

IDEOLOGICAL STRATEGY

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The Battle of Ideas—the Decisive Battle

AN INDIAN student recently tried to explain to me his countrymen's attitude to other nations. What he said was more or less as follows :

"We Indians recognise the fact that the United States has given millions of dollars to help India economically, and that the Western countries constantly contribute material aid to develop our industry, our economic life, our health services, etc. In spite of this, everything that comes from the West is regarded, at any rate by students, with scepticism and suspicion. Soviet Russia has only given India a minimum of economic or material help. Yet the Soviet Union has won thousands and thousands of friends and ideological allies of late years in India. The reason is obvious: whoever wants to win India today must offer us ideas that will give our lives purpose and meaning. The West does not understand this. But Soviet Russia understands it and acts accordingly."

What he said about India applies everywhere in the world.

Externally, the world situation is characterised by a tremendous tug-of-war between the West and the Soviet Union. Each of the main combatants has various other

states grouped around it. Some cannot be said to have joined either of them outright, and both of the power-groups are competing to win the friendship of those nations. But the Soviet Union has in addition succeeded in securing as ideological allies a number of individuals in the countries of the West and the countries which stand with the West in the political battle. As an example of this we have only to think of what the many cases of espionage since the last World War have revealed.

Both groups of nations feel that it is necessary to make military preparations for war, so as not to be weaker than its opponents. This has led to armament programmes vaster than the world ever thought possible. Military preparedness is the first priority in both power-groups.

The great stress that is laid on military preparations for war should not, however, cause us to forget the war of ideas that is so characteristic of our time. At the heart of the so-called "cold war" there is a battle in progress between opposed systems of ideas which aim at gaining control over mankind.

The problem which confronts democracy today is this:

Has democracy the strength to defend itself? Can it now and in time to come count upon citizens who feel deeply and personally committed to the ideas which underlie democracy? And can democracy take the offensive? Has it the ideological power to win the peoples now subject to totalitarian governments?

Modern military science has produced such efficient and destructive weapons that a war will inevitably have the most catastrophic results for everybody. Accordingly any nation with aggressive aims must do its utmost to obtain its objective without risking a military war. It must therefore resort to psychological warfare, taking the form of ideological influence and infiltration. By adopting this

method it will be able, in time of peace, so to weaken its opponent's national morale that it will either achieve its purpose without resort to arms, or win as easily as possible if open warfare is unavoidable.

A number of authorities have stressed this.

B. H. Liddell Hart writes in his book *Defence of the West* that, "We are in a time when ideological warfare is more dangerous than atomic war."¹ And in his address to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in Paris, July, 1951, General Eisenhower said: "The one thing I want to stress at the beginning is this: the struggle going on in the world is for the minds and hearts of men. It is an ideological struggle. There is every possible way of going about the thing, and open warfare is only one method."

Both of these statements emphasise points which are of vital importance for our endeavours to prevent a future war, and strengthen our nation to meet the stresses and strains that the immediate future may bring, even without a war. Our work must not merely aim at strengthening the nation militarily and preparing people, on a purely psychological level, for some possible future military war. If we work solely with that objective it will not be enough, and the results may even be dangerous. It may lead the nation to take it for granted that an armed conflict is inevitable, and thus impede the positive work which must always be carried on, with a view to eliminating causes of war and promoting understanding and unity in international relations. Our work for what is termed "psychological preparedness" must in these days first and foremost aim at giving all citizens—the military forces and the civilians alike—a clear understanding of the war of ideas that is in progress already, increasing at the same time

¹ Liddell Hart, B. H.: *Defence of the West* (Cassell, London, 1950), p. 329.

their willingness and ability to defend themselves against the onslaught of ideas which are incompatible with democracy and destructive of it. Experience shows that where the morality of a community is bad, and where in consequence social conditions also are bad, undemocratic ideas find it particularly easy to take root. What we have to do, therefore, is to create a higher level of social morality in our democracy.

A high level of morality gives strength to any society, in war or peace. Its effect is to bring ethical principles consistently to bear upon every aspect of social life. This will help to remove social inequalities and the resulting mistrust, and will also strengthen the sense of fellowship in our nation by making it possible for all sections of the population to participate fully in the responsibilities and privileges of democracy. A feeling that one is neglected, that there is unfairness in the distribution of social benefits, and that one is not allowed to exercise the responsibilities for which one is competent, tends, on the other hand, to weaken the will to resist, and makes it easier for an enemy to win ideological allies who will act as fifth-columnists behind one's own lines. Because victory will be easier, the enemy will be more strongly tempted to attack. In general, then, we must realise that effective psychological preparedness is directly conducive to the preservation of peace.

