

Links between Jordan and Iraq continued to be very close after Jordan became independent at the end of the British mandate in 1946, when Emir Abdullah of Transjordan became King Abdullah of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Since Jordan was not yet a member of the UN, Jamali sometimes spoke for her there.

When he served in the Ministry of Education Jamali had many friendly contacts with Egypt, and these continued to help his efforts to bridge Iraqi-Egyptian differences after he moved to Foreign Affairs. Some of these differences were over the Palestine question. Other issues were the Arab League, Syrian-Iraqi federation, alignment with the West, Nasser's aspirations to Pan-Arab leadership. The issue of the Arab League arose soon after Jamali's transfer.

The idea was first suggested by British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden. Spurred in part by Iraq's abortive nationalist, anti-British revolt in 1941, the British government sought the support of Arab leaders by offering to give its endorsement to the creation of a regional organization. Eden announced this concept on 29 May, 1941, the day of the collapse of Rashid Ali's coup. Later, in 1942 when Nuri es-Sa'ïd was serving as Iraqi Minister to Egypt, he proposed a Syrian-Iraqi-Jordanian federation which the Egyptians, the Sa'udis and other Arab states would be welcome to join. In a memorandum printed early in 1943, entitled "Arab Independence and Unity," Nuri presented his idea to R. G. Casey, the British Minister of State resident in Cairo. It became known as "The Blue Book," and Nuri sent copies to Anthony Eden, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and to Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs. In his covering letter he advised that the Arabs' situation be studied carefully so that the mistakes of World War I, when the Allies betrayed them, would not be repeated.

Later that year Eden spoke in Parliament expressing "His Majesty's support of any Arab initiative towards unity." With this green light, Nuri urged Egyptian Prime Minister Nahhas to invite representatives of the Arab states to Alexandria from 25 September to 7 October, 1944, to discuss a proposal for Arab unity. The resulting document was called the Protocol of Alexandria. (553f) It was signed there on 7 October, 1944, by representatives of the Arab nations and Palestine. A pact was drafted, and on 22 March, 1945, the individual states, having assured themselves that their rights were protected, signed it. The League of Arab States was born. The founding members were Syria, Lebanon, Sa'udi Arabia, Yemen, Iraq and Egypt. The first Secretary General was Abdur Rahman Azzam Pasha, a distinguished Egyptian supported by Nuri. In spite of Nuri's generous deference to Egypt from the outset, the League was plagued by rivalry and mistrust between the Hashemite interests of Jordan and Iraq on the one hand and by Egyptian-Saudi concerns on the other.² These rivalries and animosities never died out, and a decade

later they surged anew in the heated debate over the Baghdad Pact.

King Feisal I of Iraq and King Abdul Aziz did their best to clear this historic enmity when they met on a British warship in February, 1930, off Uqayr in the Gulf and signed a Treaty of Brotherhood. However, Prince Abdulillah, who was Regent as well as King Feisal's uncle, considered himself the legitimate heir to the throne of his father, King Ali of the Hijaz, who had inherited the throne from his father, Sherif Hussein. Since the Sa'udis had seized the Hijaz after World War I, they naturally enough viewed any move by the Hashemites with suspicion, especially Iraq's hope for federation with Syria and Jordan. In the face of this perceived threat the Sa'udis moved closer to Egypt, and the Arab world still suffers from such polarization of these old regime loyalties and fears.

In his new responsibilities for Foreign Affairs Jamali felt the burden of this feudal animosity. At one point when Sa'udi Arabia was strongly opposing Syrian-Iraqi federation Jamali called on the Regent and asked if he could not come to an understanding with the Sa'ud family. To this the Regent replied,

Fadhel, have I ever interfered in your policies regarding Sa'udi Arabia? If I had done so, you would have some reason for your remark. But, since I have not interfered, what do you want from me? How do my relations with the Hijaz concern you? This is a problem that concerns me personally. (314f)

Such was the impasse.

Although he was not usually given to uncritical acceptance of Nuri's ideas, Jamali is clear that it was Nuri's statesmanship that led him to defer to Egypt and to let her as the largest sister state take the initiative in League affairs. Naq-rashi Pasha, a later Prime Minister of Egypt and a good friend of Jamali, told him personally that he considered Nuri the architect of the League.

Egypt and Iraq, having achieved their own independence, were now fighting for the liberation of their Arab brethren. This aim naturally included those still under the

British Mandate in Palestine, and so the Arabs were dismayed when the "Biltmore Resolution" was passed by a Zionist conference in New York on 11 May, 1942. It was the first open statement of the Zionists' intent to establish an independent Jewish state in Palestine, and it urged

that the gates of Palestine be opened; that the Jewish Agency be vested with control of immigration . . . ; and that Palestine be established as a Jewish Commonwealth.³

Because the political strength of Jewish organizations in America far outweighed their actual numbers, the two major political parties began to compete for Jewish support, and there was as yet no American Arab grouping to balance the picture. Arab Americans were too few and unorganized for their voice to be heard in Washington's political jungle.

Noting this enthusiasm on the part of American politicians to win Zionist favor, the Arab states protested. Jamali, as Director General of Foreign Affairs in 1944, joined his own Minister, Prime Minister Hamdi al-Pachachi, and others in the government to call for the application of democratic principles in Palestine, where over 70 percent of the population were Arabs, and to protest the forced intrusion of large numbers of foreigners. Their arguments were faithfully transmitted to Washington by the American Minister, Loy Henderson.

Later during Jamali's brief term as Prime Minister in 1953-54, Dr. Izzet Tannous, a prominent Palestinian medical doctor, visited Baghdad. They became friends and discussed the situation at length. Tannous proposed opening an office in New York to enlighten the American public on the question of Palestine. Jamali agreed and offered ten thousand dinars a year in support, suggesting that Sa'udi Arabia might be asked to help as well. Indeed, the Sa'udis matched Iraq's contribution, and Izzet Tannous began his years of effective work there, continuing until the overthrow of the Iraqi Monarchy in 1958.

Musa al-Alami, a prominent Palestinian leader, had headed up the Palestine Information Offices funded by Iraq

from 1944 to 1948. This the Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husseini, viewed as defiance of his own leadership, and he asked for a meeting with Jamali in Cairo in March, 1947. They met one evening for two hours at the Iraq Legation. The Mufti expressed his desire to improve relations with Iraq. He also protested that he was innocent of having encouraged the revolt of Rashid Ali in 1941, and he produced in support of this contention a report written about him for the British government by his compatriot, George Antonius. Jamali reported the substance of this conversation in a cable to Baghdad dated 25 March, 1947. (194f)

Notes

- 1 "In the name of Allah, the Merciful, the Compassionate. This is the Covenant which Omar ibn al-Khuttab, the servant of Allah, the Commander of the Faithful, grants to the people of Aelis (Jerusalem). He grants them security of their lives, their possessions, their churches and crosses . . . they shall have freedom of religion and none shall be molested unless they rise up in a body. They shall pay a tax instead of military service . . . and those who leave the city shall be safeguarded until they reach their destination."
- 2 Robert W. Macdonald. *The League of Arab States*. pp. 34-41; and Charles D. Cremeans. *The Arabs and the World*. pp. 118f; and Jamali. *Memoirs*. pp. 551ff.
- 3 Walid Khalidi. *From Haven to Conquest, Readings in Zionism and the Palestine Problem Until 1948*. The Institute for Palestine Studies, Washington, 1986, 2nd Printing 1987, pp. 495-497.

6

The United Nations

Jamali's debut at a major world conference was at the organizational meetings of the United Nations in San Francisco in the late spring of 1945. As Director General of Foreign Affairs he was outranked by the other members of the Iraqi delegation: Foreign Minister Ershad al-Omari; the Minister to the United States, Ali Jawdat al-Ayubi, a former Prime Minister; and Nasrat al-Farisi, a former Foreign Minister.¹

The UN meetings included 48 nations. Among them were five Arab countries—Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Sa'udi Arabia and Syria. These Arab delegations worked hard to be sure there would be guarantees in the UN Charter for the independence of Syria and Lebanon, for the rights of non-independent Arab states and "to protect Palestine from Zionist invasion." They gained some success in their objectives, except for that of achieving self-determination for Palestine. Jamali took part in the committees drafting the portions of the Charter that dealt with trusteeship and with the Security Council. Iraq and the other developing countries insisted on the right of all nations to be free. Dr. Wellington Koo of the Republic of China, General Carlos Romulo of the Philippines, Mr. Andrei Gromyko and Jamali tried for a month in the Trusteeship Council to have this right

included. In the Committee which was drafting those provisions Jamali asked the colonial powers who so adamantly opposed the insertion of a guarantee of independence,

Gentlemen, we assume that you are taking charge of these people for humanity's sake in a humanitarian spirit, and I assume that you are educating – that you are their teachers. Don't you expect that the people you are educating will one day reach a state to be certificated and given independence? If you cannot enable them to reach that stage, you are poor teachers; you are not entitled to rule them.²

In the Security Council, however, the Big Five – the USA, the UK, the USSR, France and China – insisted on having veto power, and so the others grudgingly gave in. This, Jamali believes, is one great weakness, another being the lack of power to enforce the Charter's principles.³ At one point Anthony Eden, Great Britain's Foreign Secretary, sent him word: "Jamali, stop fighting the veto or there will be no United Nations." The UN exists today, but action on many important issues was blocked, at least up to the end of the Cold War.⁴

Article 78 of the Charter states that the Trusteeship System shall not apply to territories which have become members of the United Nations, where their relationships shall be based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality. This was a victory for newly independent Syria and Lebanon who until then had been under France's mandate and were not yet free in spite of being members of the UN.

An impasse was reached in the Trusteeship Committee when the Arab states asked for a text which would protect the Arabs of Palestine from unwanted immigration and guarantee their independence. The struggle between the American delegates, behind whom the Zionists sat, and the Arab representatives lasted more than a month. The Arabs wanted guarantees for the right of self-determination, not only for Palestine but for any country under mandate. The American delegates led by Commander Harold Stassen were under domestic political pressure and resisted the Arab proposal,

ignoring the principle of self-determination to which the Arab delegations had made eloquent appeal. As a result Article 80 made no mention of the rights of the Palestinian Arabs. This opened the way for President Truman to ignore those rights and to involve the USA in support of what Jamali calls "the ugliest imperialistic operation enacted in modern history." (186)

Although Jamali was junior in the delegation at San Francisco, he signed the Charter for Iraq because Nuri es-Sa'ïd and the others had left early to protest America's refusal to apply the principle of self-determination to Palestine. It was a mark of confidence on the part of Prime Minister Nuri who was, in or out of office, the most powerful personality in his country. Jamali said regarding their relationship, "I was no trouble to him as far as the West goes." He also points out that, while he and Nuri generally agreed on foreign policy, they disagreed on internal affairs on several points. One was their views on the need for speed in reform: "I was the rabbit; he was the tortoise."

They also differed regarding the proper extent of social justice and of morality. Nuri wanted to preserve the system. Jamali

wanted to raise a standard. I as Prime Minister had the beer signs taken down, and the government bought houses of prostitution and had them razed. We also differed on the extent of freedom to be granted to the political parties.⁵

In the debate on accepting the draft UN Charter Jamali graciously thanked those who had worked so hard and went on to point out what ought still to be done:

the Charter does not guarantee the rights of those territories now under mandate . . . Their rights are being preserved up to the time the new arrangements are made. But after . . . we don't know what happens . . . the League of Nations has recognized that territories formerly belonging to the Ottoman Empire are provisionally recognized as independent. . . . this right is not specified in the Charter.

... under the same paragraph (in the League's Covenant) the wishes of the people are to be taken into account in the selection of the mandatory power. That is not in the trusteeship provision (of the UN draft) ... there is no specific regulation ... to terminate a trusteeship. A territory ... has no way of applying for independence and being granted that independence. It is at the mercy of the trusteeship power. Had the Charter made provision for that, the Charter would have been better.

He nevertheless concluded these critical remarks by affirming his hope and confidence in the powers undertaking these obligations, that human brotherhood would be the motive in trusteeship and "that racial discrimination ... will be discarded forever ... no superiority of any sort, national, racial or religious."⁶

In spite of these concerns, Jamali points out that

as important as my part in the creation of the Charter was my meeting Dr. Frank Buchman (initiator of Moral Re-Armament). We had a long dinner. He did not talk: he let me talk. I made the point that, since people were either reactionary, corrupt and backward, or are destructive and subversive, we need a third way of progress with peace and justice.

Dr. Buchman invited him to see the play, *The Forgotten Factor*. It portrayed the solution of an industrial strike.

Jamali was captivated by the theme "It's not WHO is right, but WHAT is right." He writes:

I'll never forget it! It made a lasting impression on my mind and spirit. It showed how violence is no way, but that the road to just and lasting peace lies in forgiveness and in the admission of mistakes, both in families and in politics.

The Forgotten Factor gives a new method for peaceful solutions based on four absolute moral standards—honesty, purity, unselfishness and love. I saw the play three times. I was completely convinced that such a spirit must be learned. The spirit of that play was a new light in my life. It has been an effective element in my life and conduct ever since.⁷

His convictions were broadcast by the Swiss Broadcasting Corporation later in a speech Dr. Buchman made at Caux, Switzerland, on 4 June, 1947. In it Buchman quoted Jamali:

The world is at the crossroads. One road leads to revolution and chaos. The other to reaction and despair. Moral Re-Armament is the third way—the way of an inspired democracy that will unite the world.”⁸

From then on he and Frank Buchman kept in touch. When he came to the UN General Assemblies in New York he would bring members of his own and other delegations to join Buchman and American friends at Dellwood in Mt. Kisco, New York, a center for the MRA program. He was inspired by Buchman’s vision for the Muslim world, that it could be a “girder of unity for all civilization.”⁹

The theme of the need for a rebirth of moral and spiritual values as a third way, an alternative to the materialism of both right and left, recurs in Jamali’s thought throughout his career. The need for moral standards as the foundation of sound education has been a continuing element in his statesmanship. It is a principal note in his lectures on the Philosophy of Education at the University of Tunis, as it was in the concern he expressed in the UN that colonial states should find full independence,

In September, 1946 he represented Iraq at the Palais de Luxembourg Conference in Paris which was to decide the fate of the former Italian colony of Libya for which he asked immediate independence. Britain wanted Cyrenaica, Italy and Russia both wanted Tripoli, France wanted the Fezzan, and the United States wanted an air base. Jamali urged that, if the conference did not grant immediate independence, trusteeship powers should be exercised either by the Arab League or by a League member. He also asked that Iraq be admitted as a full member of the conference, reminding them that his country had declared war on Italy in January, 1943.

In 1946 following the first UN meetings the American President, Harry Truman, asked of Britain that the 1939 White Paper on Palestine be no longer enforced. This was

one of the main targets of the Zionists in the Biltmore Declaration, because the 1939 White Paper limited Jewish immigration into Palestine to 15,000 people a year for five years, at the end of which period Palestine was to be independent. This immigration ceiling on the Balfour Declaration's "national home for the Jewish people" upon which His Majesty's government "looked with favor," while safeguarding the rights of "existing non-Jewish communities," was anathema to the militant Zionists. Britain's Foreign Secretary opposed setting the White Paper aside because doing so would open the door to unlimited entry for Jews into Palestine where tensions were already dangerously high. The Jewish community in Palestine after World War I was less than ten per cent of the total population: after World War II it was over 30 per cent. The White Paper's limit on this disproportionate growth was motivated by peace-keeping considerations, but any limit placed on Jewish immigration into Palestine was unacceptable to the Jewish Agency with its strong lobby in the American Congress.

Truman then went even further. He asked Britain to permit immediate entry for 100,000 Jewish refugees and detainees. Up to then emigrant Jews, who had left Europe without visas for Palestine at the urging of the Jewish Agency, had been detained in Cyprus as the illegal immigrants they were. Truman's call and its attendant publicity obliged the British to release detainees. The novel *Exodus* portrays Jewish illegal entries as heroic ventures, but for the Arab majority in Palestine they were unjust and provocative.

Truman's move was a bombshell. His announcement revealed a total lack of teamwork with Britain, America's closest ally. Foreign Secretary Bevin had been engaged in conciliatory talks with both parties, Arabs and Jews, but his efforts were now scuttled. On 25 February, 1947, Bevin explained in the House of Commons:

I did reach a stage, however, in meeting with the Jews separately . . . when things looked more hopeful. There was a feeling . . . that I had the right approach at last. But what happened? . . . the next day . . . the Prime

Minister, telephoned me at midnight and told me that the President of the United States was going to issue another statement on the hundred thousand.

I think the country and the world ought to know about this. I went next morning to the Secretary of State, Mr. Byrnes, and told him how far I had got the day before. I believed we were on the right road, if only they would leave us alone. I begged that the statement not be issued, but I was told that if it was not issued by Mr. Truman, a competitive statement would be issued by Mr. Dewey. In international affairs I cannot settle things if my problem is made the subject of local elections.¹⁰

Truman's views necessitated negotiations between the US and Britain, and it was agreed that an Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry be sent to Europe and the Arab countries to study conditions and submit a report as to what seemed appropriate regarding current Jewish immigration and the future of Palestine itself. The Committee's twelve members included several Zionists. In Cairo the Committee based near the Pyramids at the Mena House Hotel to hear the Arab point of view. Jamali was designated to represent Iraq. He joined the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Dr. Mansur Fahmy, in condemning Zionism as a reactionary, aggressive movement that threatened Middle East security. Jamali asked the Committee to apply the same principle to Arabs and non-Arabs alike. He cited the Golden Rule, "Do unto others as you would like them to do unto you." He invited the Committee to Baghdad to hear political leaders there, both Arab and Jew. The invitation was not accepted. The Committee's conclusion, in spite of impassioned Arab statements, was in agreement with Truman's wishes, and the Report recommended immediate entry into Palestine for 100,000 Jews. The Report further denied exclusive claims either by Arabs or Jews to a state in Palestine, rejected the partition solution and proposed continuation of the mandate.

The Arab League States were outraged at the Anglo-American Commission's report, and they met in Bludan, Syria, in the mountains near the Lebanese border to consider the situation. The delegates decided to send notes of protest

to Britain and the US and to attend a London Conference proposed by the British government to discuss the Palestine problem further. At Bludan Iraq suggested that the League's member states contribute two million pounds sterling a year, half of which would be used for an information service and half to buy up Arab lands in Palestine. No other Arab state was willing to participate. (346)

As for the "Confidential Resolutions" passed at Bludan, Jamali as always was outspoken. He likened the Resolutions to "a big drum which echoes afar but which is entirely empty," "no more than ink on paper." He even proposed that "we must tell America that the oil will stop if they go ahead with Palestine partition"; but he comments, "The Sa'udis wouldn't agree, and I made a pinching speech." He seems to have been nearly thirty years ahead of his time. The next year Defense Secretary James Forrestal told the American oil industry that, unless they could have assured access to Middle East oil, the automotive manufacturers would have to devise a four cylinder motor car.¹¹

The oil weapon was not used until 27 years after the Bludan Conference when the Sa'udis closed the valve. The Arab delegates at Bludan, however, opposed Jamali's oil boycott proposal. They tried to shout him down. Ex-Prime Minister Hamdi Pachachi of Iraq called out, "Please delete. Delete Jamali's statement." When tempers had cooled a bit, Jamali replied, "Delete the words, but you cannot delete the situation: the facts still apply."¹²

The Bludan Resolutions were voted upon and passed at the League's fourth session in June, 1946. Back in Baghdad Jamali was asked to prepare Iraq's protest to the British and American governments. He put the case so firmly that the British Ambassador in Iraq, Sir John Stonehewer-Bird, refused to accept the document, urging that the message be conveyed orally and nothing so harsh be committed to paper.

The *New York Times* reported on 6 February, 1947, that the unexpectedly violent reaction of the Arab League's delegates to any suggestion of a partition of Palestine had shaken Foreign Secretary Bevin and other top officials of the

Foreign and Colonial Offices, and that the outspoken attacks had forced a hurried reconsideration of plans. Nonetheless, the partition proposal prevailed. Even there at the London Conference Jamali held out a hope for a peaceful solution when he said on 5 February, 1947:

There is no reason why Jews and Arabs should not live together amicably, if Zionism gives up its political aspirations and becomes cultural and spiritual Zionism.¹³

Later that year while in Cairo to preside over the Council of the Arab League he met with President Truman's personal representative, George A. Brownell, who had just come from India where he had been negotiating air traffic agreements. Jamali told Brownell to inform President Truman that "revolution throughout the Arab world" could be expected if Arab rights were violated. The warning was part of his reply to Brownell's inquiry about the possibility of obtaining a civil aviation agreement. Jamali concluded his reply by saying, "It is now for the President to think whether he really wishes to become a cause of international instability and insecurity in this part of the world."¹⁴

Following these Arab protests, the London Conference proposed by the British took place in two sessions; the first convened in the Fall of 1946, and the second early in 1947. Ernest Bevin, the Foreign Secretary, and Anthony Creech-Jones, Minister for the Colonies, represented Britain. Among the Arabs present were Prince Feisal bin Abdul Aziz of Sa'udi Arabia, Prince Seif ul-Islam Abdullah of Yemen, Faris al-Khouri of Syria, Abdur Rizzaq Sanhoury and, later, Isma'il Hakki Pasha of Egypt, Samir Pasha er-Rifa'i of Jordan, Jamali of Iraq and Camille Sham'oun of Lebanon who later became President of his country. The Arab League was represented by its Secretary-General, Abdur Rahman Azzam Pasha, and the Arabs of Palestine by Jamal al-Husseini, Sami Taha and others.

An amusing incident occurred in London during that Fall Conference when Faris al-Khouri appeared one day all wrapped up and suffering from a cold. After greeting him

Jamali asked, "Father, why don't you ask Dr. Fawzi al-Mulqi to treat you?" Dr. Fawzi, the Jordanian diplomat who later became Jordanian Prime Minister, was then Advisor to the Yemeni delegation. Professor al-Khoury protested, "Fadhel, do you want your father to be treated like a donkey?" "Far from it, Father! Why do you say such a thing?" "Because," he replied, "Dr. Fawzi is a veterinary doctor." (21) And a good laugh was had at Fadhel's expense.

The Arabs unitedly proposed an independent state of Palestine, governed by the vote of the legitimate inhabitants irrespective of their race or creed. This plan was flatly rejected by the Zionists. Bevin offered a provincial plan, known as the Morrison Plan, which was similar to the Swiss cantonal system. It was rejected by both Zionists and Arabs. The salient points of Jamali's speech at that London Conference are worth noting, since they offer a good summary of the Arab position at that time:

First—the Arabs desire peace and security in their land. Any proposals which took cognizance of Arab rights have been shelved, while decisions favoring the intruders have been implemented.

Second—there is nothing magical about Palestine; it has its natural population capacity which is not affected by the fact that it contains places holy to three great faiths . . .