The main task in our psychological preparedness must therefore be that of meeting the psychological warfare waged in peace-time. The work we do in time of peace may be decisive for the future of the nation: it may preserve peace; and it may create the will and power to resist which will be needed if war should come after all.

Psychological warfare will, of course, vary to some extent according to the circumstances, taking different

forms in war-time than in time of peace. But in the main it is always the same. By and large we may say that the psychological warfare which we have to counter has the following aims in all circumstances and in all its forms :

1. To destroy or weaken the belief in the central values that a nation wishes to preserve and endeavours to defend.

2. To undermine confidence in the ability and moral integrity of the national leadership—the politicians, the military and administrative leaders, and others, with whom the citizens are in contact and who have their confidence.

3. To weaken the ability and willingness to co-operate for common aims by destroying group solidarity.

4. To destroy the people's psychic equilibrium and personal adjustment to the existing conditions.

In view of this the objective of psychological preparedness will be manifest. It must not, however, be restricted to the situation at the moment. It is a necessary part of the policy of every democracy as long as any anti-democratic ideologies exist. And it has no specifically military character. It concerns each one of us and the part each one of us is playing. Further, as already indicated, it is something more than defence, for anti-democratic ideologies cannot be stopped by defensive measures. Democracy must be on the offensive.

It must unfortunately be admitted, however, that democracy has in recent times remained on the defensive in the ideological struggle. What can the reason be? Democracy believes that it has the right ideas for the furtherance of social development, the ideas which, measured alike by scientific and moral standards, should be the soundest, the ideas which in the deepest sense of the word are best for the individual man. Democracy

should consequently have every reason to be on the offensive. But perhaps we are not sufficiently clear in our minds as to what is implied in our democratic ideas if we really try to work them out in practice. Possibly, too, we do not understand the power inherent in the anti-democratic ideologies, or how these ideologies work in the world and in our own country today. The explanation of the defensive role played by democracy in the ideological battle today may be found in these words of a former Communist leader in the Ruhr district:

“With ideologically blind democrats Communists can do what they like.”

Psychological Preparedness and National Morale

IN THE march of events, psychological warfare, besides retaining some of the general characteristics it always has possessed, has acquired certain new and special features. These are to a large extent connected with the emergence of the great ideologies, which have gained adherents—in larger or smaller numbers—in all countries, and have shown an appalling power to capture and control the minds and lives both of individuals and of the masses.

The reasons are many. In the last few generations people have seen how a number of generally accepted values have lost their binding and unquestioned authority, without being replaced by any clear standards of value. The optimistic faith in science and technology, which temporarily served as a kind of substitute, was soon succeeded by deep frustration, as the course of events showed only too painfully that it was ill-founded. This has had the effect of giving people a deep sense of insecurity: they grope for a foothold, and therefore often fall an easy prey to well-directed psychological propaganda. Other causes, too, have contributed to the result. Social evolution has in many places created hard and disagreeable conditions of life under which large sections of the population suffer. Similarly, political evolution has caused certain larger or

smaller sections of the nation to feel that they are unfairly treated; accordingly they have been driven into an alliance because they have the same needs and demands. And finally, the propaganda technique of today has made it possible to influence such groups of people on a scale unimaginable hitherto—moulding and giving a one-track direction to their minds and working upon their emotions. Hitler, as someone has said, would have been unthinkable without the loudspeaker.

The great ideologies of our day appeal to urgent needs that are so essentially human that they know no frontiers. For that reason a nation which considers itself as the champion of such an ideology can count upon finding loyal and obedient allies in other nations. These allies, believing that they are fighting for the ideology of the future, are also willing to be used as pawns in the manoeuvres for purely political power that such a nation employs. In the last World War we saw how “ideological allies” of just this kind were very largely responsible in several countries for successfully putting the military defence organisation out of action in quite a short time. Still more drastic is the experience we have had in the years since 1945, when the exploitation of ideological allies has made it possible to subject country after country to the control of a Great Power, without military intervention.