Third—the basis of all trouble in Palestine lies in the aggressive nature of political Zionism . . . The Zionists come with territorial ambitions wider than just Palestine as we know it . . .

Fourth—He reaffirmed his faith that the American people, given the justice of the Arab cause on the one hand and the peril to friendly relations with the Arab world on the other, will cease to champion Zionism.

Fifth—The Zionists have no rights in Palestine: they were granted a favor by Britain which they have misinterpreted and misused. The world Jewish problem must be separated from that of Palestine. The Jewish problem must be dealt with in Europe . . . Zionist designs have been applied to de-nationalize European Jewry and make them believe that they do not belong where they are and that they should go to Palestine.

Sixth—Are the democratic principles of the United Nations Charter, the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms to be applied to Palestine? Or are the people of Palestine to be victimized by designs and problems for which they are not responsible?

Seventh—The British government has solemnly declared that the Balfour Declaration was not intended to prejudice the rights and privileges of the Arabs . . . If Britain still holds that position, we hope they will put an immediate stop to Zionist ambitions and see that no plan proposed for Palestine will lead to a Jewish state.

Eighth—If Mr. Balfour were alive he would surely regret having made the Declaration, for he seems to have been misled into thinking that Palestine had very few inhabitants, or a few primitives with no aims or ideals of their own . . . We must recognize the right of people to live their own life in their own homes and to enjoy self-determination.

Ninth—The Arabs cannot give up their historical and legal rights to Palestine . . . The McMahon correspondence and other First World War pledges; Paragraph 4, Article 22 of the League of Nations Charter; the Churchill White Paper of 1922, the Passfield Paper of 1930, the White Paper of 1939—all are British pledges to whose fulfillment we continue to regard the British government honor-bound. (200)

Britain decided to put the problem in the lap of the UN and requested a Special Session of the General Assembly at Flushing Meadow, New York, in the spring of 1947, soon after the London Conference. Jamali led Iraq's delegation and continued to defend the Palestinians' right to self-determination. He insisted that Palestine could not supply a local answer to a global Jewish problem and warned that any denial of those rights guaranteed by the UN Charter could only lead to bloodshed. That 1947 Session of the UN General Assembly focused a major and united effort by the Arab states to prevent partition, and Jamali was in the thick of the battle.

The US Secretary of State, General George Marshall, met with the heads of the Arab UN delegations for a luncheon near Lake Success and assured them that America was still "open-minded," and that while America "gave much weight to

the majority report" (of the Commission of Inquiry) this of itself did not mean a final acceptance of the conclusions of that report.

The Palestine issue was the beginning point, the *raison d'être*, for the development of an Afro-Asian group. The Arabs, who met regularly to coordinate their own efforts, approached Iran, Turkey and pre-partition India to stand with them. Jamali asked Assaf Ali of India, the Ambassador to the United States who was leading his own delegation, to bring the Arab and Afro-Asian delegations together to discuss cooperation on the Palestine issue. That luncheon invitation offered by Assaf Ali gave impetus to the Afro-Asian movement.

There was a procedural struggle to put Palestine on the Political or First Committee's agenda, since it was undoubtedly a major issue. Therefore in his speech to the UN General Assembly on 29 April, 1947, Jamali proposed that the termination of the British mandate and the declaration of the independence of Palestine be placed on the agenda of the General Assembly's Special Session on Palestine, but this was not to be. He gave the historical argument that the Arabs under Sherif Hussein of the Hijaz and his sons had led a revolt against the Ottoman Empire joining the Allied forces in this endeavor, and that in doing this they had "no motive other than the attainment of their national freedom and independence."¹⁵

He pointed to the several declarations on the part of the Allies which assured the Arabs of their right to freedom and independence. He argued that even without these promises the Arabs were entitled to enjoy the "Wilsonian principle of self-determination." He cited Paragraph 4, Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations as follows:

Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a state of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these

communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the mandatory.

He pointed to the fact that Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Transjordan had all achieved independence and continued

Are the people of Palestine of a lower standard of culture? Why should their independence be withheld? Legally, the mandate on Palestine violated the spirit of the system of mandates, for the mandate system was devised to help develop a people toward self-government and independence, and not to deprive a people of that right by introducing aliens to dominate them and check their national development . . .

Declaring an independent Palestine along democratic lines where all rightful citizens enjoy equal rights and take part in the government is all that is needed. The application of the principles of the Charter does not need a committee . . .

The fundamental issue is whether the rightful inhabitants of Palestine are to be considered as humans entitled to enjoy human rights, or are they to live subjected to a domination by aliens, imposed by force, invasion and aggression. To answer this we do not need a committee, we have only to read the Charter and to implement its principles. It is in the light of these principles that my government proposed the end of the mandate and the declaration of the independence of Palestine.¹⁶

But other considerations prevailed. During the debate Jamali referred to President Truman's request that 100,000 Jews be granted immediate entry into Palestine. "Part of our home is on fire," he asserted, "That fire is spreading: immigration is petrol added to the fire. And I address this to my American friends." The reporter notes that Dr. Aranha, President of the General Assembly, "frequently called to order the Iraqi delegate."¹⁷

Later the meetings of the newly-created Special Committee on Palestine were reported in the *New York Times*:

With the insistency of a trip-hammer the Arab States representatives reiterated and stressed the idea that

acquiescence to the Zionists' ambitions in Palestine would mean war in the Middle East . . .

Referring to Jamali, the *Times* writer went on,

Asserting that Palestine was being invaded by armed immigrants and that terrorism was rampant in the country, he said, "If this is not an act of aggression and an infringement of international peace, we do not know what aggression is. A Zionist state could never survive in Palestine, but a unitary democratic state should be established with equal rights for all citizens and membership in the United Nations."¹⁸

Instead, an Ad Hoc Committee was formed over the objections of the Arab delegates, and it in turn formed a Commission of Inquiry to submit facts and make recommendations. In spite of the protests by Jamali and other Arab delegates, this Commission included Guatemala and Uruguay whose representatives had proved to be quite pro-Zionist. The United Press wire service from Washington, D.C., on 20 May, 1947, reported that Jamali was sharply scornful of Zionist ideals of conquest, that he said that the Arab states would not be bound by any solution involving partition, and "to leave the people of Palestine alone to lead a democratic life without distinction as to race or religion" was the only solution which conformed to the UN Charter.

Dr. Evatt, the Australian Foreign Minister, was elected Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee set up by the Special Session of the General Assembly. At first Jamali and the other Arab leaders were pleased, since Australia had not voted for partition, but that initial impression was changed when the Chairman proved himself to be a "master of tactics in steering the Committee towards achieving Zionist aims." (218) Both the Arab Higher Committee led by Jamal al-Husseini and the Jewish Agency headed by Moshe Shartok, later known as Sharett, were invited to take part. Jamali did his best to point out the illegalities in the handling of the Palestine question, and that the conclusions of the Committee of Enquiry were not only contrary to democratic principles but to the UN Charter itself. Jamali was reported as charging

that the American government was well aware of Zionist training in the United States, and that "if Zionism gives up its political aspirations and becomes cultural and spiritual, there is plenty of room for Jews and Arabs to live together."¹⁹

Later in that Special Session of the General Assembly he appealed for the Arab states to be granted the universally recognized right to self determination by the United States and said that the important question was whether the United States would be bound by those "higher universal principles" or by power politics and local interests. Speaking on 29 April to the General Assembly he traced the evolution of the matter from Britain's first promises of independence for the Arabs in World War I.²⁰

An important statement was made by Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan, who later became a Justice at the International Court in the Hague. He reviewed the whole case, proving the legality of Arab rights, refuting Zionist claims and underlining the absurdity of the partition proposal. The British Secretary of State for the Colonies, Anthony Creech-Jones, explained that the mandate was not workable and that his government would not accept any solution which did not please both Arabs and Jews. Jamal al-Husseini reiterated the Arab position. (219)

Rabbi Silver, who spoke for the Jewish Agency, claimed that Jewish rights were supported by the Balfour Declaration and that, although the Mandate gave them rights to all of Palestine, they would sacrifice Transjordan and accept partition. Herschel Johnson speaking for the American delegation came out for partition, calling for an international volunteer militia to implement it.²¹ The Johnson statement had been shown to the Arabs a day before, and Faris al-Khoury of Syria was chosen to reply. This he did forcefully, followed by others.

Jamali's own speech in the General Assembly on 29 April, 1947 was a major one, for in it he made the important distinction between Zionism and Judaism which has become obscured over the years. He said that the Arab world was tense for two reasons: one, because Palestine is a vital part of

the Arab world; and two, because of the infiltration of Zionism among the Jews who have lived there for centuries along with Christians and Muslims in peace and harmony. He said in part

Zionism is certainly poisoning the atmosphere between Jews and non-Jews in the Arab world. It may undermine the loyalty of many a Jew all over the world.²² It endangers peace and harmony everywhere. Nothing can remedy the situation except a resort to the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter. Declaring an independent Palestine along democratic lines where all rightful citizens enjoy equal rights and take part in the Government is all that is needed.²³

This statement was followed by a supporting intervention from Dr. Charles Malik of Lebanon.

Despite these efforts the General Assembly on 1 May refused the Arab appeal to place the termination of the British mandate in Palestine on its agenda. The vote was 15 nations in favor, 24 against, 10 abstentions and 6 delegations absent.²⁴ The *New York Times* of that date also reported a shift in American policy whereby the US Delegation began to seek legal ways to have Zionists present their views to the General Assembly. This change became apparent as a wave of protests against the original American determination to bar presentation of the Jewish position reached the White House and State Department.

The Special Commission (UNSCOP) met in Lebanon at Sofar in the mountain pass above Beirut on the road to Damascus early in June, 1947 to gather evidence from Arab representatives. Jamali was in London then, but he flew back to appear before them on 23 July. Again, the Arabs warned the US and Britain not to implement partition.

The Commission's report was submitted to the UN Secretary General in August of 1947 with both minority and majority recommendations. The majority proposed a partition of Palestine into an Arab state, a Jewish state and an international zone around Jerusalem. The minority, which included Iran, India and Yugoslavia, recommended the

establishment of Arab and Jewish regions confederated in the Swiss cantonal pattern. The reports were circulated to the UN members for study.

Nuri and Fadhel were Co-Chairmen of the Iraq delegation at the Regular 1947 General Assembly of the UN, the session that voted for the partition of Palestine. Before departing that Fall for New York Jamali met with Iraq's Minister of Defense, Brigadier Shakir al-Wadi, who assured him that he could speak with the full support of the Ministry of Defense and that Defense "would take all measures to defend the rights of our Palestine brethren." (215) The Arab delegations met frequently and were well-organized. Jamali writes that they worked "day and night and under great strain. The pressure of power politics was great, and we sometimes had to speak as fighters and not as diplomats." (216)

His wife, Sarah, accompanied him, and she was in her own right a delegate, accredited to the UN Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee. In an interview with the *New York Times* she pointed with pride to the fact that Iraq "has the strongest representation of women in the United Nations." In the interview she also warned that "there is great danger of a popular uprising throughout the Arab world" if the UN accepted the partition plan for Palestine.²⁵

Once more the Arab states warned Britain and America against implementation of the majority report and said they would hold them responsible for any consequences if it were adopted. The Iraq government's reply is dated 22 September 1947. (211) Jamali was realistic enough to see that Britain and America were not likely to give much weight to protests from countries too weak either to defend their own rights or to threaten Western interests, but he also pointed out to the West that they underestimated the danger both to peace and to relations with the Arabs. On 6 October, 1947 at the request of Prime Minister Nuri as-Sa'id, Jamali gave a summary of the Arab position to the Ad Hoc Committee which is reported in the UN records of that date:

Mr. Jamali (Iraq) attached primary importance to respect for the fundamental international principles . . . which had been enunciated in President Wilson's fourteen points, the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations Charter.

In the first place, there should be observance of the right of ownership by prescription, in accordance with which a people who had inhabited a country for a long time, like the Americans or the Australians, became the rightful owners of that country . . . the rights of the Arabs were incontestable, since the Arabs had lived in Palestine for the previous fourteen centuries.

The Zionists alleged that historical links with a country conferred a right of possession. That principle would apply to the Greeks, to the Romans and to many others, and would sow discord throughout the world. There was only one sound principle that could be universally applied: each country belonged to its existing rightful inhabitants . . .

Zionist achievements due to American funds and Western techniques did not give them political rights and should not allow them to dominate the country . . . Palestine did not belong to the Jews of the whole world or to the Christians or Muslims of the whole world except in the spiritual sense.

In the second place, it was necessary to recognize the right of the inhabitants of a country, whatever that country might be, to decide their own fate, in other words to choose their government and to manage their own affairs. That was the very spirit of the Atlantic Charter and the Charter of the United Nations. The right of the people of Palestine to independence, recognized in Article 22, paragraph 4, of the Covenant of the League of Nations, had been violated, and that was the reason for the disorders of the previous twenty-five years . . .

Third, the inhabitants of a country were the sole authority on the admission of immigrants into their country . . . Mr. Jamali considered that this was a corollary to the principle of self-determination. The Americans, the Australians, the Canadians fixed their own quotas and categories. Anyone who wished to force immigration upon the United States without the consent of the Americans would be called an aggressor. The right to self-determination, which included the right to regulate

immigration, would be granted to all civilized people and should apply to the inhabitants of Palestine.

Fourth, care should be taken to ensure freedom from foreign interference in the country's internal affairs. . . . He hoped that citizens of the United States would cease to finance terrorism and illegal immigration into Palestine. . . .

Fifth, the democratic character of community life should be respected. . . . The majority should respect the rights of the minority, and the minority should respect the will of the majority. If the minority sought to impose its will upon the rest of the population by force or by foreign pressure, that constituted a form of tyranny. Mr. Jamali quoted a message from President Truman of 12 March, 1947, concerning the support which should be given to free peoples who were resisting the attacks of armed minorities or outside pressure. . . . If it were applied to Palestine, any idea of partition would have to be abandoned.

Sixth, loyalty to one's country was indispensable. The homelessness of the Jews was an acquired feeling which was detrimental to their loyalty and destroyed the unity of the countries in which they lived.

Seventh, humanitarian aid should be given to displaced persons. That principle should be wholeheartedly accepted. The whole world should share the burden equally. . . . The world's conscience should do more to help the displaced persons whom Zionism was not in a position to relieve.

Eighth, a distinction should be made between politics and religion. Judaism was a world religion linked indeed with Palestine as were Christianity and Islam, whereas Zionism was a modern political movement. . . . Many Jews were not Zionists. Throughout the world they had the right to brotherhood and equality in common with every other citizen.

Ninth, freedom of worship and the sanctity of the Holy Places should be observed. There was unanimous agreement on that principle. It should be respected in the future as it had been throughout Islamic history.

In conclusion, the Palestine problem would appear to be very simple if it were considered according to the principles of democracy, justice and international law.²⁶

The partition of Palestine passed in spite of the Arabs' best efforts. The vote came up just before the long weekend recess for American Thanksgiving Day which is always on a Thursday. When those in favor of partition saw that they did not have the required two thirds vote, they mustered the simple majority needed to postpone the vote until after the holiday. By that time enough delegations had been persuaded to change their minds to ensure passage of the partition plan by the required two thirds.

The United States and Russia competed in speedy recognition of the newly-proclaimed state of Israel. Although the Soviets later switched their support to the Arabs, the Arabs did not forget that initial recognition and the aid they had given the Zionists. Jamali recalls:

I embarrassed Vyshinsky (the Soviet Foreign Minister) several times. I said, "Mr. Vyshinsky, I want to ask you one question. You people always spoke of Zionism as a reactionary force, and I have in Baghdad some books in English published in Russia against Zionism as reactionary. How is it that you supported this movement and you created Israel? What did you create Israel for?" He replied, "I can't say."²⁷

Alphabetical seating in the UN placed Israel beside Iraq. Israel's Abba Eban writes of two incidents involving Jamali: in one he recalls that when he put a dead match in the ash tray between them, Jamali had called an attendant for another tray. Eban also writes that, when he entered a Geneva restaurant where Jamali was "in the midst of devouring a succulent steak." Jamali got up and left without finishing his meal.²⁸ When asked about these accounts Jamali roared with laughter: "I've never smoked and certainly never asked for a clean ashtray, and I would never give up a good steak for his sake!"²⁹

After the partition vote Jamali returned via London where he called on the Foreign Secretary. "How are you?" Bevin asked. "As bad as can be," was the answer. "We labored day and night at the UN so that justice might prevail, and when we were about to succeed in our efforts, Truman

overwhelmed the UN and made it pass the unjust resolution on partition." Mr. Bevin, replied, "Don't be in despair. Your efforts will not be wasted, and the Zionists will not be able to form a state in Palestine." (243)

The vote for partition inevitably provoked resistance by the indigenous Arab Palestinians, both Christian and Muslim. The neighboring Arab states came to their rescue, and war began. On the southern front the Egyptians were besieged in Falouga. Poorly led and with faulty arms and equipment, the Egyptian Army did not do well, and out of the humiliation of that defeat and the betrayal by their leaders the Egyptian Revolution was born in the hearts of Gamal Abdul Nasser and his comrades in arms. They appeared to the world several years later as the "Free Officers."

Reconciliation between Iraq and Egypt was rife. Jamali, then a Minister Plenipotentiary, was dispatched to Cairo to confer with his friend, Egyptian Prime Minister Naqrashi Pasha. One result was the sending of three "Fury" fighter aircraft from Iraq to Egypt. (347) En route from London to Cairo he stopped in Amman for an audience with King Abdullah. Jamali records how the Jordanian ruler opened his heart saying that, although he had been appointed by the Arab League as Commander-in-Chief, he had no knowledge of what was happening on the Egyptian front. The King complained that the Egyptians had not arranged for a visit, nor had they replied to his inquiries about their needs and difficulties. He told Jamali that Egypt had already confiscated a shipload of arms intended for the Jordan Army and that his army was not his own, since it was led by British officers. (255)

Jamali was Minister to Egypt for only twenty five days. Then he was called back to be Foreign Minister again. He says he had never before held a diplomatic post and lacked the money needed for entertaining. The Iraq government had to loan him 585 Iraq dinars (about US\$2500) so that he could buy a car, a 1948 Chrysler, suitable for his post. He took delivery of the auto in Beirut. It went to Cairo with him and back to Baghdad where it sits in his garage today. Hashim

Hilli from the Foreign Ministry accompanied him to Egypt, and their friendship continued over the years. Of the three weeks in Cairo as Minister he says, "I never had a meal alone. I was either guest or host at every lunch and dinner. I spent all my allowance and what money I had with me and came home penniless." (359)

King Farouq, a Sunni like the vast majority of Egyptian Muslims, invited Jamali to attend Friday prayers with him. Of course the answer was in the affirmative, although some Shi'as consider Friday prayers optional in the absence of the Hidden Imam.³⁰ Normal protocol for a newly arrived diplomat was that an audience be offered immediately after credentials had been presented, but in Jamali's case a week passed with no word from the Palace. Then a letter was delivered saying that His Majesty would be pleased to receive Jamali in three days.

However, on that same day there came a summons from Nuri in Baghdad, "Come right away for three days." Jamali contacted the Palace about what to do. Tal'at Pasha, the Royal Chamberlain, consulted King Farouq, and the word came back that it was left to Jamali's judgement. When the Chamberlain was asked what that response meant, he said, "Don't go." Jamali consulted the Prime Minister, who advised him to go, saying, "When you return we will be very happy to meet His Majesty with you." The Chief of the Royal *Diwan*, Hassan Yusef, gave similar advice, and so Jamali went to Baghdad.

The party who greeted him on arrival offered congratulations on his being appointed Foreign Minister! He did, indeed, return to Cairo after three days, but only to make his farewell calls. The King granted no audience, and so Jamali bade farewell to Farouq, to the Government and to the people of Egypt in a press article. Later as Foreign Minister he led Iraq's Delegation to the General Assembly where he was instrumental in securing a seat on the Security Council for Egypt. Returning to Baghdad he was greeted by the Egyptian Ambassador who expressed King Farouq's gratitude by

extending an invitation to Cairo. "Anyway, my friendship with Egypt was repaired," he comments.³¹

His AUB friendships continued. The day he arrived in Cairo, the Iranian Ambassador, Ali Deshti, rang the doorbell. He was the brother of Mohammed Deshti, Fadhel's classmate at the AUB. In the case of his brother's friend Deshti refused to stand on protocol, which dictated that Jamali as the new arrival should first call on him.

Once again the cost to newly independent nations who felt obliged to choose between the great powers became evident. Iraq's alignment with Britain was a stumbling block for Syria, since her own effort to distance herself from French control eventually led her to the left. Of course, there were other elements deterring Syria from federation with Iraq, a major one being King Abdullah's aspirations for a Syrian-Jordanian alliance. As spokesman for Jordan at the UN, Jamali argued for the Arab nature of Jerusalem and opposed the UN plan for its internationalization. This was King Abdullah's policy. However, when Jamali discovered that all the other Arab states were backing the UN plan, which Israel opposed, he could not in all conscience break Arab solidarity by opposing it, and so Iraq joined the other Arabs and the overwhelming majority of the UN. This so enraged King Abdullah that he made a special trip to Baghdad to protest Jamali's position. (154)

Jealousies continued to bedevil Arab unity. The USSR, a member of the Security Council, had opposed the admission of Jordan and several other states for some years. In Florence at the UNESCO Conference that same year, 1950, Jamali worked for Jordan's admission to that body. Egypt opposed the proposal simply because relations between King Farouq and King Abdullah were strained at that time. Only Israel and Egypt, in unusual agreement, opposed Jordan's admission. In spite of his occasional displeasure, however, King Abdullah twice honored Jamali: once with the First Order of Independence (*Istiqlal*) and later with the First Order of the Renaissance (*Nahda*).

Early in July, 1951, a meeting was held in the northern Iraqi mountain resort of Sarsang at which Crown Prince Abdulillah presided. The purpose was to discuss a handwritten proposal from King Abdullah for uniting the thrones of Iraq and Jordan. The Iraqi leaders approved and authorized formal negotiations to begin. The plan went unimplemented because King Abdullah was assassinated during prayers at the Mosque of Omar in Jerusalem on 20 July, 1951.

Later that year Jamali led Iraq's delegation to the United Nations General Assembly at the Palais Chaillot in Paris, and he recalls that, when he spoke in support of independence for Morocco, the next issue of a leading Paris daily, asked, "Who is this Fadhel Jamali who wants Moroccan independence? He is a Nazi!"

Jamali brought a copy of the paper to the General Assembly and read the article publicly. The Foreign Minister of France, Robert Schuman, then went to the rostrum to say that the paper did not represent the view of the French government and that he apologized to the delegate of Iraq.³² Although Jamali is clear both in his *Memoirs* and in interviews about this incident, the only reference in either *Le Monde* or *Le Figaro* is a comment that he was the first to open the subject of Morocco and that, while criticizing France, he was careful to avoid mentioning the massacres of Kurds and Assyrians in his own country. *Le Figaro* (26 November, 1951) calls his speech "injurious, lying, very calumnious . . . intolerable." On 14 December the same paper remarked that it was "surprising to hear the delegates of Iraq and Egypt speak of human rights." *Le Figaro* on 14 December, 1951, mentions that M. Robert Schuman "was led to speak three times during the debate" which was, in principle, a debate on procedure, on whether or not Morocco should be on the agenda of the General Assembly. *Le Figaro* reports that the motion to include Morocco on the agenda for debate was carried by 25 votes to 23, with 7 abstentions.

Jamali never let up on his conviction for Arab self-determination and independence. After Prime Minister Mendes-France had spoken of the decision to grant

independence to Tunisia he approached Jamali and asked, "Did that please you?" The reply was, "Yes — but what about Morocco?" The Premier said, "Wait a little."³³

In discussions of independence for Morocco and Tunisia there appeared to be little hope of France budging, and so Jamali suggested to his Moroccan and Tunisian friends in Cairo that they begin working for a conference on North Africa to be convened in New Delhi. Nehru favored the idea, but did not want to displease the French. Although that conference never occurred, the Bandung Afro-Asian Conference met four years later.³⁴

During a meeting of the Council of the Arab League in Cairo in 1952, Egypt's Foreign Minister, Ahmed Tay'i Farraj, gave a dinner at the Semiramis Hotel for the delegates. As Jamali entered the dining room he was called by a former Prime Minister of Egypt, Ali Maher Pasha, to join him at a table where the Egyptian leader was already seated with Prince (later King) Feisal who was then Foreign Minister of Sa'udi Arabia. Jamali joined them, and after the usual greetings and polite enquiries as to each other's health, Ali Maher said, "Now I want to clear up matters between you." Jamali replied that Iraq had done nothing in the way of aggression or propaganda against Sa'udi Arabia." We do not harbor anything but good will," he insisted, "and the Iraq government has no interests which clash with those of the government of Sa'udi Arabia." Turning to their host, he said, "I would like you, Pasha, to ask His Royal Highness if he has anything outstanding against Iraq." Prince Feisal agreed that there was nothing, and so Jamali continued:

I should like to address a question to His Royal Highness regarding the propaganda campaign in Damascus, Beirut, Amman and Baghdad against the present regime in Iraq and the money which is being spent for that purpose. For whose interest is it and with what objectives?

Feisal again said that he knew nothing about the matter, but Jamali pressed his point:

Your Royal Highness, kingdoms belong to God. Individuals perish. Where is Farouq today? Where is Quwatly? Where is King Abdullah? Aren't they all gone? But the people remain. Isn't it better that money should be spent for the welfare of the people and for their good instead of spending it on harmful propaganda between close brothers? (319f)

At this point their host intervened and asked that the discussion be postponed to another luncheon meeting in his home the next Wednesday. This was agreed. The luncheon took place; but, although, Jamali says, the occasion was cordial and friendly, they did not continue the uncomfortable subject. Ahmed Shuqairi of the Arab League asked Jamali what had been said, because he had heard that Prince Feisal had passed an uncomfortable night.

Jamali later came to regret what he described as his "harsh remarks" and wrote:

When I think of that conversation now I regret it. I had a just cause but I used a harsh method. That is why I feel I owe a sincere apology to His Majesty, King Feisal. (319-321)

Feisal's was not the only sleepless night. US Ambassador George Wadsworth, then accredited to Sa'udi Arabia, remarked to Jamali in New York where they met at the UN General Assembly that King Abdul Aziz had said to him one day recently that he, too, had spent a restless night worrying about Syria and wondering what Jamali was doing there. (319)

We do not know how much this conversation colored Iraqi-Sa'udi relations when Feisal succeeded his brother Sa'ud to the throne, but Sa'udi Arabia aligned herself with Egypt and, therefore, with Nasser's opposition to Iraq's joining the Baghdad Pact. Jamali in January, 1956, after talks on the subject with Nasser in Bandung, made a statement in the Iraq Parliament which, while it may have been accurate, did nothing to build unity:

The Arabs are threatened by communist activity supported by Egyptian propaganda and Sa'udi rials. That

Egypt and Sa'udi Arabia could align themselves with communist propaganda is a matter which makes the heart of every loyal Arab bleed. (323)

In the Government of Mustafa al-Omari (July-November, 1952) Jamali again held the Foreign Affairs portfolio, and he moved quickly and directly to reduce barriers between Iraq and Syria. He invited the Syrian Ambassador, Khalil Mardam Beg, a well-known poet, to his house and told him that he should always feel at home there and that he should come to his home or office without protocol. He also sent a confidential message to the Ministry of Interior and to each Iraqi embassy and consulate ordering the removal of all restrictions on Syrians, Lebanese and Palestinians entering Iraq. This he did at a time when the Syrian Ambassador in Baghdad was not being invited even to official functions.

Although the al-Omari government resigned that November while Jamali was heading Iraq's delegation to the General Assembly, he retained his portfolio under the new Prime Minister, General Nur ud-Din Mahmud. But when he was re-elected to Parliament representing Diwaniya in 1952, he was also elected as Speaker, and so he was obliged to relinquish Foreign Affairs.

Notes

- 1 United Nations Library, New York. UNCIO-01, p. 28, D-62.
- 2 Jamali. Interview taped by author. Zurich. 2 September, 1988.
- 3 Jamali. Author's notes from interview. Caux, Switzerland. 4 August 1969.
- 4 Jamali. Unpublished talk. Caux, Switzerland. 24 July, 1981, p. 2.
- 5 Jamali. Author's notes of interview. Caux, Switzerland. 20 September, 1986.
- 6 United Nations Records, New York, transcript of San Francisco meeting. 1945, 5314, p. 134. (also numbered pp. 9f.)
- 7 Jamali. Unpublished talk. Caux, Switzerland. 24 July, 1958, p. 3.
- 8 F. Buchman. *Remaking the World*. Blandford Press, London, 1961, p. 155.
- 9 *Ibid.*, p. 223.
- 10 United Nations Records, New York. Bevin quoted by Jamali. Transcript of the 26th Plenary Session, UN General Assembly. 28 November, 1947.
- 11 *The Forrestal Diaries*. p. 356f.

- 12 Jamali. Interview taped by author. Caux, Switzerland. 20 August, 1986.
- 13 *New York Times*. 6 February, 1947, p. 3.
- 14 *Ibid.*, 21 November, 1946, p. 14.
- 15 *Ibid.*, 30 April, 1947, p. 4.
- 16 *Ibid.*, p. 3.
- 17 *Ibid.*, 2 May, 1947, pp. 1f.
- 18 *Ibid.*, 24 July, 1947, p. 2.
- 19 *Ibid.*, 6 February, 1947, p. 3.
- 20 *Ibid.*, 30 April, 1947, pp. 4f.
- 21 *Ibid.*, p. 1.
- 22 Differences arose at once between those Jews who hold that loyalty to their country must be undivided and the Zionists, who claim that every Jew owes allegiance to Israel.
- 23 *New York Times*. 30 April, 1947, p. 4.
- 24 *Ibid.*, 2 May, 1947, p. 1.
- 25 *Ibid.*, 27 November, 1947, p. 3; also *Christian Science Monitor* of same date.

In November, 1990, Sarah wrote, "A charming invention. I accompanied Fadhel to New York, and my name was put on the list of delegates so that I would be admitted to the session . . . I usually listened to the discussion in the Ad Hoc Committee (on Palestine). Neither Fadhel nor I remember my being interviewed by the *New York Times* or the *Christian Science Monitor*."

- 26 United Nations Records, New York. Proceedings of 6 October, 1947. Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine; and *New York Times*, 7 October, 1947, p. 4.
- 27 Jamali. Interview taped by author. Zurich. 1 September, 1988.
- 28 Abba Eban. *Abba Eban, An Autobiography*. Random House, New York, 1977, p. 144 and p. 149.
- 29 Jamali. Interview taped by author. Zurich. 3 September, 1988.
- 30 Moojan Momen. *An Introduction to Shi'i Islam*. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1985, pp. 58-50 and pp. 161-171.

The term "hidden" refers to the belief held by many Shi'i that the twelfth Imam, son of the eleventh, disappeared (occulted) as a boy in the mid third century A.H., and that he will eventually return to earth in a messianic role.

- 31 Jamali. Interview taped by author. Zurich. 31 August, 1988.
- 32 Jamali. *Memoirs*. p. 472. This is Jamali's recollection. The quotation has not been found in the files either of *Le Figaro* or *Le Monde*, although Jamali is reported in *Le Monde* on 14, 24 & 26 November, 1951, and in *Le Figaro* on 26 November and 14 December, 1951. Other French papers not researched. A note from Jamali dated 22 November, 1990 states that both his own statement and the reply of M. Schuman were published on p. 78 of the monthly *Rissalet al Maghrib* of February, 1952, in Rabat, Morocco.
- 33 Jamali. Interview taped by author. Caux, Switzerland. 20 August, 1986, p. 3 of transcript.
- 34 Jamali. Interview by author. Caux, Switzerland. 8 August, 1969.



*Sheikh Abbas al-Jamali, father of
Fadhel. (Jamali collection)*



*Sitt Alwiya Khadija, mother of
Fadhel. (Jamali collection)*

*Mohammed Fadhel Jamali and Sarah Powell Jamali.
Wedding picture, 11 July, 1933. (Jamali collection)*






*Sheikh Abbas holding Laith,
the Jamalis' oldest son.
(Jamali collection)*

Fadhel with oars and friend go for a row on the Tigris. (Jamali collection)






The Jamalis at home with Laith (left) and Usama. (Jamali collection)



*Dr. Jamali and Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan of Pakistan.
(Jamali collection)*

Fadhel, Usama, Sarah and Abbas. (Jamali collection)





Signing the United Nations Charter for Iraq, San Francisco, 1945. (UN photo)



Dr. Jamali (second from left) joking with Faris el-Khoury of Syria at UN. 1950. Farid Zeineddine of Syria (center) and Adnan Pachachi of Iraq. (UN photo)

Ambassador Warren Austin (left), US Permanent Representative, Dr. Jamali (center), and Faris el-Khoury, Chairman of the Syrian Delegation. Fifth UN General Assembly, Lake Success, New York, 17 November, 1950. (UN photo)





Dr. Jamali (left) with Prof. Amazasp A. Aruntunian (right) of the USSR Foreign Ministry and Faris el-Khoury, Chairman of the Syrian Delegation. Lake Success, New York, 17 November, 1950. (UN photo)

Dr. Jamali talking with US Secretary of State John F. Dulles and UK Minister of State Kenneth Younger. (UN photo)





Three leaders of Arab delegations before a meeting of the First (Political) Committee, Lake Success, New York, 8 January, 1951. Ambassadors Mahmoud Fawzi (left) of Egypt, Charles Malik of Lebanon (center), and Jamali. (UN photo)

At the White House with President Eisenhower, 1954. (Jamali collection)





Dr. Jamali, leading Iraq delegation, Bandung, Indonesia, April, 1955. (New World News photo)

Addressing first Afro-Asian Conference, Indonesia, April, 1955. President Nasser of Egypt, lower right. (Jamali collection)





Moral Re-Armament Conference, Mackinac Island, Michigan. Driver, William Wake of Canada. Middle seat: Ray Foote Purdy (left) and the author. Rear: Abdul Majid Mahmud of Iraq (left) and Dr. Jamali. (New World News photo)

Visiting game farm in Windsor, Ontario, Canada. Left to right: Abdul Majid Mahmud, Iraq; Senator Abbas Mehdi, Iraq; Jamali with goose; Cyrus Minvalia, Pakistan; Dr. Viqar Hamdani, Pakistan, with goose. (New World News photo)





*Dr. M. F. Jamali at the World MRA
Assembly, Caux, Switzerland, August, 1956.
(New World News photo)*

*Pierre Mendes-France (left), Brahim al-Fadhli (Iraqi Chargé
d'Affaires), and Fadhel. Paris, 1956. (Jamali collection)*





Iraqi Delegates at Fifth United Nations General Assembly, 20 November, 1956, with Dr. Jamali. Left to right: Hashim Jawad, Permanent Iraqi Representative; Rashid Rauf, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Jamali, Dr. Adnan Pachachi; and Hashim Hilli of Foreign Affairs Ministry. (UN photo).

United Nations, 1957. Abdel Moneim Rifai (left), Jordan; Dr. Jamali; Mahmoud Fawzi, Egyptian Foreign Minister; and Dr. Charles Malik, Lebanese Foreign Minister. (UN Photo)






*With Eritrean leader Sheikh Mohammed Surur, Caux, 1985.
(New World News photo)*

*With President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia.
(Jamali collection)*





*Fadhel (right) and Sarah (left) with son Abbas and family.
Caux, 1986. (Jamali collection)*



*Dr. Jamali and author at MRA Assembly, Caux, Switzerland, August 1986.
(New World News photo)*

*Recalling The Forgotten Factor play with author Alan Thornhill (right), and
UK Ambassador A. R. K. Mackenzie. Caux, Switzerland, 1988. All three
were in San Francisco in 1945. (New World News photo)*





Hotel Rigiblick, Zurich. Dr. Jamali talks with Mayor of Massawa, Eritrea (right), and Swiss friend. (New World News photo)

7

Diplomacy of Relationships

Although Syria was represented at the UNO meetings in 1945, French troops were still in the country. It was a year later that President Shukri al-Quwatly and his government achieved complete evacuation. Jamali was one of the Iraq delegation attending the celebration, and he recalls President Quwatly saying in his speech on that historic occasion, "There shall be no flag flying over Syria except the Syrian flag, and nothing shall be above it except the flag of Arab unity."

When the Syrian President's first move was to go to Riyadh and pay his respects to King Abdul Aziz ibn Sa'ud, Iraqi sensibilities were offended. Raised as he was on traditional Hashemite rivalry with the house of Sa'ud, the Regent, Prince Abdulillah, was "stunned," and Tahsin Qadri, Iraq's Minister to Syria, was "embarrassed." He arranged for President Quwatly to visit Baghdad right away, "but although Prince Abdulillah was psychologically unprepared for such a visit, he could not turn it down." Finally persuaded to go to the airport to welcome the Syrian party, the Regent "wore a sport shirt instead of the normal formal attire" and the Syrians felt the slight. Jamali records that both President Quwatly and Prime Minister al-Jabiri were, "somewhat peeved." (20)

Prime Minister al-Jabiri asked to meet Jamali privately, and he exploded, complaining of the lack of courtesy, lack of cordiality and lack of reciprocity on the part of the Iraqi authorities. Jamali pleaded for tolerance, for generosity and for overlooking official trivia. He said, "Iraq is your home and the Iraqi leaders are your brethren." In spite of Jamali's plea the visit further muddied the waters it was intended to clear: from then on President al-Quwatly and most of his entourage turned more than ever toward Sa'udi Arabia and Egypt rather than to Iraq. This attempt by Jamali at reconciliation, while not a great success, nonetheless reveals a quality which let others feel they could speak frankly with him and have a fair hearing.

He kept up such personal relationships as were possible with Syrian leaders, whatever the strains on the political level. With Faris al-Khoury, who led the Syrians in San Francisco and at later UN sessions as well as at Arab League meetings, there was always whole-hearted cooperation.

The man who had sought Jamali's ear in confidence when the Syrian delegation had come to Baghdad earlier, Sa'adullah al-Jabiri, represented Syria at the Arab League meeting in Cairo in 1946. There was shouting and interruption, and Jamali felt obliged to preside rather strictly. After the first meeting, al-Jabiri teased Jamali, "Fadhel, have you put us back into school?" "Yes, Sa'adullah Beg," was the reply, "And you needed it." (22)

Later he visited Sa'adullah in Damascus when he lay terminally ill in the Omayyad Hotel, and the Syrian leader referred to Iraq's proposals for federation:

Fadhel, I regret very much not having gone along with Iraq. I am greatly disappointed in the achievements of the Arab League. (30)

Syrian concerns over Iraq's desire to federate with them were eased in November, 1946 by two reassuring statements. One was Prime Minister Nuri es-Sa'id's declaration in an interview that "the Syrian people alone will determine the future of Syria." The other was a declaration by Jamali in

Cairo that the political committee of the Arab League had investigated the alleged "Greater Syria" controversy and had found nothing in it to threaten the independence or the internal regime of any country.¹

In the ensuing years, beginning with the coup of Husni ez-Za'im early in 1949, Syria vacillated between Amman, Cairo and Baghdad in her alignment and moved into dictatorship, hoping, among other things, to annex the Muslim areas of Lebanon. Za'im's regime ended when he was killed on 13 August, 1949. (59) During this period Jamali was Minister of Foreign Affairs without being a Member of Parliament, a condition legally possible only for six months. While he was in New York leading the delegation to the UN General Assembly, that six months expired, and he was appointed Permanent Representative of Iraq to the UN. This ended his close involvement with Iraqi-Syrian affairs for the moment.

Jamali sought a wider, Jordanian-Syrian-Iraqi federation, but sensitivities and suspicions proved too strong. When earlier in 1949 Husni ez-Za'im overthrew the Syrian government and dismissed President Shukri al-Quwatly, Iraq responded to overtures from the new government in Damascus, and there was an exchange of delegations. Notwithstanding the strong Hashemite family ties with Iraq, King Abdullah sensed a threat to his own hope to be King of Greater Syria. Jordan's Premier, Tawfiq Abul Huda, was sent to Baghdad in 1950 to protest what Jordan alleged was Iraq's interference in Syria. He said that King Abdullah was furious, and that he had even threatened to invade Iraq. Jamali laughed and said that Iraq would certainly welcome His Majesty and the Jordanian army. Jamali tried to give Tawfiq Pasha a true picture of the situation. He asked him to pay his respects to His Majesty and to assure him that Iraq would always be glad if His Majesty could achieve the unity of Syria and Jordan. He also asked whether, if that were not possible at present, would His Majesty prefer that Syria should be estranged from both Iraq and Jordan? Would not His Majesty prefer that Syria and Iraq should be closer together until an eventual unity of all three were possible? He put himself

at King Abdullah's disposal in any policy he might put forward on the subject, their aim being one and the same.

These suggestions were duly conveyed to King Abdullah upon the Prime Minister's return, and the message telephoned back was, His Majesty kisses your cheeks and has full confidence in your stand. Pursue your policy. (52 & 154)

Although Iraq has a slight Shi'a majority, the Sunnis are generally dominant. It was not until 29 March, 1947, 23 years after the monarchy had been established, that there was a Shi'i Prime Minister, Saleh Jabr. Jamali continued as Foreign Minister, for the first time under a Premier from his own community.² He was off again that Fall to the UN General Assembly, a fateful session for the Arab majority in Palestine. At the 92nd Plenary Session Jamali rose to support the admission of Pakistan and Yemen and to express his regret that the veto had been used against the admission of Transjordan.

In 1953 King Feisal II of Iraq reached the age of eighteen and ascended the throne. That autumn he chose Jamali as his first Prime Minister. One evening during his first week in office he was called to Qasr ar-Rihab, the residence of Crown Prince Abdulillah. There he found Nuri Pasha already with the Prince. Nuri had received a letter from Dr. Ma'aruf ed-Dawalibi, a former Prime Minister of Syria, asking for Iraq's help to remove Syria's dictator, Col. Shishakly. Dr. Dawalibi was invited to Baghdad, and special precautions were taken to keep the visit a secret. He was loaned a secluded villa where his discussions with the Iraqi leaders took place.

Less than five years later Jamali, at his trial by the Revolutionary Military Tribunal, was amazed to hear a letter read, allegedly addressed to the Court by Dr. Dawalibi. That letter charged that he had been held under duress pending his signature of a document asking for Iraq's help. The letter further said that he prided himself on the downfall of Nuri es-Sa'id and Prince Abdulillah, the very men whose support he had solicited five years earlier.

When Jamali became Prime Minister in September, 1953, a Jordanian delegation was already in Baghdad negotiating a

three million dinar loan from Iraq. Before that business was concluded Israeli forces attacked the Jordanian village of Qibiya, killing men, women and children. Jamali at once flew to Amman to attend a meeting of the Arab League's Political Committee and, on seeing the destruction of the Qibiya village school, announced a donation of 10,000 dinars towards its reconstruction.

He went to Cairo in January, 1954, to attend the Arab League Council meeting at which he presented a plan for Arab unity. This proposal was discussed at length with President Mohammed Nagib and Prime Minister Gamal Abdul Nasser at a private dinner in President Nagib's home. The Egyptian papers, presumably at government inspiration, came out in support of the project. Jamali felt that his arguments for the federation appealed to Colonel Nasser who later adopted the idea of Pan-Arab unity as his own. There were Syrian objections, and the League Council referred his plan to the member states for study. (379f)

When Jamali returned to Baghdad he reviewed the continuing Syrian question with Prince Abdulillah and his Minister of Finance, Abdul Karim al-Uzri, in whose home he and Sarah had been married. After long discussion they decided to ask ex-Premier Saleh Jabr to go to Beirut to help exiled Syrian leaders. Around midnight the Prince, al-Uzri and Jamali went to Saleh Jabr's house, woke him up and told him their proposal. He accepted the plan, and they discussed his departure for Beirut. They told him that 100,000 Iraqi dinars (about US\$400,000) would be sent to the Embassy in Beirut at his disposal.

While Jabr's overt mission was to hold discussions with the Lebanese authorities regarding the Iraq pipeline branch from Mafraq in Jordan to Sidon, his covert mission was to contact Syrians in Beirut who were already working for the downfall of Shishakly and to render them moral or material help. There was more than one way to work for the desired federation.

Whatever role the Jabr mission played, Shishakly was overthrown. He stayed first in Beirut but was encouraged to

leave by the Lebanese authorities and went on to Sa'udi Arabia. However, Jamali notes,

The fall of the anti-Iraq dictator did not bring an end to the obstacles in the path of Syrian-Iraqi federation. Efforts had to continue. (76)

Whether they "had to continue" or not, they did; but Baghdad's persistent efforts to federate with Syria aroused concern and opposition both from Riyadh and Cairo. In any case, pro-Baghdad elements in Syria continued to receive subsidies from Iraq. Nuri es-Sa'id himself had doubts about this Syrian policy, and ultimately Jamali's government resigned. Such unflagging pursuit of Syrian-Iraqi federation as the necessary first step in building Arab unity thus often divided the Arabs, losing sight of its ultimate goal.

Although it lasted less than a year, the Jamali government's accomplishments were considerable. A report by the Chargé d'Affaires of the Netherlands, B. A. Piets, three months after Jamali had formed his Government, states in unofficial translation:

...so far Dr. Jamali has scored high... the administration of this government, which to a large extent is being inspired and carried by the energetic personality of the Prime Minister, is more business-like, more beneficent, and more powerful...