For the conclusion of peace after the last World War did not end the *ideological* war. On the contrary, it ushered in a period marked by an enormous increase in its intensity. As time has gone on, the situation has become clear, and the antagonistic forces are easier to recognise. The whole Communist world has definitely segregated itself as a single ideological bloc, which also constitutes a military unity (with the exception of Yugoslavia). The Communist ideology, as it manifests itself today, is clearly opposed to

what is meant by democracy in the nations of the West. The Communist-controlled countries have abolished many of the forms of freedom that we consider essential for the development of individual personality that democracy envisages—e.g. the freedom of the Press, freedom to meet and to organise political parties, to visit other countries, and so on.

The common ideology unites Communists in all countries, irrespective of nationality or race. Wherever they are, they follow the same directives and work for the same ends.

This being so, it is essential to see clearly that psychological preparedness does not become less necessary when from time to time a certain relaxation of international tension sets in. So long as there are strong ideologies that are widespread and have content incompatible with our democratic principles, we shall be subject to the impact of psychological warfare. And the ability of ideologies to gain adherents in the enemy's camp is not diminished in the periods when the danger of war does not appear to be imminent. Accordingly it is of the utmost importance that the moral fibre of the nation be strengthened, irrespective of the variations in international tension.

Norway's foreign policy since the War has clearly shown that she will throw in her lot with the whole democratic world. This does not merely mean that we realise the weakness of our position if we stand alone. Norwegian foreign policy is not solely dictated by the desire for security in association with the great nations. It is an expression of our desire to build the country's future upon the groundwork of ideas which serve as the foundation for all democratic societies in the world.

It would seem to be clear, then, that what we do to fortify our people morally and ideologically cannot stop

short of a narrow, national objective; it must be part of a larger whole. In this work it is a primary goal that we promote co-operation and confidence between our own and other nations, linking our country more closely with all the peoples who set store by the same ideals and basic values. On that account we must also meet with positive counter-measures all endeavours to sow division and mistrust between the democratic states, for instance between the U.S.A. and the European democracies, between the countries in N.A.T.O., etc.

This loyal co-operation with the other democratic peoples does not mean that we renounce the right to criticise. Sound, positive criticism is unquestionably necessary. But we must be no less ready to see our own shortcomings than to criticise other nations, other parties, and so on. One-sided criticism only produces self-righteousness in those who are criticised. We must also be able to respect things we *do not understand* in other nations, things which may have underlying causes about which we know too little. This is a highly-important point in the ideological battle. One of the strongest weapons the anti-democratic ideologies wield today is the prominence they give to all antagonism between the democratic states, with the intention of creating emotional strains and bitterness between them. One must realise where such criticism comes from and what its aim is. Often there may be a kernel of truth in it. But its intention is negative. Partly it emanates from people who know what they are out for, and for whom objective democratic criticism is merely a cloak for an altogether different aim, namely, the creation of division and ideological confusion. And in part the criticism comes from naïve idealists who mean well, but do not understand how the ideological forces work.

What makes the ideological battle specially dangerous today is the fact that so many in the democratic countries do not realise the enormous power of the ideologies, nor the nature of their propaganda, so that they think it is only a matter of yet another tug-of-war between Great Powers, of the kind we know so well from the history of the nineteenth century. The situation today is essentially the same, they say, except that modern weapons make it more terrifying than ever before. Such a view arises from an imperfect understanding of the nature of the ideologies involved.

The Communist ideology naturally exploits the present tension between the Great Powers. But its own dynamic nature impels it *to exploit any situation* and any power-combination by which it is confronted. An alteration of the balance of power in favour of the democratic nations will not alter this. Communism as an ideology has still the same objective, and its chances of gaining world dominion will depend upon the degree of ideological clarity and conviction with which democracy can meet it.

The fear and insecurity we all feel on account of the world situation often causes us unconsciously to minimise the dangers. To relieve our anxiety our subconsciousness helps us to believe that Communism has changed its nature, that for instance the Communists in China are not at all of the same type as those in Russia, but are only poor peasants who want more land, and that if only we reduce the armament programmes of the Western nations the Soviet Union will no longer feel in danger, and so the Communist menace will disappear. Again and again we see how utterances along these lines are eagerly seized upon by people who have no antidote to their fears, and how propaganda of this kind is largely employed in

democratic countries with the object of making the population blind to what is really happening.

From time to time one even hears doubts expressed as to whether the ideological battle has any reality. Is it true that the ideologies have such enormous power? Is it true that it is such a dangerous thing if we fail to grasp what these ideologies mean and how they work?