Within 14 days the state of emergency was lifted... there has been an almost complete reshuffle of the *mutasarrifs* (provincial governors), resulting in the removal of some corrupt elements... a committee has been installed for combatting corruption... government information has been organized on completely new lines... better and more complete; this has removed a not insignificant stone of offence.

An energetic Mayor of Baghdad has been installed... the Ministry of Development shows remarkable resolution... foreign policy is good and tranquil... a program for building houses has been launched; labor laws have been supplemented; the salaries of civil servants have been increased... the energetic appearance of Jamali et al. has given the present cabinet a certain

popularity, which none of its predecessors has ever had . . .³

Mr. Piets, however, was correct in his premonitions about Nuri's attitude toward younger leadership, and in another letter to his Foreign Ministry in the Hague he noted, again in unofficial translation:

. . . Nuri es-Sa'id and followers have no interest in the success of Jamali's cabinet . . . Nuri's attitude and . . . the ever present pressure of the non-governing "old clique" presents a constant and real danger for Jamali's cabinet . . . at the same time there is constant pressure from the left . . .

Young Iraqis from private circles are convinced that the "old clique" is using the workers' agitations—which are instigated by the communists—to overthrow the Jamali cabinet, and to take over the reins of government for their own benefit.⁴

Mr. Piets commented further on 30 December, 1953:

. . . the Jamali cabinet has taken a course which is refreshing and is giving hope for the future. The members of this cabinet are non-corrupt. Jamali himself can be described as an idealist . . . the progressiveness shown by Dr. Jamali has certainly not failed to make a great impression on public opinion.⁵

He brought a freshness, an innovative mind to government. When Sheikh Fehed, Kuwait's Minister of Public Works, came to Baghdad he called on Jamali at his home. Jamali expressed Iraq's readiness to let Kuwait dig a canal to Kuwait from the Euphrates using one of the river's old stream beds to bring fresh water both for drinking and irrigation. He made the offer without conditions, but nothing was done from the Kuwait side, and the installation of plants to distill fresh water from the sea went ahead soon after. (308)

When he flew to the Arab League meeting in Cairo to present his plan for Arab unity he failed to consult King Hussein, although he did consult Egyptian leaders. This was viewed as a slight by the Jordanian Ruler. To compound matters a rumor reached him in Baghdad on his return that King

Hussein had been told that Jamali had given 100,000 dinars to a plot against him, and that Iraqi troops were ready to move into Jordan. Jamali took his usual direct approach. Stunned by the allegations he went at once to King Feisal II, told him the story and asked permission to go to Jordan. It was granted. On 11 February a small military plane took him to Amman where he went directly to the Palace. He writes,

I told his Majesty, "There are no 100,000 dinars in the Iraqi budget for your assassination and there are no Iraqi forces on the border. I have always cherished loyalty to the Hashemite house in Jordan and in Iraq. I believe in the unity of the Hashemite house, and Your Majesty has a home in Baghdad just as you have in Amman.

"For my part I am always ready to receive your direct commands by telephone. Mischief makers must not be given a chance to intervene between Iraq and Jordan, or between Your Majesty and myself." (161f)

Confidence was restored by Jamali's forthrightness, and with the atmosphere thus cleared they were able to discuss a wide range of Arab affairs. When King Hussein learned of his guest's intention to return to Baghdad the same day, he insisted on his passing the night in Amman and offered his personal plane to take him to the ancient Nabatean city of Petra the next day accompanied by the President of the Senate, Sa'id al-Mufti. He spent the second night also in Amman to attend a palace luncheon in his honor and left with relations cordial and clear. Two weeks later King Hussein made an official visit to Baghdad and Basra.

Another Israeli raid occurred on the Jordanian village of Nahaleen soon after King Hussein's return to Amman. Jamali, still Prime Minister, offered help. An officer of the General Staff was sent. At the same time an unusually severe flood threatened Baghdad, peaking on 29 March. Internally, there was a lot of political maneuvering. He went to the Palace and expressed his desire to resign after he had done two things: The first was to ensure that the 100,000 Iraqi dinars already allocated for Saleh Jabr's use would be sent as authorized, and the second was to conclude the Military Aid Agreement with

America. His Majesty agreed, and he stayed in office until he had taken care of both items.

Authorization for the Syrian money passed the lower House, but it was blocked in the Senate by the head of the Finance Committee, ex-Prime Minister Towfiq es-Suweidi. Jamali requested a recess and invited es-Suweidi to a side room. There Jamali told Suweidi that, if he did not expedite the business, he, Jamali, would be forced to reveal that the original figure had been 250,000 dinars, a fact which es-Suweidi, although he was then Foreign Minister, had not been told. To reveal this in the parliamentary session would have caused Suweidi embarrassment, for it would have shown that his own Cabinet lacked confidence in him. With this made clear they went back to the Senate floor and the item passed. With Jabr's money for the dissident Syrian leaders assured and the Military Aid Agreement with the US signed, he resigned on 19 April, 1954.

Nuri once again was asked to form a Government, and the next morning Jamali was called to the Palace to meet the Crown Prince and Nuri Pasha. Nuri asked him to join his Cabinet as Minister of Foreign Affairs. When Jamali declined Nuri protested that Jamali had promised to work with him. He reminded Nuri that the promise was conditional on his reconciliation with Saleh Jabr. He further pointed out that Nuri's obstruction on the issue of Syria in Parliament made it impossible to accept his offer.

Other candidates for portfolios agreed with Jamali's stand, and so Arshad al-Omari was asked to form a government. He, too, asked Jamali to be Foreign Minister. Jamali accepted on two conditions: first, that the policy of working toward a Syrio-Iraqi federation should be continued, and, second, that the present Parliament be dissolved and new elections held. These stipulations were accepted, and a government was formed.

Shortly after resuming office as Foreign Minister he collapsed at work. A duodenal ulcer was diagnosed, and he entered the AUB Hospital in Lebanon. His room there was soon crowded with Syrian leaders and Iraqi friends urging

action on federation. His physical condition was not equal to the long discussions so he asked the Prime Minister to request Saleh Jabr to come and help. Jabr could not come, and so Ahmed Mukhtar Baban was deputized instead.

Jamali went into the Lebanese mountains to the Hotel Mont Vert in Broumanna, a well-known resort town, hoping to reduce the flow of visitors and get the needed rest, but pro-federation Syrians continued to visit him there to talk about possible unity. These discussions were predicated on King Feisal II of Iraq being the head of the federated state.

To Prime Minister al-'Omari he wrote from the Mont Vert on 9 May, 1954, that the previous night he and Ahmed Mukhtar Baban had met with Sabri al-Asali, Prime Minister of Syria, and Mikhail Ilian. The meeting lasted until one in the morning with al-Asali criticizing Iraq's reliance on the People's Party, on Ma'aruf ad-Dawalibi and other personalities. The Syrian Prime Minister felt that if Iraqis were serious about federation they would rely on himself and on Mikhail Ilian. (54f) He was certainly dealing with federation on a high level, but such a schedule was hardly the rest cure he needed.

In spite of the lengthy visits and the intense talks, he took off in early July, 1954, first to touch base in Baghdad, and then to go on to London and the United States where he had been invited to receive an honorary degree from his alma mater, Columbia. He also wanted a medical check-up and had planned to see President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles. When the Syrians with whom he been discussing possible federation heard of his travel plans, they asked him to raise the matter of Iraqi-Syrian federation in both London and Washington, hoping to receive assurances that Israel would not attack Syria if federation were accomplished.

He met with Selwyn Lloyd, the British Foreign Secretary, in London, and discussed the matter. The Foreign Secretary said that as far as he could see the British government would welcome such an event. He advised that Jordan also be included. Lloyd made it clear that this was his personal view, but to make the matter formal he offered to submit the

question to the Cabinet and then give his Government's view on Jamali's return from the States. (93f)

There were two days of long meetings in Washington with John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State. They ranged over the general international scene as well as focusing on Iraqi-American relations and the proposed Syrian-Iraqi federation. On the latter question Dulles frankly stated that he could not support such a federation at that juncture nor could he give any assurance that Israel would not attack Syria. He pointed out that the Arms Agreement which the United States had just signed with Iraq had already aroused Israel's friends in the Congress and that, if the United States were to support a Syrian-Iraqi federation, it would be interpreted as a threat to Israel's existence.

Dulles did point out, however, that, if Iraq joined the Northern Tier and then federated with Syria, the case could be made that the step was a measure against communism rather than against Israel. This conversation was an important factor in Jamali's later efforts to bring about Iraqi participation in the Northern Tier and the Baghdad Pact. However, while he was in Washington, the government of Ershad al-Omari resigned, and Nuri Pasha was asked once again by the Palace to form a new one. "Plus ça change, plus ça reste la même chose!"

On his return to Baghdad that summer of 1954 he went north to report to the King who was in the mountains at the summer resort of Sursang. Jamali's room in the hotel was next to Nuri's, and he soon discovered that Nuri had been hurt by his earlier refusal to join his government. Nuri complained to him, saying, "I thought I could always depend on you, and I never expected you to let me down." Jamali told him that federation with Syria was important to him and that he refused to compromise on it. Nuri replied that Syrian-Iraqi federation could never take place unless France were convinced. He reproached Jamali saying that the poor Iraqis, who had been waiting so long to enjoy the fruits of their oil production, might come out badly in a federation with Syria,

since the Syrians were clever and Iraq might be exploited. This odd argument left Jamali unconvinced. (95ff)

Nonetheless, after some debate, he and Nuri embraced with Nuri's assurance of his regard for Fadhel as a loyal friend. He asked that he continue to support him in foreign affairs and that he lead the Iraqi delegation again to the UN General Assembly. This Jamali did and continued to do until July, 1958. He was eloquent in defending the right to freedom for Libya, Somalia, Ethiopia and the North African Arab states—all of whom to some degree achieved that goal. But it remained a great disappointment that the UN never reached a satisfactory solution for the Palestine question.

At that Ninth Session of the UN General Assembly in 1954 Jamali's relationship with Andrey Vyshinsky, then Foreign Minister of the USSR, offers a glimpse of his capacity to make friends without yielding on his own basic convictions. In the Political Committee he referred to Vyshinsky's "new approach" on disarmament as a "great step forward" and went on to say that he did not wish to agree with those who said that the new Soviet approach to disarmament was a mere tactical move designed to mobilize the partisans of peace and give them new ammunition for propaganda. Jamali said,

Let us hope that the Soviet move means that the USSR is changing its policy as a result of a real change of heart and mind . . . Mr. Vyshinsky rightly speaks of forgetting the past and emphasizing points of agreement rather than differences. May we hope that the USSR will show the world its good intentions by deeds as well as by words? . . . by a final stoppage of the Cold War? . . . amend its subversive communist activities in countries like my own? . . .

We need to effect two ideological changes before disarmament can be really effective and lasting.

The first is ideological disarmament . . . the two opposing camps must stop attacking each other, . . . stop the Cold War. We know very well that communism today amounts to a new, militant, materialistic religion. It has its crusaders, its missionaries and its martyrs all over the world . . . (it) defies all recognized spiritual, social and moral values of the non-communist world.

At one time in history there were Crusade wars between Christians and Muslims. Today the two religions can fraternize very well in most of their points of contact. Is communism willing to abandon its crusading and to disarm ideologically? If so, we can speak of physical disarmament very safely . . .

Along with achieving ideological disarmament we must achieve moral rearmament. We must recognize that our problems and differences as nations cannot be solved so long as we are selfish, so long as our political honesty and integrity is questioned.

International problems and tensions, if dealt with in the spirit of moral rearmament, will be easily solved. For we shall search our souls for our own motives and weaknesses, recognize our mistakes, and then cultivate brotherhood. Mankind will become one great family . . . Are the statesmen of the world ready . . . are we ready for ideological disarmament and at the same time for moral rearmament? If the answer is "yes," then . . . physical disarmament will be realized and atomic energy could very well be turned to peaceful uses. If not, humanity is doomed.⁶

A few days later in the same Committee Vyshinsky accused Jamali of playing with words:

Please, Mr. Jamali, disarm your own ideology which prompts you to ask us to disarm. I do not ask you to renounce your ideology. I ask you to disarm your ideology. I shall wait.⁷

Jamali's call for moral and spiritual rearmament had registered, perhaps even interested the Russian, for he soon invited friendship. Jamali recalls,

We often had duels, you know. When he attacked America I would recite some verse from the Bible like "Those who have not sinned must cast the first stone." I spoke of moral rearmament. I said we cannot disarm because we have no confidence in each other. You need moral rearmament. He asked, "What does Dr. Jamali mean by 'moral rearmament'?"

We had good times in that way, and he invited me a few times for dinner with Faris al-Khoury (a Syrian delegate) and Charles Malik (Jamali's AUB classmate from Lebanon). Those were pleasant occasions.

I asked him, "Well, Mr. Vyshinsky, will you tell me how it is that you came to vote for the partition of Palestine? I know that your authors and philosophers consider Zionism a reactionary movement. How did you support that action?" He smiled, but he could not answer.

Once when he invited us to dinner I had not seen him at the General Assembly—he hadn't come. I asked him that evening, "What were you doing—what was the matter?" He said, "I was relaxing... I read novels." "Don't you like music?" He said. "Of course—I am a musician myself. I play the cello." So I said, "I want to ask you, Mr. Vyshinsky, you often speak of Prokofiev and Stravinsky and Tchaikovsky and all these as 'bourgeois musicians'—what do you mean by that?" He said, "We mean that the masses do not understand them." I said, "Don't you expect the masses to raise their cultural level one day and appreciate them?" He said, "I think you are right—I think you are right." I asked "Who is a popular musician that the masses like now?" He said, "Ipolitoff Ivanov."

Later in London at the HMV shop I bought one of Ivanov's records. It is called "From a Caucasian Village"—very charming—very popular. I didn't know Ivanov, but thanks to Vyshinsky I now do.

I last saw Vyshinsky alive only a few days before his death. We were at a reception given by the Indian delegation. I was standing alone and he came to me and said, "Dr. Jamali, greetings. We think you are an honest man." I said, "I hope so." He said, "But honest men are not afraid of communism. Why are you afraid of communism?" I laughed and said, "Afraid of you? Have you ever seen me afraid of you?" I have a photo of us together.

When he died I said in the General Assembly: "We were bitter opponents in views and in politics, but humanly speaking we were brothers."⁸

Jamali returned to Baghdad at the end of the year and plunged into preparations for a defense pact with Turkey and Syria. He bore in mind Dulles's remark that it would be easier for America to supply arms to Iraq through such a pact for the purpose of containing communism than to arm Iraq directly and risk a Zionist lobby complaint that they might be

used against Israel. Early in 1955 the Prime Minister of Turkey, Adnan Menderes, came to Baghdad, and on 24 February the Turkish-Iraqi Mutual Cooperation Pact was signed. It later developed into what became known successively as the Baghdad Pact, METO (Middle East Treaty Organization) and finally CENTO (Central Treaty Organization) of which Iran was a member also. Hopes of having Lebanon, Jordan and Syria join rapidly faded, and Iraq was the only Arab member. Nonetheless Jamali persisted, mindful of Dulles' suggestion.

Archibald Roosevelt was present in Washington at the meeting of the "wise men" with Dulles when the idea of the pact was conceived, and he writes

I recall vividly being asked by CIA Deputy Director, General Pearre Cabell, to attend a meeting . . . presided over by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in 1957.

A decision was being made about countering the forces of Arab nationalism, specifically their radical form in the United Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria, using the instrument of the Baghdad Pact. I looked around the table and saw only one other person, Loy Henderson, who had a first hand understanding of the Middle East and really knew what we were talking about. The subject under discussion was a mission on which Henderson would be sent to the presumably friendly capitals of the (USSR's) periphery to line up opposition to the UAR. Secretary Dulles was canvassing for our views.

I slipped a note to "Pree" Cabell saying, "I wish to voice my strong dissent from the opinions expressed here." He scribbled a comment and passed it back to me: "It is not for us to give our views on matters of policy." He was a soldier who saluted when a commander gave him his orders.

So when Dulles said, "I presume we are all in agreement with the decision we have reached here" and looked around the room, I kept my eyes on the table and remained silent . . . I could not sleep that night . . . I tried to locate Henderson, but it was too late . . . Afterward he told me, "I heard you were trying to get hold of me, and I knew why. The decision was a mistaken one."

The Baghdad Revolution of July 1958 put an end to this policy of containment. Yet we did not learn.⁹

Jamali still cherished his dream that this Treaty could pave the way for a Syrian-Iraqi federation as the nucleus of a wider Arab unity which could aid the Arabs of Palestine. Reaction to the new pact was not long in coming. The Egyptian Minister for National Guidance, Major Salah Salem, went to Damascus to argue against the Pact. From 26 February to 2 March he met with the Syrian Prime Minister and others, and their joint decision was not to join the Iraqi-Turkish Alliance. They announced their plan to form an Arab organization for mutual defense and economic cooperation which Jamali took as a thinly veiled attack on the Baghdad Pact. Arab policy remained divided by mistrust. In many ways the proposal for Arab cooperation seemed a reasonable one, but personalities clashed.

From that point on Egypt's national radio, "Voice of the Arabs," with the most powerful transmission facilities in the area launched an intensive campaign against western influences and singled out Nuri es-Sa'id, Iraq's pro-western leader, in particular.

Baghdad was apparently taken by surprise by the viciousness of the Egyptian radio attacks and did not have the skilled radio personnel to mount an effective counter attack.¹⁰

This propaganda barrage against Baghdad continued until the 1958 Revolution.

The Baghdad Pact remained a point of controversy among the Arabs. None whitewashed the wrongs committed by the West, but some were blinded by those wrongs and thus walked rather naively into the communist orbit. Others, who were clearer on the nature of communism and the class struggle as well as on the evils of Western capitalism, felt as Jamali did that the smaller nations had to choose the lesser of the two evils. This meant the West for the Baghdad Pact members. It was a painful choice, costly either way.

The issue came to a head at the meeting of Arab Prime Ministers in Cairo in January, 1955, just before Cairo's "Voice of the Arabs" opened its barrage against Baghdad. Nuri

es-Sa'íd, Prime Minister again, shrewdly decided not to go and asked Jamali to represent Iraq. He arrived there on 27 January. After a long and heated exchange of views, only Prince Feisal of Sa'udi Arabia sided with Nasser. During a recess Jamali suggested to Nasser that it might be better not to cut the bridge between Egypt and Iraq but that a delegation might be sent to Baghdad to talk to Nuri. Nasser agreed, presented the proposal and it was approved.

Later when Khalid al-Azm became Foreign Minister in Damascus, he visited Baghdad and began talks with Jamali which were continued in Syria. Al-Azm's position was that the Arab states should move together at any cost. Jamali asked,

If one Arab state does not want to move, should we all remain static? Or, if the Arab states are heading for an abyss, should we all follow? (100)

Al-Azm said that they should, but his position apparently did not represent that of his President, Hashim al-Atassi, because a cable from the Iraq Embassy in Damascus in February, 1955, had stated that al-Atassi believed that France, Sa'udi Arabia and Egypt were doing their best to keep Syria and Iraq apart. The cable noted that the President had talked of this with the US Ambassador, alleging that large sums of money were being spent by other Arab states to undermine the Baghdad Pact. He expressed his fear that, if a leftist government came into power, the Turks might try to recover some of the Syrian territory they had lost after World War I. Federation with Syria was proving as elusive as ever.

What might have been the result if Jamali and Iraq had gone along with Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Sa'udi Arabia, leaving the Baghdad Pact and moving with the other Arab states is an interesting field for speculation.

Notes

1 *New York Times*. 30 November, 1946, p. 11.

2 *Ibid.*, 30 March, 1947, p. 34.

Author's note: Although this is historically true, Jamali refuses affiliation to any community, insisting that he is "... simply a Muslim,

- in theory and practice fostering Iraqi unity without divisions of religion or race." In adulthood he certainly rose above narrow sectarianism, and it is unfair to him simply to identify him as a Shi'a political figure.
- 3 Netherlands Foreign Ministry Archives, the Hague. Report from Chargé d'Affaires B. A. Piets in Baghdad. 17 December, 1953.
 - 4 *Ibid.*, Letter from Chargé d'Affaires in Baghdad B. A. Piets. 23 December, 1953. (911.31 IRAQ Polit. Verhoud. en Partijen 1950-1954).
 - 5 *Ibid.*, 30 December, 1953.
 - 6 United Nations Library, New York. Proceedings, Ninth General Assembly, 693rd Meeting of the First Committee, pp. 121-123, 19 October, 1954.
 - 7 *Ibid.*, 99th Meeting of the First Committee, 99th Meeting, p. 211.
 - 8 Jamali. Interview taped by author. Switzerland. August, 1986.
 - 9 Roosevelt, pp. 233f.
 - 10 Douglas A. Boyd. *Broadcasting in the Arab World*. Temple University Press, Philadelphia, n.d., p. 107.

8

Bandung: the First Afro-Asian Conference

As the tide of colonialism receded following World War II, new nations were born on the continents of Africa and Asia, and they found their way to independence. Cut adrift from the paternalism of the colonial relationship, these new countries were eager to manage their own affairs, but there was also the need for links with like-minded independent nations who faced similar challenges. The British Commonwealth filled that need to a limited degree for some, and the franco-phone nations had their own basis of association, but neither offered a place for countries that had been under other control or who shunned any continuing link with the former colonial power. They, too, were new to the world of independent self-government and needed a basis of association with their peers.

Their first coming together really occurred when the United Nations Special Session on Palestine was meeting in Flushing Meadows, New York, in 1947. The Arabs felt the need for understanding, consultation and support on a basis broader than membership in the Arab League, and so Jamali approached Ambassador Assaf Ali of the Indian Delegation with the suggestion that he convene the UN delegates representing African and Asian nations "in order to have

them unite their efforts in defending the right of the Arabs of Palestine to self determination." (616)

Then, of course, India was not yet partitioned and there was no Pakistan. Assaf Ali responded by inviting the Afro-Asian delegates to a luncheon in a restaurant near the UN in Flushing Meadows. There they discussed the need for cooperation on the Palestine question to insure that it would be handled in the spirit of the Charter. Jamali notes that

At that luncheon the foundation stone of the Afro-Asian group was laid, and contact between the Asian and African members became a regular practice in dealing with any problem brought before the United Nations that affected the Asian and African members." (616)

On the issue of the partition of Palestine the Africans and Asians voted as a bloc and began to realize what power their unity wielded. At that point in the evolution of the United Nations, the Afro-Asian group was a minority: today they number over two thirds of the member-states. Although partition proceeded in spite of their expressed objections and questions as to the legality of such an action, the Afro-Asian bloc had flexed its muscles, and others became aware that here was a force with which to reckon. They learned the strength of their united stand on any particular issue.