How does an Ideology work?

IT WILL help to answer this question if we recall what we experienced in the years between 1933 and 1940. Many of us did not understand the power inherent in Nazism and Fascism. We failed to see that these dynamic ideologies could never be checked or satisfied by the concessions that the democracies made to them. Our thinking still ran on the time-honoured lines of diplomatic negotiation and power politics. We did not realise how an ideology can exploit the blindness of its opponents. That is why, although we were democrats and despite the fact that we definitely rejected both Nazism and Fascism, we made concessions and took part in celebrations and events such as the Olympic Games in 1936, which these ideologies utilised and turned to their own advantage. We did not realise that it was a dangerous thing when these ideologies won allies within the democracies, nor did we understand how catastrophic it might be for us as democrats if we had not a clear grasp of the moral obligations implicit in democracy. Our eyes were only opened when we saw our own Nazis and collaborators in full swing, aiding the enemy in our own country.

We can learn much from the history of the last few decades. But if we want to grasp the real nature of the

ideological battle, to see how ideologies work and learn what they are out for, we cannot do better than study the theory and practice of Communism.

Lenin has defined the task of Communism with complete clarity :

"To carry on a war for the overthrow of the international bourgeoisie, a war a hundred times more difficult, prolonged, complicated than the most stubborn of ordinary wars between countries."¹

Typical also of an ideology is the belief that it must sooner or later attain its goal because of its inherent power: "Communists must know that the future is theirs in any case," as Lenin says.² Communists can change their tactics and pursue a policy which may seem opportunistic, but the aim is always the same, and the convinced Communist has an unshakable belief that historical evolution is on his side—an evolution which will lead, with the necessity of natural law, to the victory of Communism. One can well understand that such a conviction is a source of great strength.

How, then, does Communism work as an ideology? Are all the accusations of infiltration and disruptive manœuvres true? Many people say: After all we have seen great fluctuations in Soviet policy; how can they be reconciled with a consistent ideological outlook?

The answer is that the fluctuations in foreign policy, which have so often aroused optimistic hopes in the democratic mind, are entirely in accordance with the directives given by Lenin. They do not denote any change in fundamental point of view or principle. Accordingly, the charges brought against Communists of infiltration and disruptive manœuvres are not tendentious calumnies; they simply

¹ Lenin: *The Infantile Sickness of "Leftism" in Communism* (Moscow, 1920), p. 52.

² *Ib.* p. 87.

draw attention to the fact that Communists are consistent in following the ideological directives they received from Lenin and Stalin. Lenin says, for example:

"To refuse beforehand to manœuvre, to utilise the conflicting (even though temporary) interests between enemies; to refuse co-operation and compromise with possible (even though transient, unstable, vacillating, conditional) allies—is this not an infinitely laughable thing? Is it not as though, in the difficult ascent of an unexplored and heretofore inaccessible mountain, we were to renounce beforehand the idea that we might have to go sometimes in zigzags, sometimes retracing our steps, sometimes giving up the course once selected and trying various others? People who hit upon such ideas have neither sense nor experience."¹

That the varying Soviet policy towards other countries is dictated solely by tactical ideological considerations is clear from the principles laid down for foreign policy by the great Communist leaders. We quote Stalin:

"The Party's tasks in this period in the sphere of *foreign policy* are determined by its position as the party of international *revolution*. These tasks are:

1. To utilise all the contradictions and conflicts among the capitalist groups and governments which surround our country, with the object of disintegrating imperialism.

2. To stint no forces and resources to assist the proletarian revolution in the West.

3. To take all measures to strengthen the national liberation movement in the East.

4. To strengthen the Red Army."²

It is also clearly stated that agreements with capitalist governments must be regarded as temporary:

¹ *Ib.* p. 53.

² Stalin: *The Party Before and After the Seizure of Power (Works, Vol. V, Moscow, 1954), p. 113.*

"Evidently this refers to temporary agreements with capitalist states in the field of industry, trade, and, perhaps, in the field of diplomatic relations . . .

"I think that the existence of two opposite systems—the capitalist system and the Socialist system—does not exclude the possibility of such agreements . . .