In 1949 Sir Benegal Rau, head of the Indian delegation, called the Afro-Asian group together from time to time for consultation concerning the future of the former Italian colonies of Libya, Eritrea and Somaliland. In all these meetings Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan of Pakistan gave encouragement and wisdom. Charles Malik of Lebanon, Mahmud Fawzi of Egypt, Faris al-Khoury of Syria and Jamali continued to work together.

In that same year, 1949, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India convened a conference in New Delhi to discuss action against the Netherlands, who were still against independence for Indonesia. The conference resolved to refuse harbor and landing facilities to Dutch ships and aircraft, and action was taken. Later when the question of Morocco and Tunisia came before the United Nations in 1953, France had

refused to acknowledge the General Assembly's jurisdiction, and there was no other body to which to appeal. Mere expressions of hope were ineffective. Jamali sent an appeal to Nehru through his friend, Sayyid Mahmud, India's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, asking the Prime Minister to convene the Afro-Asian states to consider the Moroccan and Tunisian questions and to deal with France as they had with the Netherlands. Nehru's reply was that he did not want to provoke France, but that, if such a conference were to be held somewhere else, India would gladly join. (617)

In the meantime views were exchanged on the subject between India, Pakistan and Indonesia. Jamali wrote to his friend Allal al-Fasi, the leader of the Moroccan Istiqlal (Independence) Party who was in Cairo at the time, advising him that effort should be made to hold an Asian-African conference that could take a unanimous decision to confront colonialism in North Africa. Jamali hoped that India might undertake this project but also said that the key for action was in Egypt's hands. He closed his letter saying,

If you could influence the Egyptian government, please let me know so that I can play my role in Iraq. You have my prayers for your success in your national endeavors. Your brother, Mohammad Fadhel Jamali." (618)

On 11 July, 1953, he received a letter from Ali al-Belhawan, the Assistant Secretary General of the Tunisian Free Destour Party in Cairo, which described his contacts with leaders as they passed through Egypt—Nehru, Indonesian Ambassadors, Pakistanis—all of whom were supportive. He said that the Indonesians hoped to persuade President Sukarno to take the initiative. Belhawan's letter continued,

No matter how we exert our efforts we need your help and support. The idea itself is your own idea, and you are the one most capable of realizing it, . . . That is why Tunisia requests Your Excellency to champion this question as you did at the beginning, and requests that you work to achieve the calling of this conference. Let us

have your valuable advice to guide our steps which are approaching final success. (620)

The Tunisian continued, urging Jamali to take the initiative and saying that "the present circumstances in the Arab states leave no other than Iraq to undertake this work."

Jamali had first met Habib Bourguiba, the leader of Tunisia's Destour Party, in Cairo in April, 1946, at the Mena House Hotel near the Pyramids, where they were testifying before the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine. Jamali was the first speaker and Bourguiba the last. Although they talked there briefly, their friendship really began in 1951 in Paris at the General Assembly meeting in the Palais Chaillot where Jamali was trying to put Morocco on the agenda. The Tunisians had failed in their own negotiations with France for independence.

There was a luncheon for the heads of the Arab delegations, which Bourguiba and other Tunisian leaders attended. They asked Jamali and the other Arab leaders to pursue the Tunisian case. Jamali and Bourguiba also had private lunches to review Franco-Tunisian relations. Bourguiba told Jamali that he was going to follow a gradual process, and Jamali pointed out that progressing by stages had been the policy, the successful policy, of King Feisal I with the British and that it had ended in independence. He calls it *khudh wa talib*, "take and ask."¹ Bourguiba asked, "I trust that you will personally take care of the Tunisian case," and Jamali replied that he would do his best.

They did not meet again until 1956 in Tunis when Jamali brought Iraq's congratulations on their achievement of independence. Bourguiba was then Prime Minister, and they saw a lot of each other. Jamali was invited to address the National Constituent Assembly and was made an Honorary Citizen of Tunisia. In his address to the Assembly he tried to warn Tunisia about communism and about subversion, and he now recalls, "I think Bourguiba didn't like that speech." Perhaps too much of the schoolmaster came through.

In September, 1953, when he became Prime Minister, he was able to continue his efforts for North Africa with India, Pakistan and Indonesia. There was no immediately apparent success, but when the five Colombo powers met in Ceylon in 1954 Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo launched the idea of a meeting of the independent nations from Africa and Asia. The concept was growing. The others present, Jawaharlal Nehru of India, U Nu of Burma, Mohammed Ali of Pakistan and Sir John Kotelawala of Ceylon, agreed.

In December that same year, 1954, they again met in Bogor, Indonesia, to finalize conference plans, and the Prime Ministers decided to issue an invitation for a conference to be held in Bandung, Indonesia, in April, 1955, less than four months away. By mid-February only eight of the twenty five other nations had accepted. The aims had by then been broadened. Initially conceived as a conference to decide on collective measures to make France recognize the right of the peoples of North Africa to self-determination, the purpose was now to survey the many problems of Africa and Asia in the new setting of world politics and of the cold war. Twenty five countries beside the Colombo five were originally invited; twenty nine actually participated.

At that point Jamali held no position in the Iraqi government other than his protocol rank as a Minister of State: his cabinet had resigned the previous year. Nuri es-Sa'id as the incumbent Prime Minister was naturally expected to lead the Iraq delegation. However, Nuri was preoccupied with domestic problems and with setting up the mechanism of the Baghdad Pact, so he requested King Feisal to order Jamali to lead the delegation. In his usual way Nuri issued no instructions. Jamali chose his own delegation and took with him Dr. Abdul Majid Abbas, a former cabinet colleague; Dr. Abdul Hamid Kadhim, ex-Minister of Education; Hashim Hilli, who had been on his staff in Cairo, and Rashid Ra'uf, both officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

After a stop in Karachi, the group arrived in Jakarta and were asked to take a local flight to Bandung. It was explained

that the car journey took four hours and that there was risk from rebel groups in the mountains. Jamali wanted to see something of Indonesia, and so he insisted on going by auto. An armed escort was provided, and they enjoyed the beauty of the mountains. Jamali's reasons for wanting to drive were not altogether touristic. He felt the need to think about the conference and to formulate his philosophy and to write down his ideas. (622)

He enjoyed attending Friday prayers at Bandung's Great Mosque and, ever the teacher, he appreciated the opportunity to visit a few schools before the Conference.

The meeting was formally opened by President Sukarno, and then a procedural meeting was called for the heads of delegations to decide on the agenda, conference policy and procedure. Nehru urged that there be no opening speeches but that, if any delegations had statements to make, they could be printed and circulated. Jamali objected strongly as did others, and they proved to be the majority. Jamali wanted a half hour limit, but a fifteen minute limit was decided. Jamali's opening statement nevertheless took twenty three minutes. Nehru declined to speak as did a few others, but twenty three nations took the opportunity to make their positions publicly known.

Another procedural question was whether to allow controversial subjects to be introduced, which might lead to heated debate. Nehru was eager to avoid disagreements, but he was overruled. The issues of communism, defense pacts and alliances and the Palestine problem were on the minds of most of the delegations and had to be brought up. U Nu, the Prime Minister of Burma, objected to the inclusion of Palestine, claiming that since Israel was not represented the subject should not be discussed. Jamali argued that if the absence of Israel should preclude discussion of Palestine, then the absence of the colonial powers should preclude discussion of the colonial problems of Africa and Asia. He threatened to withdraw from the Conference if the Palestine problem were not discussed, and the item was included on the agenda. (223)

Jamali was never a horse to stand without hitching, so it was not unexpected that his opening address, as he describes it,

fell like a bombshell My colleagues were struck by the excess of frankness and lack of diplomacy in my speech. My friend, Dr. Abdul Majid Abbas had some reservations concerning the wisdom of making such a strong statement." (624f)

Nevertheless, he went ahead and spoke of the need to integrate the values of Western civilization with the spiritual values of other great religions of mankind. He urged that law and justice replace power politics and "immoral machinations," that hate, fear and corruption give way to love, cooperation and honest dealing. He enumerated the three forces which he felt were disturbing international peace: Western colonialism, Zionism and communism. Of colonialism he noted,

The fact that most of us here are new nations who have won our freedom and independence since the end of the first World War is a good proof of the passing away of the old-time colonialism. The United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, all have been more or less realistic in meeting the spirit of modern times. Thus Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, the Philippines, India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, Jordan, Indonesia, Libya and others have achieved freedom and independence.

Other peoples are still in the process. This process of liberation is certainly a proof that some of the colonial powers have been responding to the spirit of the time

Unfortunately colonialism is still well-entrenched in many parts of the world. The people of North Africa including those of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco are still under the French yoke . . . negotiations have been dragging. Patriots in Morocco are being shot by French terrorists indiscriminately . . . and the legitimate Sultan of Morocco has been banished, . . . replaced by a figure-head. In Algeria the whole principle of self-determination is being ignored by France, a great member of the United Nations which should be bound by the principles of the Charter . . . (ignored) by South Africa where the color prejudice and superiority of the white

man have led to discrimination . . . contrary to the basic principles of the United Nations Charter.

. . . Zionism, the last chapter in the book of old colonialism (is) . . . making homeless and destitute nearly one million Palestinian Arabs—Christians and Muslims alike. That is why we sincerely hope that . . . this conference will continue to see that Arab rights to their home in Palestine are recognized and restored . . .

Spiritually, Palestine belongs to the peoples of the three great religions, Islam, Christianity and Judaism alike . . . Politically Palestine belongs to its legitimate inhabitants, the Arabs who lived there for centuries before imperialist designs were imposed.

Communism is a one-sided, materialistic religion. It denies God and the spiritual heritage of mankind . . .

Communism is a subversive religion. It breeds hatred between classes and peoples . . . The peoples of Asia and Africa who have been struggling for decades to achieve their freedom and independence are liable through communist machinations to jump from the pan into the fire . . .

. . . today the Communist world has subject races in Asia and Eastern Europe on a much larger scale than any old colonial power. Just think of the vast areas of Turkistan in Asia which are under Russian domination. Think of the fate of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania . . . Poland and Czechoslovakia

. . . small countries like my own, who have watched the tragedies of Korea and Czechoslovakia, feel that their very existence is endangered unless we provide them with defensive protection . . . until such time when the communists may change their minds and hearts and agree to a universal system of disarmament.

Moreover, physical disarmament is not enough: the truth is that what the world needs first today is an ideological disarmament. Achieving that, we must work on the basis of moral rearmament and physical disarmament whereby men of all races and nations with clean hearts, with no rancor or hatred, approach each other with humility, admit our own mistakes and work for mutual harmony and peace. It is then, and only then, that the world will turn into one integral camp with no Eastern or Western camps.

It is our sincere hope that this conference will prove in a very modest way to be a great moral force of ideological disarmament and moral rearmament, and that it will inspire the nations gathered here to become active participants in serving the ideals of the United Nations . . . to achieve this we must strive to clean our hearts and minds.

May I conclude with a verse from the Holy *Qur'an*, which I hope will be applicable to all of us here and to all those who are not with us but share our earnest desire for peace?

"Allah will not change the condition of a people until they change from within themselves."²

The *New York Times* reported the conference fully and remarked that Jamali's speech received more applause than that of any other delegate, noting that it was "a vigorous anti-communist attack."³

Jamali was not alone in his demand that in condemning materialism there be no discrimination between its various varieties. Prince Wan Waithnayakon of Thailand called upon the communists to prove their intentions because his country also was "threatened by subversion and possible aggression."⁴

A Ceylon daily paper carried the headline, "Sir John Makes Chou Bristle—Red Colonialism Denounced," over a Bandung dateline:

Sir John (Kotelawala) charged Russia with "perpetrating imperialism" . . . He asked the delegates whether the "satellite" countries of Eastern Europe were not colonies of the Soviet Union. According to conference sources Sir John Kotelawala said: "If we are united in our opposition to colonialism, should it not be our duty to declare our opposition to Soviet colonialism as much as to Western imperialism?" . . .

Chou En Lai "vehemently objected." Nehru protested on the irrelevancy of the subject. . . the Chairman, Dr. Ali Sastroamidjojo, ruled that Ceylon's suggestion be discussed the next day.⁵

The article goes on to say that Chou En Lai, whose China delegation was placed next to the Ceylon group in the alphabetical seating of the conference, buttonholed the Ceylon Prime Minister as the delegates were leaving. . . "are you

trying to wreck this conference?" Sir John replied, "I am one of your hosts, and frank talk never ruined any conference."

In his report on Bandung to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress in Beijing on 16 May, 1955, Chou took pains to explain how

certain persons . . . for ulterior motives strangely distorted colonialism . . . using the term "so-called colonialism" . . . to slander socialism as another form of colonialism.

He reminded the Committee that

The relationship among the socialist countries is entirely a kind of relationship based on respect for each other's sovereign rights and national independence . . . The control of one state by another has nothing in common at all with the system and policy of the socialist countries."⁶

The Dutch High Commissioner in Jakarta wrote to the Hague, "The strong anti-communist voices from Iraq, Turkey and Thailand and probably the very skillfully compiled speech of Romulo have lured Chou En Lai to step out into the open."⁷

Although his opening address had been mimeographed and distributed in lieu of his speaking to the Conference personally, Chou En Lai asked to make supplementary remarks in which he said the Chinese delegation had come to seek unity and not to quarrel, to seek common ground, not to create divergence. He said,

If we seek common ground in doing away with the sufferings and calamities under colonialism, it will be very easy for us to have mutual understanding and respect, instead of mutual suspicion and fear, mutual exclusion and antagonism.

None of us is asked to give up his own views, but we should not let our differences hinder us from achieving agreement as far as our main task is concerned . . . We have to admit that among our Asian and African countries we do have different ideologies and different social systems. But this does not prevent us from seeking common ground and being united . . .

Freedom of religious belief is a principle recognized by all modern nations. We communists are atheists, but

we respect all those who have religious belief. We hope those with religious belief will respect those without . . .

We are against outside interference . . . but there are people who are establishing bases around China in order to carry out subversive activities against the Chinese government Let us be united and do our utmost to make the conference a success."⁸

Sir John in his opening speech on 18 April had called, as Jamali had, for "a change of heart." He said that the argument of physical force must yield to the argument of spiritual power. But the rigid anti-communist stance he, Jamali and others assumed did not appear to have left much room for those who differed from them to express that change of heart which both the Buddhist and the Muslim statesmen advocated.

Chou En Lai had arrived at that session telling the press that he had come to Bandung "to make friends and not to quarrel."⁹ This was in marked contrast to the description of his departure from the opening session in which Chou was reported as "striding through the crowd with a frown and ignoring all questions from the press."¹⁰

A different note was struck by the chief Japanese delegate, Tatsunosuke Takasaki, who first stated that Japan was eager for peace and economic cooperation, and then he expressed regret over Japan's role in World War II, saying she had inflicted damages upon her neighbor nations and had ended by bringing untold miseries upon herself.¹¹

Certainly Jamali was capable of a more winsome approach, as he had demonstrated in New York with Foreign Minister Vyshinsky of the Soviet Union. They saw each other as friends even though they were on opposing sides of heated debates in the Political Committee and the General Assembly.

Perhaps shortness of time prevented building such friendship in Bandung, at least as far as Chou En Lai was concerned. The Chinese leader wanted to meet everyone, and so to accommodate all members of the delegations he gave two luncheons each day, one after the other. Jamali came to one

such luncheon. This was their only contact apart from the formal sessions. The Chinese leader invited Jamali to visit the People's Republic after the conference, but Jamali did not go. He felt it was not fair to have Communist China represented while Nationalist China was absent. After the Conference he did, however, visit Taiwan, Japan, the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan. It is sad that such a meeting of Afro-Asian leaders for the first time was so brief. It did not provide opportunity for lasting friendships to be built in the few days of its sessions.

Whatever else it may have been, Bandung was certainly not the meeting of "non-aligned states" which it has been often called. Alignments were clearly delineated. Among the Arab delegations the issue of the Baghdad Pact continued to divide, or, perhaps more accurately, to reveal the underlying suspicions and rivalries which already existed. Discussions among those who were against the Pact were carried on behind the scenes during the Conference.

There was a meeting in the residence of Egypt's Prime Minister, Gamal Abdul Nasser, attended by his Minister of National Guidance, Major Salah Salem, Prince Feisal of Sa'udi Arabia, and Khalid al-Azm and Ahmed Shuqairi of Syria. Jamali understandably assumed this meeting was planned to counteract the Baghdad Pact. At any rate a plan was proposed for the three states whose representatives were present to form a common military, foreign and economic policy, but it was never implemented.

While the Jordanian delegation in Bandung did not agree with the Baghdad Pact, Jamali points out that there was no conflict between the two delegations, and he attributes this cooperation there to Hezza'a al-Majali in whom Jamali discovered a real friend. (169) Later, after al-Majali became Prime Minister of Jordan, he tried to bring his country into the Pact along with Iraq but was not able to overcome Egyptian influence. He was killed in his office later by a bomb.

Jamali and Nasser did have a talk in a recess between conference sessions; but Iraq had already joined the Pact, and Egypt had launched a radio propaganda war against it. There

was a major clash at the beginning of the year when the Arab League convened the Prime Ministers. After agreeing that the radio war should end, Nasser told Jamali, "Dr. Jamali, hands off Syria! Leave Syria alone." Jamali replied,

My brother, *you* leave Syria alone. Iraq only wishes to fulfil an aspiration which nationalists in both Syria and Iraq have long cherished. There are no natural boundaries between them. The Euphrates unites them. Iraq's access to the Mediterranean is through Syria. Syria's economy complements Iraq's. It is natural that the two states should confederate. If not, they should develop close cooperation . . . that is why I beg you to stop the anti-Iraq campaign in Syria As a true Arab nationalist I hope that you will promote Syrian-Iraqi rapprochement. (104f, & 643)

They also discussed the attacks on Iraq which Egypt's Radio, Voice of the Arabs, was broadcasting daily. Nasser promised to see that the attacks ceased but countered by charging that Iraq was behind a clandestine station which attacked Egypt and President Nasser himself every day. Jamali denied any knowledge of such an operation. The Egyptian radio attacks continued until the 1958 Revolution. They never had another chance to talk.

With the opening speeches delivered, the Conference was organized into three committees,—one to deal with political problems, a second for cultural and social matters and a third for economic questions. The heads of delegations attended the Political Committee, and at its first session Nehru defended the idea of co-existence and attacked the defense arrangements made, especially singling out the Baghdad Pact.

Jamali asked for a definition of co-existence, pointing out that words like "democracy," "peoples," "freedom," "co-existence" do not always mean the same thing in the free world and in the communist camp. He asked Nehru whether, when he spoke of co-existence and of the need to shun defense pacts and alliances, the delegates were to understand that they should sit quietly with open doors for communism to walk in and carry out its subversive activities. He asked if non-

communist nations were to have access to the communist world as it had to the rest of the world. (631) Nehru was, according to Jamali, "enraged" and said, "The honorable representative of Iraq wishes to muddy the waters of the Conference."

Jamali was given the opportunity to reply the next day. He defended the principle of peace by preparedness and self-defense rather than peace by submission, and he asked if the Honorable Delegate from India preferred peace by submission. He further pointed out that the communist world was one geographical unit while the free world was spread out and divided. He asked whether Pandit Nehru advised remaining spread out and divided and thus permitting the communists . . .

to swallow us one by one, or would he rather let us unite and organize ourselves in self defense . . . If we do not join defense pacts is he (Nehru) willing to guarantee our safety from invasion by either East or West?

Jamali's speech lasted over an hour, and he was followed by others including Dr. Jalal Abdoh of Iran, General Romulo of the Philippines, Mr. Fatin Zorlu of Turkey and Prince Wan of Thailand, all supporting Jamali's position. He notes in his *Memoirs* that in the afternoon session Nehru took the floor and apologized to the Representative of Iraq, stating that India was not ready to guarantee the safety of other states, that he was not against their preparing for self-defense and that responsible people in each state are entitled to take care of their own defense arrangements, including pacts and alliances. (633)

Two basic objectives were in Jamali's mind at Bandung: one was to explain and defend the Arab cause; the other was to promote the cause of freedom and expose the dangers of communism, which he called "the new colonialism." These entailed two sets of meetings apart from the official program of conference sessions: the Arab group which met outside the city in President Nasser's villa, and the free world, anti-communist group, which included some Arab states and met

in the home of Prime Minister Mohammed Ali of Pakistan, also in the outskirts. The latter included Mohammed Ali, Fatin Zorlu, Jalal Abdoh, Charles Malik and Jamali. While Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Libya, Liberia and Japan were sympathetic to the stand this group took, they did not come out as openly with their anti-communist views as did the others.

The Arabs easily secured full support in the question of Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria. Palestine, as always, was more difficult. U Nu was already leaning toward Israel, Nehru did not want the subject discussed at all. A sub-committee consisting of Jamali, Charles Malik and Ahmed Shuqairi was then formed to decide how to handle the question. Abdel Khalek Hassouna attended as observer.¹² After deciding that the proposal of any resolution on Palestine ought to be made by a non-Arab state, it was discovered that the Afghan delegation was "willing and enthusiastic to help in the matter." The following resolution was then proposed by the Afghan group, and it passed unanimously:

In view of the existing tension in the Middle East caused by the situation in Palestine and of the danger of that tension to world peace, the Asian-African Conference declares its support of the rights of the Arab people of Palestine and calls for the implementation of the United Nations Resolutions on Palestine and the achievement of the peaceful settlement of the Palestine question. (634f)

The resolutions regarding North African self-determination and independence also passed unanimously, and so Arab matters were relatively easily agreed upon. It was the issue of communism and the free world that divided the meetings. Nehru wanted to avoid any ideological division, whereas the delegates from the free world were vigorous in their conviction that there was a real need for defense and to expose the threat of communism. One note from Jamali's record gives a glimpse behind the scenes:

Our free world group met one night until the early hours of the morning in the house of Prime Minister Mohammed Ali of Pakistan... We discussed our

strategy and debated what attitude we should take in the conference if it should fail to condemn communism. We were divided. . . One point of view was that we should pull out of the Conference altogether and let the Conference collapse. The other point of view, which I shared, was that we should accept a compromise formula that would imply our condemnation of communism without saying it explicitly.

After hours of discussion and debate this view prevailed. It was my opinion that such an historic occasion in which the power of Asia and Africa was emerging before the modern world should not be allowed to end in emptiness. (636f)

The formula was simple: The Conference is agreed in declaring that colonialism in all its manifestations is an evil which should be speedily brought to an end.

Here Jamali comments:

As far as I know, the term "neo-colonialism" was first used by me in Bandung, and on that occasion I applied it to communism. But today we find the communists using the term and throwing it back at the Western powers. (637)

Jamali joined the other delegation heads in expressing their appreciation to the Indonesian government and people for their hospitality. He added his regret, however, that the Conference had not included Nationalist China, and he expressed the hope that this omission would not be repeated. He believed that the Conference was a great success and that the new consciousness and self-recognition on the part of the Asians and Africans represented "had proved to be a great force for liberation from the colonial yoke." In his view the Bandung Conference did not propose the principle of neutralism for Asia and Africa. He points out that the *Final Declaration*, Principle No. 5, under the heading, "Declaration for the promotion of world peace and cooperation," calls for

Respect for the rights of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.

This, he insists, is not neutrality. The communists and the neutralists have often spoken of the spirit of Bandung as one of non-alignment or neutrality, but this is not accurate. There were three clearly-defined groups in Bandung; namely, anti-communists, neutralists and full-fledged communists. No one group yielded to the other two. In actual fact the anti-communists formed the majority. (638) Most of the free world group, as Jamali calls them, were friends with a history of association and common effort in the United Nations and other international meetings.

The neutralist group was represented by the "4 Ns:" Nehru, Nasser, Na'im (Afghanistan) and Nu, and by President Sukarno. Jamali felt that Nehru played a leading and helpful role in the Conference, and years later wrote of him in a reflective mood:

He differed sharply with the Prime Minister of Pakistan, as well as with me, on one fundamental issue, namely neutralism vis-a-vis communism. He wanted to win both the communists and the free world. He was against defense alliances and pacts. I could not agree with him at the time. I thought he was misleading the Asians and Africans by trying to make them neutral towards communism.

I have often thought that, if India had joined some great powers in a defence pact, she would not have been attacked by China as she was later on. Until now I cannot tell whose stand was right on this question, Pandit Nehru's or mine. (640)

In spite of these sharp differences his and Nehru's relationship was cordial, and there was real mutual respect. Nehru invited him to a luncheon at his residence in Bandung at which Nehru's daughter, Indira Gandhi, was hostess, and three years later Nehru appealed with other world leaders to Iraqi Prime Minister Qasim to save Jamali's life when the Military Tribunal had condemned him to death.

The communist nations' sole representative was China. Jamali refers to Chou En Lai as "a charming and patient member of the Conference. Politically he seemed malleable and

reasonable. He was kind enough to include me in one of the luncheon parties he gave at his residence in Bandung." (640f)

After the Conference Jamali was able to have useful conversations with various officials in the Indonesian government including the Prime Minister, the Minister of Education and people from the Foreign Ministry. He discovered what he judged to be a complete lack of concern about communism.

They never thought that a communist danger might threaten Indonesia. They believed that, since the communists had fought side by side with other freedom fighters to liberate Indonesia from the foreign yoke, they would never prove one day to be a danger to their country.

I was told that the communists had only sixteen members in Parliament out of a total of several hundred and that they could do nothing subversive. Actually I learned that those members had a great influence on the government because it was their number added to that of the Party in power that gave the government its strength and majority." (643f)

On meeting a prominent Muslim, Mohammed Nasir, who led the Masjumi Party, he received Nasir's gratitude for his clear statement that communism was a godless religion. Nasir was also pleased that Chou En Lai had confirmed this fact in his reply. Nasir felt that, since faith in God was one of Indonesia's five principles to which all parties including the Indonesian communists claimed to subscribe, Jamali's declaration and Chou En Lai's affirmation of communism's atheism would help reveal the Indonesian communists' hypocrisy.

The Iraq delegation was taken to visit the majestic Hindu temple of Bourrabudur near Jokjakarta, spiritual center of the country, where they also visited the great mosque and the Islamic University. There Jamali was invited to address a large gathering. He says, "It is a moving experience to feel close and at home with a people who live thousands of miles away from one's homeland and whom one has not known before." (645)

After visits to Surabaya and Bali he and Hashim Hilli travelled on to accept the invitations to Taiwan, Japan, the

Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan which had been extended to him during the conference. In these countries he talked about the need of Asia and Africa for a new ideology that would preserve the spiritual values of the East while adopting techniques and organization from the West. He warned that while freeing themselves from old-style Western colonialism they should not fall victim to communism, the new colonialism which enslaves the mind as well as the body, denying the existence of the spirit. For Jamali,

Bandung ushered in a new era of political liberation from the Western yoke, but it was only a beginning. The nations of Asia and Africa have hard work ahead of them if they wish to develop themselves materially and morally. It is my belief that they need a new, uniting ideology based on faith in God, morality, science and democracy. (646)

In an article dated 25 April, 1955, the *New York Times* reported its own conclusions about Bandung:

Middle Eastern delegates to the Asian-African conference, in general, held to their positions despite direct exposure to mild-mannered Chinese communism and persuasive Indian neutralism. Four of the ten Middle East states—Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon and Iran—were, in fact, among the leaders of the successful fight by anti-communist and pro-western forces to prevent the conference from being turned into a propaganda asset for either communists or neutralists.

The Arab states remained split on the question of the defense of their region. Iraq, now an ally of Turkey and indirectly of the North Atlantic Treaty powers, demonstrated here the thoroughness of her conversion to the idea of collective defense and "peace through strength." Dr. Fadhel al-Jamali, chief Iraqi delegate, and the Turkish Deputy Premier, Fatin Rustum Zorlu, were initiators of the move to define and condemn Soviet colonialism.¹³

Jamali's own evaluation of Bandung is that it was one of the most important events of recent history . . . for the first time the personality of Asia and Africa became prominent in world affairs, and the world began to give weight to these two continents in the struggle between East and West and in the balance of world power. (296f)

Notes

- 1 Jamali. Interview taped by author. Caux, Switzerland. 26 August, 1986, p. 2.
- 2 *Afro-Asian Conference News*. 21 April, 1955, pp. 17-20. Quote is from *The Qur'an*, Sura XIII (al-Ra'ad), v. 12.
- 3 *New York Times*. 19 April, 1955, p. 1.
- 4 *Ibid.*
- 5 *The Ceylon Daily News*. 22 April, 1955 (from R. L. Michael, UP and Reuter Service), p. 1.
- 6 Report on Bandung Conference to Standing Committee of National People's Congress, Peking, China. 16 May, 1955; and supplement to 17 May, 1955 Daily News Release, National People's Congress, p. 5f.
- 7 Netherlands Foreign Affairs Archives, the Hague. Report from Jakarta, 21 April, 1955.
- 8 *Afro-Asian Conference News*, Bandung. 21 April, 1955, pp. 9f.
- 9 *New York Times*. 19 April, 1955, p. 1.
- 10 *Ceylon Daily News*. 22 April, 1955, pp. 2-4.
- 11 *New York Times*. 19 April, 1955, p. 1.
- 12 Abdul Khaleq Hassouna, former Egyptian Cabinet Minister, had succeeded Abdur Rahman Azzam as Secretary General of the Arab League. Jamali had supported his candidacy for the post. Ahmed Shuqairi was Assistant Secretary General.
- 13 *New York Times*. 26 April, 1955, p. 26.

9

Business As Usual: Prelude to Revolution

After their 1945 meeting in San Francisco Dr. Jamali and Dr. Buchman had kept in touch. On his frequent visits to America as leader of the Iraq UN delegation Jamali attended Moral Re-Armament conferences on Mackinac Island in Michigan, and he was a frequent weekend visitor at Dellwood, the MRA center in Mount Kisco, New York. He often brought along friends from his own and other delegations. If he and Buchman were not able to see each other, they talked on the telephone.

On one occasion Jamali was on board the *Queen Mary* and just docking in New York when Buchman, who was in the Southwest, telephoned colleagues to suggest that Jamali be invited to go directly from the dock to dinner at Dellwood, and then to give his evaluation of Dellwood to the local Zoning Board. Jamali agreed. The question did not come before the Board until late in the evening, and Jamali sat listening patiently through discussions about garage set-backs, rights of way and building plans. When he was finally introduced as Foreign Minister of Iraq, he began by saying that although he had studied democracy and local government at Columbia he had never had the chance to see it function in such a fine manner, and he thanked the members of the Board for the

opportunity. He then proceeded to outline the contribution of Dellwood to international affairs by giving hope and support to people involved in political, diplomatic, industrial, educational and other sectors of life.¹

In the summer of 1955 a musical play, *The Vanishing Island*, was created by MRA on Mackinac Island, and invitations were received from several countries, including Iraq, to bring the play which was accompanied by a group of international leaders. The musical portrayed the struggle between two countries, each dominated by its own form of materialism. It then dramatized moral change beginning in individuals, replacing hate and fear and creating the climate for unity and understanding. Some like Jamali for whom moral and spiritual values were of primary importance supported the move enthusiastically. Others, for whom dishonesty and impurity were means to their ends, or who had been misinformed, were understandably upset by the play's direct challenge to change, and they opposed it with various unsubstantiated charges. If a play advocates absolute honesty, no one can say publicly that he is against honesty, and so accusations that it was "anti-American" may have been the kind of general charge that issues from a stung conscience.

At the same time Senator Alexander Wiley, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, supported the world tour of the play and wired the US Embassies on the group's route to that effect. Congressman Charles Deane of North Carolina, a respected pioneer for civil rights, and his family actually travelled with the cast.

Following the Bandung Conference that spring Buchman had cabled Jamali, who was back in Baghdad. After congratulating his friend on his "decisive presentation at Bandung," he invited him to join the group travelling with *The Vanishing Island* through Asia and the Middle East and concluded with these words "thus Iraq through you will again have a world voice and be the sounding board of nations."

Jamali was too involved in the implementation of the Baghdad Pact and with the Syrian issue to accept this tempting opportunity, but he arranged with his close friend,

Foreign Minister Burhan ed-Din Bashayan, to invite the group to Baghdad. Jamali helped make arrangements for accommodations, secured the King Feisal II Theater for the play, and attended the opening night on 10 August with a party of friends.

A leading Arabic daily in Baghdad reported the occasion saying that Jamali was a well-known "partisan of Moral Re-Armament," and it printed an interview in which he noted that the play asks that the principles for which MRA stands be applied by all: absolute honesty, absolute purity, absolute unselfishness and absolute love. He stated that,

Just as together they are the essence of Islam, so they are of Christianity and Hinduism . . . not the property of any one religion or nation . . . but common to all . . .

These principles are not new. What is new is that the world stands in greater need of them than ever before . . . In this atomic age mankind has the choice either to change human nature and thus change human destiny . . . or to continue to a war of extinction.

This is a faithful confirmation of the verse from the Holy *Qur'an* which says, "God does not change the condition of a nation until the people of that nation change themselves."²

Along with such concerns federation with Syria was never far from Jamali's mind, nor was it from the minds of the King and Crown Prince, so, at King Feisal's request, Jamali stayed in Lebanon during much of the summer of 1955 as did ex-Premier as-Suweidi. There they kept a "Syria watch," talking with various Damascus leaders who made the two hour drive over the mountains. He made one sortie to Damascus himself at night to meet General Showket Shuqair in the home of Natheer Fansa for two hours, returning to Suweidi's home in Suq al-Gharb at 3:00 a.m. Shuqair hoped to reach an understanding with the USA without joining the Baghdad Pact. Syria felt torn between her immediate neighbor to the East, Iraq, and her sister Arab states to the South, Egypt, and Sa'udi Arabia. Jamali tried to explain to his Syrian friends his government's reasons for looking to the West:

Your propaganda is primarily directed against the United States, yet you keep silent about Russia and France. France is the friend of Israel, Russia bears equal responsibility for creating the Palestine tragedy, and the communist bloc has recently opened its doors for Zionist emigration into Palestine." (113)

Discussions continued through that summer. Jamali, joined by Sarah, stayed on at the Mont Vert Hotel in Broumana, except for a brief return to Baghdad to support *The Vanishing Island*. Michel Aflaq, founder of the Ba'ath Arab Socialist Party whose ruling junta moved to Baghdad after the 1958 revolution there, was invited for a dinner at which Jamali also included his friend, Dr. Costi Zurayk. He was not impressed with Aflaq's slogans and felt that the Ba'ath socialist's preaching of secularism would rob the Arab nation of its soul and of its message to the world. He adds in his *Memoirs*, writing in 1974, that Aflaq's "recent ideological message has been a call for a rapprochement between the Ba'ath Party and the Communist Party!"

Among other old friends from AUB days who came to see Jamali at Suweidi's home in Suq-al-Gharb was Sa'id Taqi ed-Din, a writer and person of great charm. Hajji Hussein al-Oweini and Sa'ab Salaam—both former Prime Ministers of Lebanon—also offered their services. (129) Kamil Muruwa, the owner-editor of the Beirut Arabic daily, *al-Hayat*, and the English-language *Daily Star*, arranged a meeting with Jamali for Abdullah Bilkheir, the Lebanese-born AUB graduate and personal secretary to King Sa'ud, who was anxious to remove obstacles to a rapprochement between the two countries. Jamali assured Abdullah Bilkheir of Iraq's desire for closer relations with Sa'udi Arabia and insisted that the Iraq government had not at any time harbored ill-will towards Sa'udi Arabia. He said that Iraq's desire to federate with Syria was not directed against any Arab state, but, on the contrary, it was to the benefit of the two countries concerned and a contribution to Arab strength at large. (324)

While in Lebanon he worked constantly on the question of federation with Syria. He persuaded his friend, Adnan

Menderes of Turkey, to withdraw his objections to a Syrian-Iraqi federation as he tried to do with the British, the US, and the French Ambassadors in Beirut and with the Maronite Catholic party. He sums up his failure by saying that the only three powers that Iraq could not overcome in Syria were Sa'udi generosity, Egyptian propaganda and Israeli intrigue. He seems never to have questioned the rightness of his own unbending determination to achieve federation.

There was a further problem, however, and that was the Lebanese Christians' fear of Muslim domination. This had roots going back to the Crusades when France began to play a conscious role as their protector. He tried to build trust and mutual understanding and had long conversations with Sheikh Pierre Jemayel, leader of the Kata'ib party which represented the Maronite community in the Lebanese political scene, and with the Maronite Patriarch, His Eminence, Cardinal Me'ouchi.

In all these efforts he had the support of Crown Prince Abdulillah, whose motives Jamali defends from later allegations that the Crown Prince's main concern was to secure a throne for himself in Syria. Jamali points out that in all discussions with Syrian leaders in 1955 and onwards it was understood that King Feisal II was to be head of the federation. However the Crown Prince asked him in the presence of the King when they met at the resort hotel in Sarsang, "Tell the Syrians that, if the Iraqi throne stands in the way of Syrian-Iraqi unity, we are ready to leave it, if that would serve Arab national interest." (129)

When Shukry al-Quwatly was elected President of Syria, in spite of differences over the federation issue, cables of congratulations and thanks were exchanged.

After Tunisia and Morocco had achieved independence, Jamali's efforts were directed towards Algeria. This was a thorny problem because of the French position that Algeria was part of metropolitan France, a *departement* like those that made up European France. At the General Assembly in the Fall of 1955, Jamali introduced the Algerian question, and Henri Spaak of Belgium rose to defend France, insisting that

any matters concerning Algeria were France's internal responsibility and that the other members should trust France to run her own affairs. He enumerated the faults of the Arab states which, he said, disqualified them from interference.

When Jamali rose to speak he praised Spaak as a hero of liberation in Europe and paid tribute to the great French humanist tradition of liberty, fraternity and equality. He conceded to Spaak all his criticisms of the Arab states, and stated that, nonetheless, they were determined to move ahead in the path of freedom and progress. The vote, by a margin of one, placed the Algerian question on the agenda of the General Assembly that year.

It was a narrow margin which a little horse-trading helped achieve; as he left the rostrum Jamali stopped by the seat of the Philippines Representative and asked how he was going to vote. Learning that he intended to abstain, Jamali argued that Algeria could be no exception to the Philippines' stand for freedom, adding that, if the Philippines delegation voted for Algeria now, the Arab states would support them for a seat on the Security Council. One vote turned the balance. The French delegation walked out, threatening to leave the UN if Algeria remained on the agenda. Eventually a compromise was reached whereby Algeria would not be on the agenda until the next year and the French would stay.³ Henri Spaak was intrigued with Jamali's handling of the situation. He asked, "Who is this Jamali?" and they had luncheon together.

Jamali attended a New Year Conference at the MRA Center in Michigan with Senator Abbas Mehdi and Abdul Majid Mahmud from his own delegation, joining other UN delegates from Yemen, Pakistan, Philippines, Iran and Bolivia. Later in 1956 he went to Morocco with Nuri es-Sa'id and other Iraqis to congratulate King Mohammad V on his nation's independence. Jamali stayed more than a week as the King's guest after the others returned. He went on from there to Tunis via Paris where Mendes-France asked to see him. Over tea at the Iraq Embassy they discussed North Africa and Palestine. In both areas they saw eye to eye. On

Algeria, Mendes-France said, "If I were in power, I would immediately order a cease fire; but no one can do that except De Gaulle."⁴ That was two years before De Gaulle came to power.

He went to Tunis alone after seeing Mendes-France, and the Dutch Legation in Baghdad reported to the Hague that the

... word goes around that Jamali has in mind to try to bring about a reconciliation between the Tunisian Prime Minister and his political opponent, Sayid Salih ibn Yusef, leader of the Neo-Destour Party.⁵

The attempt was unsuccessful, and he wrote, "I tried to intervene between him and Salih ibn Yusef – to make peace between them. I couldn't; I failed."⁶

The Federal German Republic invited him for an official visit to Bonn in 1956, and on the way he visited Frank Buchman at the MRA Assembly in Caux, Switzerland. While he was there Buchman learned of the Bonn invitation and gave him messages to Chancellor Konrad Adenauer who himself had earlier attended the Caux conference.

In Bonn Jamali met with Chancellor Adenauer and Foreign Minister von Brentano. He had two topics in mind to discuss with the Chancellor. The first was Germany's reparation payments to Israel. Jamali pointed out that these payments strengthened Israel while ignoring the Arab refugees. The second point he discussed with the Chancellor was Moral Re-Armament, the free world and communism. When the meeting was over Adenauer rose, held Jamali's hands and said, "Together we will work and walk in the path of Moral Re-Armament for rebuilding the world." Jamali was invited back the next year to speak about Middle East affairs to the Foreign Policy Association in a private session.⁷

That same year, 1956, Israel, Britain and France attacked Egypt in what Egypt calls "the War" and which in Britain is often referred to as "the Suez Affair." Anti-Iraqi forces in Syria blew up the pumping stations on the pipeline of the Iraq Petroleum Company near Homs, and the oil flow was cut for several months, costing Iraq some fifty million pounds

sterling. At this turn of events Nuri Pasha became more concerned about his neighbor and contacted Colonel Shishakly who had previously worked against Iraq. Shishakly was given ten thousand Iraqi dinars (US\$40,000) to see what he could do in Damascus. He went there, saw that he could do nothing and left the Middle East permanently, with the money. Jamali was at the United Nations at the time and knew nothing of the plot. When he returned, Nuri Pasha said to him, "Thank God it did not succeed: if it had, it might have been seen as part of the Israeli, French, British aggression." (122)

The Syrian question was a continuum. Even when he went to Istanbul as guest of the Turkish government in 1957 there were frequent Syrian visitors. King Feisal and his uncle, Crown Prince Abdulillah, were summering there on the King's yacht on the Bosphorus, and a meeting was arranged for the Iraqi leaders and the Turkish President, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and others, to consider the dangers of communist penetration in Syria. Ali Jawdat al-Ayoubi, the then Iraqi Prime Minister, questioned the Turkish suggestion that they should contact the USA, but the Turks did so anyway, and within a few days Ambassador Loy Henderson arrived in Istanbul to discuss the situation with the Turkish-Iraqi group. He said that America did not wish to intervene in Syria and would leave it to the states in the area. He added that if there was trouble the Sixth Fleet was of course bound to come to the aid of America's allies.

The Turks likewise did not wish to intervene in Syrian affairs, and they left it to Iraq, saying it was an inter-Arab matter. Assurances were given, however, that, if Iraq were involved and threatened, Turkey would come to her assistance. Prime Minister Ali Jawdat, speaking for Iraq, saw no danger from communism in Syria. The Syrians themselves, however, were worried about the penetration of communism revealed in recent municipal election results, and they decided to turn to Egypt. The Ba'ath party saw a useful opportunity to get rid of their rivals, the Communist Party. According to M. S. Agwani, "This stratagem stampeded non-

communist Syrian politicians as well as Nasser into a premature union."⁸ Thus the Syrian Parliament voted by a large majority for union with Egypt, and a delegation went to Cairo with that proposal. Quwatly stepped aside so that Nasser, in spite of his own misgivings, could be head of the new United Arab Republic, united in name but with no common boundaries. In January, 1958 after the union was announced, the communist leader, Khalid Baqdash, and several of his comrades took an Aeroflot plane from Damascus to Moscow. Jamali was quick to write in his daily newspaper, *Al-'Amal*, against the union. He was not against Arab unity as such, he said, but he felt it was unnatural to unite Syria with Egypt before Syrian-Iraqi federation had been achieved.

This denunciation put Jamali's pet project at risk and widened the rift between him and Gamal Abdul Nasser. Both were trying to deal with communism; both were Arab patriots. Their real difference was tactical. They agreed on Islam and they agreed on MRA. Nasser had also welcomed *The Vanishing Island* group as his guests in Cairo following their visit to Baghdad. In his cable inviting the group he had said,

The problems of government which confront the statesmen will not be solved without this secret of a change of heart which you are giving back to the world."⁹

Tragically, the convictions these two leaders shared did not get the traction needed to bridge the political differences that divided them. Nasser, speaking in Damascus at a great rally to celebrate union with Syria, told his audience, "Al-Jamali, and you all know who Jamali is; al-Jamali is an agent of imperialism and his paper is financed by the imperialists."

In an article in his paper Jamali replied to the charges. He wrote that he did not blame President Nasser for what he had said about him,

For he may not know him well enough personally, but I do blame his Egyptian and Syrian aides who know Jamali's services to the cause of Arab independence and

freedom, . . . my paper was financed by a mere thousand dinars put up half and half by myself and my colleague Dr. Abdul Majid Abbas without financial help from any outside source. If the imperialists ever provide me with money, I'll send it to H. E. President Nasser on a silver platter." (442)

This exchange only aggravated the matter.

Syria's union with Egypt put an end, for the moment at least, to hopes for Iraqi-Syrian federation. Jamali then suggested federation with Jordan. King Feisal and the Crown Prince agreed, and they asked the Prime Minister, Abdul Wahhab Mirjan, to start discussions to that end. But Mirjan soon resigned. In 1958 Nuri formed what proved to be his last government. Jamali was Foreign Minister with Iraqi-Jordanian federation now a principal aim. They negotiated the Union with Jordan and the Constitution was revised accordingly, although Nuri himself was never enthusiastic about it. He feared that Jordan, being the poorer country, would drain Iraq's resources. Jamali comments here that he himself had a different outlook: "To me Jordan was part of my nation. It was an Arab state which should be supported by its sister Arab states." To ease Nuri's worries about the financial burden he suggested that they invite Kuwait to join the Arab Union so that both Kuwait and Iraq would shoulder the financial burden. (171)

Politics is indeed the art of the possible. Nuri worked hard to persuade Kuwait to join, but the Sheikdom was still under British protection. This meant that London controlled Kuwait's foreign affairs, and Britain did not seem to be ready to grant the full independence necessary for Kuwait to join the Union. Early in 1958, Selwyn Lloyd, the British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, passed through Baghdad, and he went with Jamali to see King Feisal and Prince Abdulillah. There Jamali suggested to Lloyd that Kuwait be recognized as independent, ending British protection. Lloyd said it would have to be a cabinet decision. Recognition was accorded shortly after the Iraq Revolution that year, 1958. (309f)

In spite of the delay with Kuwait, the Iraq-Jordan Union was formed in March, 1958. That May King Feisal, the Crown Prince, the Prime Minister and the Members of the Union's Council, which included Jamali, went to Amman for the opening session of the Arab Union Council, as the new body was called. After the banquet offered by King Hussein, Jamali was obliged at King Feisal's insistence to go to New York and defend Lebanon at a meeting of the Security Council.