"The limits to these agreements? The limits are set by the opposite natures of the two systems between which there is rivalry, struggle, conflict. Within the limits permitted by these two systems, but only within these limits, agreements are quite possible."¹

Many people maintain, too, that the Soviet Union unquestionably has a sincere desire for peace. The Soviet statesmen assert it themselves, and with a certain amount of truth. But we must realise that these aspirations for peace also have an ideological background and are determined by tactical considerations:

"We must not forget Lenin's statement that as regards our work of construction very much depends upon whether we succeed in postponing war with the capitalist world, which is inevitable, but which can be postponed either until the moment when the proletarian revolution in Europe matures, or until the moment when the colonial revolutions have fully matured, or, lastly, until the moment when the capitalists come to blows over the division of the colonies. Therefore the maintenance of peaceful relations with the capitalist countries is an obligatory task for us. Our relations with the capitalist countries are based on the assumption that the co-existence of two opposite systems is possible."²

When, therefore, the Soviet leaders have been constantly

¹ Stalin: Interview with the first American Labour Delegation in Russia (*Works*, Vol. X, Moscow, 1954), p. 128.

² Stalin: Speech to 15th Congress of C.P.S.U. (*Works*, Vol. X, Moscow, 1954), p. 296.

asserting their peaceful aspirations of late, and arguing that it should be possible for the two systems to co-exist peaceably, the explanation may be quite simple, namely that the preservation of peace seems at present to be the most expedient policy for Communism in its pursuit of world conquest. What they declare today is in complete conformity with the principles laid down by Lenin and Stalin.

Lenin also gives clear directions for dealing with the non-Communist countries. His statements on this subject give us the key to much of what is happening in these countries today:

"It is more difficult for Western Europe to begin the Social Revolution than it was for us. To attempt to 'circumvent' this difficulty, to 'leap over' the hard task of utilising reactionary parliaments for revolutionary purposes, is absolute childishness."¹

"To overcome a more potent enemy is possible only through the greatest effort and by dint of the obligatory, thorough, careful, attentive and skilful utilisation of every 'breach' however small, between the enemies, of every clash of interests between the bourgeoisie of all countries, between various groups and species of the bourgeoisie within separate countries, as well as of every possibility however small, of gaining an ally, even though it be a temporary, shaky, unstable, unreliable and conditional one. Who has not grasped this has failed to grasp one iota of Marxism, and of scientific, modern 'civilised' socialism in general."²

Lenin gave clear directions for the work in the different anti-Communist states. These directions explain why Communist infiltration is so difficult to detect, for it does

¹ Lenin: *op. cit.*, p. 47.

² *Ib.*, p. 53.

not always act under the name of Communism. They show us also that the ideological world war of today is something altogether different from, and more than, the traditional struggles between the legal political parties with which we are familiar in our parliamentary life.

"But those who cannot co-ordinate illegal forms of the struggle with legal ones, are very poor revolutionaries. It is not at all difficult to be a good revolutionist once the revolution has already broken out—when all and everyone joins the revolution from mere enthusiasm, because it is the fashion, sometimes even from considerations of personal gain. It costs the proletariat labour, great labour, and I may say, excruciating pains to rid itself after the victory of these 'alas-revolutionists' (pseudo-revolutionists). It is far more difficult, and yet more valuable, to know how to be a revolutionary, even when conditions are yet lacking for direct, general, truly mass- and truly revolutionary-action; to be able to defend the interests of the revolution (by propaganda, agitation, organisation), in non-revolutionary institutions and oftentimes in downright reactionary surroundings, amongst masses that are incapable of immediately understanding the necessity for revolutionary methods. To be able to find, to sense, to determine the concrete plan of still incomplete revolutionary measures and methods, leading the masses to the real, decisive, final, great revolutionary struggle—this is the chief problem of modern Communism in Western Europe and America."¹

Of the Communists' activities among the workers in a capitalist community Lenin writes:

"And this gives rise to the absolute, the imperative necessity, for the proletarian vanguard, for its conscious part, for the Communist Party, to resort to manœuvres,

¹ *Ib.*, p. 82.

temporisings and compromises with the various groups of proletarians, with the various parties of workmen and petty bosses. The whole thing lies in being able to apply these tactics and of *raising* and not *lowering* the general level of proletarian class consciousness, revolutionary ability to fight and conquer.”¹

The tactics employed today towards ideologically confused groups in non-Communist countries are illustrated by Lenin’s descriptions of the manner in which Menshevism (a school of thought within the Communist Party² in Russia) was overcome in early days:

“The democrats of the petit-bourgeoisie, including the Mensheviks, inevitably waver between the bourgeois democracy and the system of soviets, between reformism and revolutionary moods, between fear of the dictatorship of the proletariat and sympathy with the workers. The right Communist tactics must be to utilise this vacillating attitude. But that is only possible if, as circumstances allow, one makes concessions to the elements which seek the support of the proletariat, while at the same time opposing the elements which tend to approach the bourgeoisie. And when the Bolsheviks employed the right tactics Menshevism gradually disintegrated. The opportunistic leaders were isolated, and the best workers and the best elements in the petit-bourgeois democracy came over to us. But this was a long process. Slogans such as ‘No compromises, no manœuvres’ only have the effect of weakening the influence and fighting spirit of the proletariat.”³

Lenin’s statements about England are also interesting in this connection:

“Likewise in England it is necessary to put the work of

¹ *Ib.*, p. 57.

² Known at that time in Russia as the Social Democrats.

³ *Ib.*, p. 57.

propaganda, of agitation and organisation in the army and among the oppressed nationalities deprived of equal rights in the Empire (Ireland, the colonies), on a new basis (not in the socialist but in the communist, not in the reformist but in the revolutionary manner). For all these spheres of public life, in the epoch of imperialism generally, and now, after a war which has exhausted the peoples and which has opened their eyes to the truth (namely, that tens of millions have been killed and maimed solely to decide whether English or German plunderers shall rob more countries), all these spheres of public life are especially filled with inflammable material and create especially many causes for conflicts, crisis, enhancements of the class-struggle."¹

A statement of Stalin's will throw light on the way in which Communism has worked and still works in colonial countries:

"It is a question of preparing the proletariat of such colonies as India for the rôle of leader in the liberation movement... The task is to create a revolutionary anti-imperialist bloc and to ensure the hegemony of the proletariat within this bloc."²

Communism exemplifies all the most typical characteristics of an ideology. It gives a philosophy of life, captures people's emotions, and provides a plan both for the individual and for the groups which are to champion its cause. This plan is always adapted to the conditions at the time, and changes in the tactical plan do not, of course, mean that there has been any alteration in the ultimate aim of the ideology. Thus the activity of world Communism in recent years affords a clear example of

¹ *Ib.*, p. 84.

² Stalin: *Marxism and the National Question* (Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1947), p. 217.

the way in which an ideology acting on the same fundamental ideas, creates a plan which in practice is constantly altered and adapted to the economic, political and ideological conditions confronting Communism at any particular juncture. There is therefore a great deal to be learnt from the Communist offensives since the last World War.

Lenin's instruction to exploit all the conflicting interests of the non-Communist countries is nowhere more scrupulously implemented than in the case of the relations between the United States on the one side and Europe on the other. Here the Communists have been highly successful in adroitly exploiting such conflicting interests as exist; and many democrats who lack ideological clarity have actually assisted them, because they have not seen that conflicts between democrats are something that we all share the responsibility for resolving. Such difficulties have in consequence often been used to separate the democracies from each other. In exploiting the tension between the United States and Europe the Soviet Union has had many good helpers, who, without being members of the Communist Party, nevertheless act in conscious or unconscious accordance with Lenin's and Stalin's directives.¹

In the Communists' descriptions of the relations between the United States and England certain themes to which they constantly return are not only used to divide these two countries, but are also intended to foster distrust of the United States in all the nations which feel closely associated with England. Allegations such as these are

¹ Stalin's directive states as a major principle "to utilise even the smallest breach in the enemy's front and any conflict of interests between the bourgeoisie in the different countries and between the different groups within the bourgeoisie in every country."

reiterated: the United States tries to cripple England economically by preventing her from exporting her industrial goods to East Europe, by shutting English goods out of the United States by high customs tariffs, by underselling English goods in Western Europe, and by shouldering England out of her old markets in the colonies and dominions; the United States is restoring the industries of West Germany in order to undermine England's economy, is using her economic power to bring pressure upon other countries for the purpose of undermining England economically, etc., etc.

Many will perhaps ask whether these violent accusations against the United States can be entirely baseless. Is there not some truth in them? Obviously one cannot assume that all circles in the United States are actuated by unselfish motives in regard to the country's foreign policy. In the U.S.A., as in other countries, different interests and viewpoints, both of an idealistic and of a selfish nature, come into play. But it is noticeable in the Communist propaganda that the selfish interests in the United States or other countries are exaggerated and represented as the sole factor deciding the foreign policy of the country in question. By taking this line the Communists endeavour to make people suspicious of the idealistic motives that actually exist.