Lebanon was torn with riots and communal violence. Earlier in 1958 tensions over the Baghdad Pact had already begun to mount dangerously. President Cham'oun was known as a friend of Iraq and the West, and an attempt was made to amend the Constitution so that he could serve another term. Those opposed were strongly supported both materially and with radio propaganda by Egypt and Syria. There was violence.

Lebanon took her case first to the Arab League and then to the United Nations Security Council, accusing Egypt of interference in Lebanon's internal affairs. In the Security Council Jamali defended the Lebanese position and explained that "Nasserism" meant not only domination of the Arab world by President Nasser but also the opening of its doors to communism. His arguments may have been correct, but the tone of that Security Council speech was not his winsome best. Jamali recalls that the speech he made in the Security Council cost him years in prison.

Uncertainty about the Iraq Army was reinforced when Jamali and Charles Malik had tea with Undersecretary of State Christian Herter and another American Foreign Service Officer, Mr. Rockwell. To Jamali's proposal that America provide air transport for Iraqi army units to intervene in Lebanon between the opposing groups, Rockwell asked, "Are you sure of your army?"

Apart from attending the Security Council sessions, he took time to discuss with his Lebanese friend, Charles Malik, how peace and harmony could be restored. They looked at the various options for Lebanon as they saw them: join the

Iraq-Jordan federation, enter into a mutual aid treaty with Iraq, or sign a military pact with Iraq. These alternatives were discussed with Cham'oun who also had doubts about the reliability of Iraq's army. Jamali replied that he himself had no information about the political currents among the Iraqi military leaders. (146) This was a sad admission in light of the bloody revolution of later that year in which he nearly lost his life.

In mid-June, a few days before he returned to Baghdad an American friend, John C. Newington, gave a farewell luncheon for him at the Union League Club in New York. Newington and other friends there urged him to wait before returning because of the instability in the area. However, Sarah and the boys were there, he was a responsible leader, Iraq was his beloved country, and he went back a fortnight before the Qasim Revolution struck.

Notes

- 1 Jamali. Unpublished talk. Caux, Switzerland. 24 July, 1981, p.4.
- 2 *al-Akhbar*. Baghdad. 12 August, 1955; and Peter D. Howard. *An Idea To Win The World*. Blandford Press, London, 1955, pp. 67-72; and *The Qur'an*, Sura XIII, er-Ra'ad (the Thunder), v. 12.
- 3 Jamali. *Memoirs*. p. 522ff; and interview taped by author. Zurich. September 1988.
- 4 Jamali. Interview taped by author. Zurich. 3 September, 1988.
- 5 Netherlands Foreign Ministry Archives, the Hague. Chargé d'Affaires in Baghdad Mr. Lewe van Aduard to Ministry. 2 June, 1956.
- 6 Jamali. Interview taped by author. Caux, Switzerland. 26 August, 1986, p. 2.
- 7 Jamali. Interview taped by author. Caux, Switzerland. August, 1986.
- 8 M. S. Agwani. *Communism in the Arab East*. Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1969, p. 96.
- 9 F. Buchman. *Remaking the World*, p. 224.

10

Death Sentence

The cause of Algerian independence was never far from Jamali's heart. He was President of the Committee in Baghdad to raise funds for the Algerian nationalist movement, the only cause for which he ever tried to raise money, although he did give personally to help the Palestinian people. On the evening of 13 July, 1958, he went to say goodbye to the Algerian delegation in Baghdad, because the next day, the fourteenth, he, Nuri and other leaders planned to leave for London with King Feisal II. The young King looked forward to being joined in Turkey on his way to Britain by his young Turkish fiancée, Princess Fazilet.

The meeting in London was to be with the other members of the Baghdad Pact. Jamali and his colleagues had gone earlier to talk with Selwyn Lloyd, the British Foreign Secretary, and iron out some difficulties. Jamali and Lloyd had an understanding that once a year they would take a day out to walk and talk privately—just the two of them. Lloyd had urged Jamali to be sure to come with the group, counting on him to bridge any differences between himself and Nuri with whom he did not always see eye to eye.

Although life seemed to be quite normal that evening of the thirteenth of July, when the Turkish Ambassador, Kemal

Turkuman, came by to leave a bag of coffee for Jamali to take to Turkuman's family in Istanbul on his way to London, he told Jamali that he had heard of a conspiracy in the Army. Jamali asked, "Have you told Nuri and the Crown Prince?" Kemal replied, "Yes, but they did nothing." Jamali went to bed that night with this disturbing news on his mind.¹

The family knew something was wrong when Jamali's driver turned up at six o'clock the next morning, one hour early. He said, "Sir, everything is upset; there is a revolution." Jamali at once went with Rushdi Chelabi, Minister of Agriculture, and Dr. Abdul Amir Allawi, Minister of Health, to the Chalabi farm across the river northwest of Baghdad. They stayed there three nights. In the meantime an innocent person was killed by a mob who mistook him for Jamali.

The son of the Chalabi farm manager was an army officer, and he informed the army of Jamali's whereabouts. On the third day Jamali left the farmhouse and went out into a far part of the fields. He was dressed "like a bedouin" with a long, nightshirt-like *dishdasha*, an *abba* (camel hair cloak), *kaffiyah* (head cloth), a jug of water, a bag of bread and a cane. He made a tent for sleeping by throwing his *abba* over the thorn bushes. On 17 July at dawn he heard a noise and saw soldiers rushing toward him with weapons. Jamali said, "Don't shoot: I am ready," and so they took him.² Jamali wrote 12 years later,

On the morning of 14 July, 1958, world news media said that I had been killed by the mobs in Baghdad. Actually, another unfortunate fellow was mistaken for me and killed.

On the morning of 17 July I was arrested in the wilderness north of Baghdad. In the following months I was interrogated, tried and sentenced by the Special High Military Court of Iraq. I was condemned to death, sentenced to fifty-five years of imprisonment and fined over two hundred thousand dinars. The death sentence was imposed for my supposed plotting against Syria.

Actually, I never plotted against Syria nor against any Arab state. I am a Muslim Arab nationalist who

believes in the right of Arabs to be free and to unite by democratic processes.

The *New York Times* of 16 July reported that he had been killed and his body dragged through the streets by demonstrators. UN diplomats were shocked to hear such news, for Jamali was considered an "old UN hand" and had many friends among the delegates and representatives there. Barely two weeks previously he had sat with them in the Security Council where he had come at his King's request to speak in defense of Lebanon. On 17 July a meeting in his memory was held in the National Theatre in Washington at which Loy Henderson, the author and others spoke in his honor.

American Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge on the basis of the first reports had told the UN Security Council that Dr. Fadhil Jamali, who had sat with them a few weeks before, had been cruelly murdered.³ The press report continued:

The Iraqi diplomat left here (N.Y.) July 3 and arrived in Baghdad last week. No details were available on the circumstances of his death or of the whereabouts of his American-born wife and four(sic) sons. Dr. Jamali had come here six weeks ago to participate in the Security Council debate on Lebanon.

During a night session July 10 (sic), the Iraqi diplomat spoke bitterly against the efforts of "Nasserism and communism to undermine the democratic governments of the Arab world." . . . Although Dr. Jamali firmly endorsed Egypt's stand during the Suez crisis of 1956, he has consistently spoken out for the right of Iraq and Jordan to run their affairs without interference from Cairo.

Those first false reports that Jamali had been killed were soon corrected as further news became available. Following his arrest on 18 July he was detained in a room with 26 other prisoners. They were amazed to see him, because they, too, had heard that he had been killed. The next day the police guards pointed a pistol at his head and had the television take pictures. They said, "Here he is. He is alive; he was not killed. Why do you make propaganda against the revolution saying we killed Fadhel Jamali?"

The next day, Friday, 19 July, the authorities took the press corps to see him. They reported that he was well-groomed, dressed in shirt and trousers and wearing his usual spectacles. What they were told corresponds to Jamali's own account that he had been found outside Baghdad on a family farm and dressed in Arab clothing. When captured, he is also reported to have said, "Let me alone. I am your brother. I, too, am a nationalist."⁴

The coup began at first light on the morning of Monday, 14 July, 1958, as Jamali's driver had reported to him. The Twentieth Infantry Brigade of the Third Armored Division took only a few hours to overthrow the monarchy and establish a military dictatorship. They struck at 5:00 am and seized key bridges, crossroads and communications centers. By 8:00 am the Regent's Palace, Qasr er-Rihab, was on fire and the King and Crown Prince dead. The Palace Guard had been captured in their barracks. King Feisal had come downstairs with Prince Abdulillah. The Prince attempted to draw his pistol as he faced the intruders, but other soldiers shot from the rear, killing not only the King and the Prince but also three of the officers facing them on the other side of the circle. Twenty died in that Palace skirmish.

In another incident General Rafiq Aref issued ammunition to his troops and tried to resist. The Government report said that his troops had turned on him and shot him. In a third incident Major General Omar Ali, commander of the Fourth Division, ordered his men to attack the rebels. Instead they seized him and took him in custody. He and Jamali were in the same cell in prison and became good friends. The following day rebel soldiers found Nuri es-Sa'id in women's dress, and he died trying to shoot it out with an air force sergeant. His body was hung in a public place and later dismembered and dragged through the streets.⁵

Sarah and Abbas took shelter for a month in the home of a sergeant in the US Air Force serving at the American Embassy. They had hastily gone there in a taxi and waited while the family consulted Embassy officials before taking them in.

Ambassador Vreede of the Netherlands stated in a letter to his Foreign Ministry on 24 July that

the military coup was a complete surprise . . . Nuri Sa'id . . . two days previously had told my American colleague that the only danger . . . was from 300 students and 1000 lawyers . . .

The coup was well organized and the preparation for it must have taken ample time. It is therefore incomprehensible that this conspiracy of a group mainly of field and general officers eluded the observation of Nuri and his very efficient secret police, as well as Western intelligence.⁶

One cannot help recalling the question posed by President Cham'oun and the US State Department official earlier in the year: "Are you sure of your army?" Obviously some in Washington were knowledgeable enough to be disturbed, yet *Newsweek* wrote:

Not only was the news momentous; the fact that it came as a surprise to (Allen) Dulles and his CIA represented a sorry failure for US intelligence.⁷

Western capitals responded with preparations for any eventuality. The UN Security Council was convened. It was only American and British calls for restraint that prevented King Hussein from sending Jordan's Arab Army to avenge his cousin Feisal's death and to defend the Iraq-Jordan Arab Union which had only been formed earlier that year. The British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, put British forces on alert, and the United States sent transport planes to Europe for possible troop moves. By nine the next morning American Marines were landing in Lebanon at President Cham'oun's request. In taking this action President Eisenhower had full bi-partisan congressional support. Meanwhile Turkish Princess Fazilet grieved in London for her fiancé, Feisal II.

The communists had reason to be pleased. They supported Qasim and so were able to use the smoke screen of confusion offered by the Revolution to settle old grievances. Lt. Col. Wasfi Taher, a veteran communist and a member of the Supreme Committee of the Free Officers, spoke jubilantly

at a Party mass rally in 1959: "At last we have that traitor Jamali where he belongs for what he did to us in Bandung!"⁸

Wasfi Taher had been in the inner circle of the Iraqi Communist Party for some time. Nonetheless he had served as aide-de-camp to Nuri Sa'id and then survived the transition and became aide-de-camp to Qasim. Another of that communist inner circle, Colonel Amin, was given a seat on the bench of the Peoples' Court.⁹

Agwani cites a 16 April, 1959, report by *al-Ahram*, the leading daily in Cairo, that a committee of five had been set up in Baghdad to prepare the ground for communist rule. The five were Khalid Bakdash, the Syrian communist General Secretary who had fled to Moscow when Egypt and Syria formed the short-lived United Arab Republic in 1958; Afif al-Bizri; Colonel Fadhil Abbas al-Mahdawi, President of the Special Supreme Military Tribunal; Lt. Colonel Wasfi Taher and Ahmed Salih al-Abdi. Wholesale purges by the new regime offered a chance to settle old scores.

New laws were promulgated to prosecute the "elite": a "Law for the punishment of conspirators against the country's welfare" and a "Law for the corrupters of the Administration" were published. These new laws were applied *ex post facto* to prisoners of the Revolution. A "Special High Military Court of Justice" was created to try the 108 persons accused. These prisoners included 30 military men.¹⁰ Sentence was imposed on Jamali in December, 1958, by the Special High Military Tribunal. An Article had been inserted in the Criminal Law by the Iraqi revolutionary government which stipulated that anyone who delivered a speech against an Arab head of state before an international organization should be sentenced to 20 years imprisonment, and that it applied retroactively. "I was the only person accused under that Article." (145)

Asked about his life in prison, Jamali recalled that he had been left for two or three months in a solitary cell near the filthy toilets. The soldier guards were very nice to him. The food was "ordinary." He says,

I discovered fine people in that prison: criminals, they are called, but they are not the real criminals. The criminals are those who did not take care of them.

We had a communist at one point who was Director of the Prison. He was very rude to us—in the summer, no cold water, no fans. He took our beds and made us sleep on the floor. He acted as if we were a zoo, bringing people to look at us at night.

A sergeant came to us and said that, if we gave him 25 dinars, he would get rid of this Director. The others collected the money, but I did not take part; I did not know whether or not it was a trick, but they took a dinar out of my pocket anyway and gave him the money.

A few days later the Military Police came and arrested this Director. The sergeant, knowing the Director was a drunkard, went to his office one night. When he came out he said that the Director had ordered the guards to tear down all the pictures of the *Za'im* (Leader), Abdul Karim Qasim, and stamp on them. The sergeant and his men obeyed the order and the news went to the top: "The Director of the Prison is against the *Za'im*." That was Areef (sergeant) Sharfi: I'll never forget him.

I thought about being hung. What if they hang me? It's like falling from an airplane, so why worry about it? If God has assigned me to die, I will die. Death comes anyway, but how we do not know. If God wants me to die by the gallows, I will die by the gallows.¹¹

He had a copy of the *Qur'an* with him: at first it was the only book permitted, and it was a great support. Today he carries the *Qur'an* with him always. One *Sura* (chapter) in particular meant much to him, al-'Asr, and he repeated its three verses frequently:

By eventide every man feels at a loss, except for those who believe, perform honorable deeds, encourage truth and recommend patience.¹²

In solitary there were no visitors, but after the death sentence had been pronounced Sarah was permitted to visit at least once a month in the jailer's office, and Abbas was able to bring food each day. Then Abbas was admitted to the AUB, but the authorities wouldn't let him leave the country. Jamali sent a telegram to the *Za'im*, Qasim, saying, "If I am a

criminal, does that make my son a criminal also? What did he do?" So Abbas was given his exit permit, and the food was brought each day by the Jamalis' maid, Um Senia. Sarah says, "She was our guardian angel." Um Senia came from Abadan in Arabustan, the Arabic speaking part of Iran. Apart from the occasional meetings with Sarah there was no communication, but Sarah was able to obtain permission from the Military Governor of Baghdad, Ahmed Salah al-Abdi, to get books for Fadhel to read. It was al-Abdi who later, after Jamali had been released from prison, obtained his exit visa to leave for Switzerland.

He was permitted half an hour of exercise a day. His cell mates were others who had been condemned to death. Eleven were crowded in a room the size of a hotel bedroom: they included Burhan ed-Din Bashayan, a former Foreign Minister; Sa'id Qazzaz; Ahmad Mukhtar Baban, a former Prime Minister; and Bahjat al-Attayah, a former head of the political police. Among the others was a young Christian who they were told was there "to look after us," and whom they all assumed was a spy. A real friendship developed between Jamali and Bashayan. When Bashayan was brought to the cell they said, "Welcome to the club!" Bashayan told Jamali that they must now strengthen their nerves, their spirits, so as not to give in. After their release they called on each other and kept up that cordial relationship until Bashayan's death.

One prison character is described by Jamali as "a very nice thief":

He used to come and clean our room and smuggle newspapers to us. We gave him a quarter of a dinar every day. He would put the papers under a mattress and then leave.

One day he came and said, "Goodbye." We were surprised and said, "What! How can you leave us? What are we going to do without you?" He said, "I'll come back in two week's time." We discovered that he was a thief on the Baghdad-Basra train. So he went and came back. He said that was his specialty—Baghdad to Basra. They arrested him and brought him back. He was a charming fellow — very nice.¹³

Then there was the prison barber, sentenced for killing his sister who had dishonored the family name. The man had only followed tribal tradition, but the law found him guilty, so he plied his trade while in prison making extra money for himself. The prisoners were allowed five dinars a month for pocket money which the families brought.

There was a moment of real fear, Jamali recalls, when the guards came and said they were going to hang General Ghazi Daghestani, the Deputy Chief of Staff and Commander of the Third Armored Division in which both President Abdel Karim Qasim and Abdur Rahman Aref had served. They came and called, "Ghazi, prepare yourself for hanging." The other prisoners were shocked; but then they brought him back and laughed, saying it was a joke. He was eventually released. Like others for whom Qasim had high regard, including Jamali, he may have been kept in the prison until the dust had settled and the communist elements had been brought under some control.

Meanwhile the trials went on: they started in mid-August. The sessions were open to the public as well as transmitted on radio and television. First in the dock was General Ghazi Daghestani. Then followed Jamali, Burhan ed-Din Bashayan, Jamal Baban and others. Jamali recalls asking Daghestani when they were together in prison, "Ghazi Pasha, you were the Commander: didn't you feel there was something going on in your Division?" The reply was, "Doctor, if you have two sons at home when you go to bed, would you expect them to kill you, or would you sleep peacefully?"¹⁴

One reason that the revolution came as such a surprise was that the Crown Prince had abolished the Army Intelligence Service. It was his view that intelligence operations ought to be mounted against foreigners, not against one's own army, and so no reports were made about subversion in the military. Colonel Ahmed Mura'i who had headed up the Army Intelligence Service had been moved into the Palace as Master of Ceremonies. He too was imprisoned, and when Jamali asked him, "Didn't you know what was happening?" he replied, "Sir, how could I know anything when we had been

removed from our position and told not to do any intelligence work?"¹⁵

The Netherlands Legation, reporting the conduct of the Military Court trials, wrote to the Hague that the way in which the President of the Court conducted the sessions gave the impression that he was motivated by feelings of personal hatred and revenge.

Unable to deal with the defendants . . . , he resorts to sneering remarks, provoking the public to laughter and in some cases forbidding the defendant to continue. Many . . . expect that, if Prime Minister Qasim's Cabinet can hold out and continue to follow a moderate course, the measures against a number of supporters of the old regime would eventually lose their pungency.¹⁶

An article on 20 January, 1959, by the publisher of Cairo's *al-Akhbar*, Mustafa Amin, likened the behavior of Col. Mahdawi, President of the Military Tribunal to the "pompous state buffoon" in an Arabic comedy by Naguib Rihani. "He is a lion before the weak and a scared mouse before the lions." Amin recalled that Mahdawi had worked with Rashid Ali Gailani in the Revolt of 1941 until he saw the tide turn, and that he had then hastily raised a white flag while other officers . . .

were laying down their lives in the field of honor . . . As a reward for his treachery he was appointed aide-de-camp to Emir Abdulillah. A cruel stroke of irony brought Rashid Ali, to whom Mahdawi had once owed allegiance, to stand before the Court and hear Mahdawi brand him a traitor . . . Gailani said nothing but looked at him with such contempt as was almost a slap.

Among those the court asked to testify against Jamali was Amin al-Mumayiz, an Iraqi diplomat. When Jamali had been Director General in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he had appointed Mumayiz to Ambassadorial rank in spite of the fact that Mumayiz had earlier objected, on the grounds that Jamali was a Shi'a, to his being taken to the first UN meeting in San Francisco. "Couldn't you find a Sunni to take his place?" Mumayiz had asked the Foreign Minister, Arshad

al-Amari. Jamali was present at the time, so he asked, "Do you want to create a Shi'a martyr for a Sunni cause? That shouldn't happen." The Minister took Jamali to the UN anyway.

Soon after that conversation Jamali telephoned Mumayiz and asked him in a friendly way, "Amin, what do you want? What can I do for you? If you'll just be quiet, I promise nothing bad will happen to you while I'm here." Mumayiz replied, "Please send me to London." Jamali arranged his posting there, and later to Beirut and to Riyadh.

When the Revolutionary Court asked Mumayiz to testify against Jamali. He replied, "I'll tell you frankly that, while I do not like this man, he is honest; and he has done clean work in Foreign Affairs. If you want me to come and say that in Court, I will." Naturally he was not called to be a witness.¹⁷

At one point the Minister of Justice was asked to determine whether the "crimes" of Jamali and his colleagues were criminal or political. Eleven legal experts were impaneled. They met and all decided that the "crimes" were political. The Government, however, made it clear that they wanted the prisoners classified as criminals, so the Minister went to the weakest of the eleven experts and ordered him to change his report and to call for a criminal classification on pain of losing his post. The man changed his opinion, and the Minister tried to act on that single minority opinion.

However, the news got out, and public opinion was stirred. The expert, who was a judge, was a marked man. People asked him how he could say these men were criminals. This judge was originally an educator who had received his appointment as headmaster from Jamali. After Jamali's release the man came to him, bowed and begged pardon. Jamali replied that he had nothing against him. He asked the judge not to be disturbed, saying, "I know the position in which you were placed, and I know all the machinations behind it. As far as I am concerned you are a fine fellow."

Much later, under the Presidency of Abdur Rahman Aref, a special law was passed applying to Ahmed Mukhtar Baban and Fadhel Jamali absolving them from all accusations

and restoring all rights, including pensions. The Ba'ath regime which followed Aref decided to deny pension payments to anyone abroad, a decision probably not directed at any particular personalities.

Abdul Karim Qasim's position required delicate political balance. It would appear that he did indeed keep men he respected in prison to protect them from danger. He removed pro-Nasser Colonel Abdul Salam Aref from the Baghdad scene by appointing him Ambassador to the Federal German Republic in Bonn. Qasim did not want to join Egypt's "United Arab Republic." When Aref returned to Baghdad unofficially he expected a hero's welcome but was met by Qasim's security people who rushed him to the Ministry of the Interior. There he was arrested on 5 November, 1958, and ordered to face a military trial on charges of attempting to assassinate Qasim. He was tried, condemned to death and later pardoned.¹⁸

The pro-Nasser daily in Baghdad, *al-Jumhuriya*, was closed and its editors were arrested. There was some concern that Nasser might retaliate. Western pleasure at this firm attitude, however, was muted by Qasim's acceptance of communist help in controlling the perceived UAR threat. The Iraqi Communist Party leaders were credited with organizing a massive pro-Qasim demonstration in Baghdad's streets the day following Aref's arrest. Qasim's backers pointed out that he was only using the communists while he dealt with the Ba'ath and pro-Nasser parties. Then, they said, it will be the communists' turn.¹⁹

On 10 November, nearly four months after their detention, General Rafiq Aref, General Ghazi Daghestani and Dr. Jamali stood handcuffed in the dock, and a five-man military tribunal sentenced them to death by hanging. Jamali was also sentenced to fifty five years in prison and fined 100,000 Iraqi dinars. Thunderous applause broke out as each sentence was pronounced. Reporters in the press box stood and cheered "the court's just decision." It took 105 minutes to read the indictments. The charges against Jamali were that he had conspired to bring about a coup in Syria with imperialist

backing, had insulted Gamal Abdul Nasser, had rigged elections and squandered public funds. He denied all charges and pled for mercy.²⁰ Three days later his friend and cell-mate, Burhan ed-Din Bashayan received the same sentence, death by hanging.²¹

Friends around the world prayed for Jamali's safety. Among the many who intervened on his behalf were Dag Hammarskjold, Pope John XXIII, the President of the Federal German Republic, the President of Pakistan, the President of Tunisia, and the Masjumi Party, the largest political group in Indonesia. Jamali and Hammarskjold were friends and used to sit for a chat from time to time.²²

In view of Gamal Abdul Nasser's past differences with Jamali it is worth noting that he was active in seeking commutation of the death sentences. One report states, "He has advised the Iraqi government through their Ambassador in Cairo, 'Follow my example. Sentence these people to death, but do not execute them.'²³

When Jamali had gone to the Security Council in 1958, just before the revolution, to defend Lebanon, the issue of the French bombing attack on the Tunisian village of Saqiet bin Yusef was also on the agenda, and he delivered a "fiery speech" against that attack.²⁴ In view of his many services to the independence of the North African nations, it is not surprising that Tunisian President Bourguiba was one of those who intervened with General Qasim on Jamali's behalf when he was condemned to death. He sent his special representative, Halim Sheti, to Baghdad to intercede.

When King Hassan of Morocco, whose guest Jamali had been, visited other Arab countries in 1960 he was also invited to Iraq. He replied that he could not come to Baghdad while Jamali was under a death sentence. Baghdad countered, "Come to Baghdad and we will consider his case." He went there during the Muslim month of fasting, Ramadhan, and on the feast day at the end of the fast the Baghdad radio broadcast the news that Jamali's death sentence had been reduced to 10 years in prison. The Official Announcement was made on 27 March, 1960. The death sentences of

General Daghestani, General Omar Ali and Ahmed Mukhtar Baban were also commuted in the same decree, issued by Abdul Karim Qasim. Jamali recalls that for over a year and a half he did not know whether the early morning footsteps in the corridor were guards bringing his breakfast or the hanging squad. He adds, "Ever since the death sentence was lifted I have offered a special daily prayer of thanks to God for saving my life."²⁵

When asked whether they beat him in prison his reply was,

No, not much. They arrested me and they beat me when they brought me to the Minister of Defense,—with the hand—slaps on the face. Generally speaking mine was the best treatment possible, the least cruel.

Abdul Salaam Aref wanted us all killed. This man was a brute. Abdel Karim Qasim said, "If any one touches these men, I will kill him." He gave orders that we should be well treated. He permitted us to have food brought from our homes and then to have books.²⁶

The sentence was further shortened by degrees as each feast or official holiday came around. By July, 1961, Jamali's sentence had been reduced to six months in prison.

On the night of 13 July, 1961, the eve of anniversary of the 1958 Revolution, Prime Minister Qasim ordered seven political prisoners brought to his office: four ex-prime ministers; Jamali, Rashid Ali Gailani, Towfiq es-Suweidi and Ahmad Mukhtar Baban, two ex-ministers; Burhan Bashayan and Abdul Karim Kenna; and a Director General of Police. Their hopes were somewhat aroused, because General Abdul Karim Omar Ali, the Deputy Chief of Staff, had been released the day before. He later told Jamali that he had asked Qasim, "Why do you keep them? They are old people, sick people. What interest do you have in keeping them?" The Leader had promised he would consider their release. It was after this that they learned that their records had been called for, and that they should be ready on the eve of 14 July to go to the Ministry of Defense. They were taken there in

Army transport at nine in the evening. At eleven Qasim arrived. The first thing he said to the seven men was,

You are people who have served the country, and we never forget your good work; but the people wanted to kill you, and I protected you. After you are served coffee, all your death and prison sentences are wiped out.

Jamali remarks with his wry humor, "No coffee came, only coca cola!" Qasim then began a "long lecture" about his achievements—irrigation canals he had opened, construction projects, development plans. Noting the many documents on the desk Jamali asked if they might have copies. "So he called and brought each of us a good packet of his speeches, his propaganda, wrapped with a nice green cord. So we took it home. That was a big souvenir."²⁷

Using a wall map he then gave them another long lecture on Kuwait and its importance to Iraq. He said that if Iraq ever moved to free Palestine, Britain, who still controlled Kuwait, would strike her through Kuwait to prevent it. (310f) Qasim's view was that Kuwait should be attached to Iraq and the Ruler would be made a sort of provincial governor. After the lecture on Kuwait Qasim asked if any of them needed anything. Jamali said he had no special needs but that he wanted to thank the Leader for giving him the opportunity to study the *Qur'an* in the prison. Qasim responded, "Yes, I recite verses from the *Qur'an* too." Qasim then told them, "Those of you who have cars to take you home can do so, and the Army will provide cars for those who have none." Jamali had none available, and so an Army car was brought for him. That was the eve of the fourteenth of July.

He went straight home where he rested and then began working on his papers. Sarah had already heard the news of his release on the radio, and so on arrival he found a group of friends gathered to rejoice with them. "All the ladies kissing me, which is forbidden, you know!" Khalil Kenna's home was also filled with well-wishers, so full that Qasim sent word that if this sort of thing continued he would take them back to prison. They were attracting too much attention. This

ultimatum offered a relief for Jamali who was exhausted and ill after the three years of prison life, and he closed his doors to most visitors.

He believes that indeed Qasim protected him and his colleagues. He says that, some time before their release, the communists had a great long banner displayed which read; "Hang the former Minister of Defense! Kamil Chaderchi is under the earth, but Fadhel Jamali still enjoys life!" There were demonstrations in the streets shouting, "Hang them! Hang them! Do not say there is no time: Hang them tonight!" By the time Jamali was freed, Qasim had so weakened the power of the left that he felt he could release them safely.²⁸

Usameh, the middle son, was then a student in Beirut. He was delighted to hear that his father was safely home, but he was puzzled that the telegram had come from Kadhimain rather than Baghdad until he learned that it had been sent by a distant cousin, Abdel Ghani Jamali, who still lived in the suburb.

Jamali was in prison three years less three days. Half of that period he was under sentence of death. It was during those years that he wrote letters to his son, Abbas, teaching him about Islam.²⁹ He says,

My faith in God kept me alive with my nerves unshattered, and I could resist the powers of evil. During my time in prison my good wife told me, "They will not hang you. You are too precious." These were thoughts that came to her in a time of listening.³⁰

The daily discipline for reading the *Qur'an* through once each month which he adopted in prison meant a great deal to him. His *Letters on Islam*, written to Abbas from his prison cell, reveals how his faith was nurtured by this practice. In fact it was out of his own reading of the *Qur'an* in prison that he came to realize how much he had failed to pass on his own faith to his boys. The *Letters*, addressed for the most part to Abbas as the youngest, were an attempt to record the things he had not shared with them earlier. He writes,

I felt that I . . . had greatly failed by not giving my sons adequate religious education. That is why I thought while in prison that I should make up in some part for this failure.³¹

His favorite *Sura* was *al-Inshirah* (Consolation, #94, v. 1-9), suggested for him by Abbas:

Did we not relieve your breast for you, and remove your burden from you that pressed down upon your back? We have even raised up renown of you! Yet hardship will bring ease. Indeed, hardship must bring ease!

So whenever you have finished, still toil on! Toward your Lord direct your longing!

Sarah's own faith also was a great strength. She recalls,

When Fadhel went to prison I didn't ask God to get him out, but I said to God, "Do your best!" One day when I was going for a visit I said, "Dear God, what shall I say?" and these words came to my mind: "They won't hang you; you're too precious."

There was a very nice commander of the prison at that time, and he let us meet in his office. I spoke to Fadhel in Arabic, but at one moment I turned and said in English, "They won't hang you; you're too precious!" and then I went on talking in Arabic.³²

Sarah and Fadhel have worked out a touching relationship based on respect for each other's religious background, she as a Christian who keeps her faith, and he as a Muslim who keeps his. That mutual respect is evident as one talks with them. When they were asked about this, Sarah, replied, "It was not always like this! At first we ran on separate tracks. Moral Re-Armament made it possible to bridge our language gap, our communication gap. Earlier, he had his religious ideas and I had mine. MRA gave us a new, common language."³³

With the overthrow of the Qasim regime by Abdus Salaam Aref and his allies on 8 February, 1963, the Communist Party was relentlessly pursued, and its leadership was routed out of its local strongholds of power, including Kadhimain. Agwani described what happened:

The communist resistance was toughest in Basra, Najaf and the Kadhimain area of Baghdad. *Pravda's* correspondent, P. Demchenko, who was in Baghdad at the time, witnessed the ironical spectacle of the CPI being crushed with Soviet-made tanks and machine guns. Scores of communists, among them members of the CPI's Central Committee, were shot dead... Qasim himself was executed before a television camera. Wasfi Taher, Taha Sheikh Ahmed and Fadhil Abbas al-Mahdawi met with similar fate.³⁴

Bloodshed had come full circle.

Notes

- 1 Jamali. Interview taped by author. Zurich. 2 September, 1988.
- 2 *Ibid.*
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- 4 *Ibid.*, 20 July, 1958, p. 14.
- 5 Hanna Batatu. *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements in Iraq*. Princeton University Press, 1978, pp. 801-803.
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- 9 Batatu, p. 782; and Agwani, p. 116.
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- 14 *Ibid.*, 1 September, 1988.
- 15 *Ibid.*
- 16 Letter from Dutch interim Chargé d'Affaires Dr. J. B. van Loon. 911.31/IRAK Polit. Verhoudingen en Partijen 1955-1958, 17 October, 1958/ #148377.
- 17 *Ibid.*
- 18 Batatu, pp. 778f.
- 19 *Newsweek*. 17 November, 1958.
- 20 *New York Times*. 11 November, 1958, p. 11.
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- 22 Jamali. Interview taped by author. Caux, Switzerland. 20 August, 1986, p. 1.

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- 30 Jamali. Unpublished talk. Caux, Switzerland. 24 July, 1981.
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- 34 Agwani. *Communism in the Arab East*. p. 143.

11

Teaching Again

Following his release from prison Jamali stayed in his home and visitors were greatly restricted. He was told that if he got involved in politics he would go back to prison. At that point he received an invitation from his friend, Frank Buchman, to join him at the MRA Assembly in Switzerland, "Come to Caux right away," but he was not yet permitted to travel.¹

One night he was dining with Jamil al-Urfali, who had been Minister of Justice in the Jamali government. He told his friend that he feared his health was deteriorating. Al-Urfali said that the Governor of Baghdad, Salih al Abdi who had married Urfali's niece and who had permitted Jamali to have books in prison, was coming to his home for luncheon the next day and that he would ask him to speak to President Qasim. Following that luncheon with his nephew-in-law, al-Urfali rang and said, "Make a good petition to the *Za'im* (Qasim) and ask for permission to leave for medical treatment." Jamali made the request, and in less than a fortnight he was called and told that his passport was ready.

With the new document in his pocket, he went straight to the Thomas Cook travel agency and asked for a seat on the next plane to Europe. He did not want the communists to have time to try to block his departure, so when he was told

of a KLM flight to Zurich which left early the next morning, 9 May, he booked a seat at once. He himself did not have enough money, but various friends had given him such generous sums that he refused further offers and insisted that the gifts he did accept be considered as loans. These funds saw him through his time in Zurich and eventually helped him and Sarah on to Tunisia. Before leaving Baghdad he asked Sarah, whose moves were not restricted, to stay behind, arrange for a member of the Jamali family to live in their home and then to join him.

Upon arrival at Kloten airport he went straight to the Hotel Royale, a little place just across the River Limmat from the *Hauptbahnhof*. From there he telephoned Mrs. Rudolf Huber, whose husband had been Director of the Oerlikon Machine Co. They had met in 1956 at the Moral Re-Armament Assembly in Caux, and they had been seated next to each other one evening at Buchman's table. Mrs. Huber recalls that they had a long talk about the status of women in Islam.²

She knew of his imprisonment, having followed the story in her *Neue Zuercher Zeitung*, and was delighted to know that he was in Zurich. She hurried down to the hotel and took him at once to her home where he stayed twenty four days. Mrs. Huber arranged for much-needed medical and dental care which the doctors offered free, knowing his history. During those days of examination and treatment he began to learn German by reading fairy tales from the children's books in the doctor's waiting rooms.

In the Huber home he frequently used the family living room for his Muslim prayers and to receive guests in his usual manner. It amused the Huber boys that he was learning German from fairy tales, and they used to call him "Herr Was Heisst?" (Mr. What does that mean?) because, determined as he was to speak German, he was always asking them what this or that meant.

Looking forward to Sarah's arrival he searched for a modest hotel without success. Then a Swiss friend of Sarah's who had advised her on the education of mentally

handicapped people found a place for them in the Righblick, a modest, alcohol-free hotel to which they continued to come each summer.

Beside Bourguiba's invitation he had also been invited by King Hassan of Morocco and King Hussein of Jordan. But when Bourguiba heard that his friend Jamali had come to Zurich he sent the Tunisian Ambassador in Bern to enquire after him and to invite him to Tunisia. This Jamali accepted. He replied when accepting Bourguiba's invitation, "I don't want to sit idle as your guest. I am a hard-working man. Do you have a job for me? I am a school teacher." Jamali never asked about salary, but he received a modest one and the use of a car and driver as Lecturer on Educational Philosophy at the University of Tunis until the spring of 1988. Although retirement age there was 60, he actually started his teaching in Tunis at that age.

Finally, he was obliged to retire as an active Professor, but the University authorities arranged for him to continue as a Research Fellow. The essential content of his lectures there is found in several books in Arabic, among which are *Tarbiyat el-Insan l-Jadid*. (The Education of the New Man), published by es-Sherikat l-Tunisi lit-Tawzi', in Tunis in 1967; and *Afaq at-Tarbiyat al-Haditha fil-Bilad an-Namia*, (Horizons of Modern Education in the Developing Countries), published by ad-Dar at-Tunisi lin-Nashr, Tunis, 1968.

Fadhel Jamali is a big-hearted man with wide-ranging interests: he has a large assembly of pocket knives, and between the homes in Baghdad, Tunis and Zurich he has nearly two hundred canes gathered during his travels. He has a very large collection of musical recordings which includes works of Mozart, Bach, Schubert, Brahms and Beethoven, great church and choir works and many Arabic recordings.³

He loves concerts. On one occasion when he was flying to London, he had heard that there was a good program at the Royal Albert Hall. Eager not to miss it, he sent his luggage on and went straight to the concert blissfully unaware that the Regent was awaiting him at their hotel!

In 1965 he was invited by the World Muslim League to attend a conference to be held in Mecca and to participate in the *Hajj*, the holy pilgrimage required of every able Muslim. The rituals culminate in the *Eid al-Adha* (the feast of the sacrifice) celebrating the readiness of Abraham to sacrifice his son, Isma'il (Ishmael) if God so ordered. This visit for the pilgrimage gave occasion for a private audience with King Feisal in Jeddah. Jamali records in his *Memoirs*:

We reviewed the past with all its mistakes and misunderstandings but, as His Majesty remarked, "At no time did the troubled atmosphere lead us to abuse one another and to create a cleavage such as occurred between the so-called revolutionary and non-revolutionary Arabs of today." (321f)

Recalling his earlier exchange with Prince Feisal at Ali Maher's table during the Arab League meetings in Cairo in 1952, Jamali noted in 1974,

I now think I was very harsh in my remarks, and I disturbed His Royal Highness . . . When I think of that conversation now I regret it. I had a just cause, but I used a harsh method. That is why I feel I owe a sincere apology to His Majesty.

Alas, King Feisal was killed in March, 1975, but perhaps the private audience that took place during the 1965 pilgrimage did its own bridgebuilding. Still later, Jamali admitted that he had caused some trouble for which he was sorry, but, he went on,

My regret is that I had caused trouble, not that I said what I did. My regret was for the effect it had on him. I was sorry he suffered for it, but I meant what I said.⁴

When Jamali was sent to Germany in 1938 to mediate difficulties between the Legation and the Iraqi students there, he visited the University in Bonn and was invited to luncheon by Professor Kahle, who lectured on oriental studies. At that luncheon Jamali met Johannes, the Professor's son. After Jamali returned to Baghdad he heard that the family had moved to Oxford. It seems the Nazis had made difficulties

for them because Mrs. Kahle had patronized a Jewish shop. They kept in touch for some time and then lost track of each other.

Years later the son, Johannes, was posted to Tunis as Ambassador for the Federal German Republic, and one of his first acts was to enquire after the Jamalis. One day Fadhel and Sarah were invited to the Embassy for a luncheon. They were surprised to find quite a large group of cultural and intellectual leaders gathered. After they were seated at table, Ambassador Kahle rose to speak, and then he awarded a German decoration to his old friend. He also came to greet Fadhel on his eightieth birthday in 1983.

Of course as an international diplomat Jamali was awarded other medals and honors—from Jordan, Morocco, Spain, the Republic of China, Iran, Tunisia, Iraq, the Vatican; Sarah says, "A whole drawer full!"

Each summer Sarah and Fadhel, usually with some of the family, go to Edinburgh to see their mentally retarded son Laith. Even though his development was arrested at age three or four, he delights in seeing them. They have worked out a marvelous philosophy of faith as they learned to accept God's gift through Laith. Sarah, writing from Tunis in May 1984, expresses what they have learned in these words:

Throughout the universe there runs a stream of good that brings growth and renewal to God's creation. Many, many people contribute to this stream of good,—even, I believe, the mentally retarded.

One day my daughter-in-law said to me, "What a pity your eldest son is handicapped. He might have been a great engineer."

In reply I said, "Yes, he might have been a great engineer, but how many people would he have been able to help? With his broken life he has helped hundreds, even thousands of others and made his little contribution to the stream of good."

My husband says that I have not told you about the years of hard work I put into helping mentally retarded, and now, as a weak old woman, I am still keeping on. I do not think it necessary to say that I worked hard in the company of many, many others. I cannot count the effort

of the past when there is so much to be done to meet the needs of today.

On the whole, I am truly grateful that I have seen the happy transformation of some of those living on the dark side of life. It is more than enough to know that God sustains us and that His blessings are amazing results from the sincere work we offer in His service. I feel deep regret for the mentally handicapped we were not able to help.⁵

Jamali is frank about Arab weaknesses. He believes that the problem of leadership and the lack of democratic structures opened the way to demagoguery, and that personal charm, family connections, religious or patriotic charisma brought leaders to the fore who were then difficult to remove. This, he believes, produced an authoritarian mentality, and with it the dissensions and personality conflicts which weakened the Palestinian cause. He points to the Mufti of Jerusalem, as one who might have been able to rally the Palestinians but whose anti-British sentiments eventually took him to Berlin where he remained isolated from his people during World War II. No one leader replaced him, and the crisis of leadership was perpetuated. Jamali asks:

How did we lose Palestine? There were at least two fundamental reasons:

The first was that we deceived ourselves with regard to the power of our adversary . . .

The second reason was that we thought we were very strong, and that we could face the whole world. We did not know ourselves. We did not know the reality about ourselves. (600f)

Jamali's conclusions are best expressed in his own words, extracted from the last chapter of his *Memoirs*.

The ideals I cherished for Iraq and the Arab world at large were national *liberation*, national *integration* and national *renaissance* . . .

For Palestine I did my very best to defend the rights of its legal inhabitants. The frustration I had as a result of great power politics in the Palestine problem was the biggest blow I experienced in my political career. It is my honest belief that there can be no permanent peace in the Middle East unless and until Muslims, Christians and

Jews begin to live together in Palestine on terms of brotherhood and equality.

This requires that the Jews in Palestine should de-Zionize themselves and be ready to recognize the right of the Palestinian Arabs to their homeland . . .

As for Arab renaissance, it requires a unifying ideology . . . based on religious and moral foundations, modern science and technology, teamwork and the democratic technique of respecting the other's point of view. To achieve this a good education is required, an education which will revolutionize the present-day lives of the Arabs . . .

The revolution we espouse is not destructive and blood-thirsty. It is a peaceful and constructive revolution with noble national aims and ideals which will guide us in all our actions . . . These goals are still worth adopting by the Arab world. They can be achieved, God willing, because the Arabs possess great potentials of human and natural resources.

It is my sincere hope that the United Arab States will be one of the leading powers of the 21st century. The Arab nation should then rank with the USA, the USSR, Western Europe and Japan. The Arabs should work hard to qualify themselves to carry their mission of brotherhood, unity, justice, freedom, prosperity and peace to the rest of the world. (647-649)

More recently, reviewing a life of eighty five years, he remarked:

I have come from a very narrow community to a broad, universal view of life and faith, and now I stand for world peace—for all humanity, not for one section against the other. I signed the UN Charter, and I am a believer and live by those principles. I do not believe in confrontation, I do not believe in wars. I do not believe in dialectical materialism. I do believe in harmonizing and integrating opposites.

I had an early sense of a destiny that involved bridg-building; first of all among the Iraqis, then among the Arab people, then in the Muslim world, then in international affairs—East and West—even between capitalism and communism.

Politics for me has been just a process of education. I try to learn and to teach people what is the truth about international affairs.⁶

Notes

- 1 Jamali. Unpublished talk. Caux, Switzerland. 24 July, 1981, p. 8.
- 2 Mrs. Rudolph Huber. Interview. Caux, Switzerland. August, 1986.
- 3 Jamali. Interview taped by author. Zurich. 3 September, 1988.
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- 5 Sarah P. Jamali. "How It Began." Unpublished article, p. 3.
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