Similarly, the Communist propaganda sought to exploit the hostility to the E.D.C. treaty which was so widespread in France. In order to strengthen French opposition to this plan Communist propaganda exaggerated and gave one-sided prominence to any American statements which could be interpreted as threats to France, bringing pressure upon her to make her accept the plan.

Such partisan misrepresentations of the mutual relations of the Western nations are partly meant for the people in

Communist countries, to strengthen their belief in the Communist theory that the Capitalist world will gradually disintegrate on account of its own inner strife, until the day comes for the Communists to take control. But it has also a very strong effect upon ideologically unstable people in the democracies, because it spreads suspicion and fosters mutual distrust. For the interpretations of political developments in the West which are sent out from Moscow are duly spread in various forms and on different occasions all over the world, not only by the Communist Party and the Communist Press, but under appropriate disguises in the non-Communist Press and propaganda, so as to make them seem more credible.

When considering the question of Communist infiltration in the non-Communist countries it is natural to start from Lenin's statement that Communists must "manœuvre and negotiate and make compromises with the different proletarian groups and with the different parties which represent the workers and small property-owners." There is also the question, as Lenin says, of trying to gain allies, even if it be only for a short time and even if they are wavering and weak. We must also bear in mind Lenin's saying that such slogans as "No compromises, no manœuvres" only weaken the influence and fighting spirit of the proletariat. How, then, does Communism go to work in this sphere of action?

It is clear that the Communists have, in a number of fields, made tactical compromises and gained allies for a time, because world Communism is best served in this way for the moment. Authoritative statements from leading Communist quarters show that this is so.

In leading articles in the Cominform journal ("For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy") dated 24th April and 1st May, 1953, clear instructions are issued from the

Communist Party in the different countries as to the causes Communists should support and in which they should co-operate, in order gradually to assume the leadership in this co-operation, and use it for their own ideological ends as long as this should prove expedient :

“The Central Committees of the Communist parties in France, Italy, Great Britain and in a number of other countries point out that the members must devote their main effort to strengthening political and organisational work in the enterprises, that they must not confine themselves solely to organising the struggle for immediate demands, but must link this struggle with the fight for peace, for national independence, with defence of democratic freedoms; they must explain to the workers the essence of the policy of the Party and its ultimate aims. The Communists must be active in the trade unions, in the peasant, women’s and youth organisations, and they must never forget that only by united action can the masses rebuff the policy of war, poverty and Fascism.”

In accordance with this, we have also seen how the Communists organise mass strikes and protest meetings not because the objects of the strikes or protest meetings are important in themselves, but because such actions can be used to disrupt and weaken democracy, and because they themselves can win popular confidence by actively supporting the “people’s” or the “workers’” cause. To gain influence and future power they are active in every form of peace propaganda and in the struggle for liberation of the colonial peoples, though in reality they have no belief in any other form of peace or liberation than that which is the outcome of the ultimate triumph of Communism.

The Cominform journal constantly repeats the directives to Communists in different countries, urging them to work in the trade unions and to set on foot united actions

among the workers and link these united actions to Communist-controlled trade unions. Such directives consistently stress the point that the formation of united fronts is the most important task of the Communists in Colonial countries.

Pravda wrote on the eve of the 1st of May, 1953 :

“One may become convinced by the example of the Chinese people’s victorious liberation struggle that the scale and strength of the national liberation movement depends on the degree to which the masses of the people of the colonies are drawn into this movement. This refers above all to the drawing into the liberation struggle of the peasantry and the working people, and it also refers to the drawing of the national bourgeoisie into the liberation movement. Hence, it becomes understandable why the Communist and Workers’ Parties attach paramount importance to the creation and strengthening in the colonial countries of a united anti-imperialist fighting front.” Then *Pravda* gives a list of all the places where this is taking place: Malaya, the Philippines, Indonesia, Egypt, Persia, Central Africa and Kenya, North Africa, Nigeria and the Gold Coast. The same article says that “the national liberation movement has become an inseparable part of the revolutionary struggle of the working people of all countries for the triumph of Socialism.”

This article in *Pravda* recalls Lenin’s observation about postponing the inevitable war against the capitalist countries either until the proletariat war has progressed far enough in Europe or until the revolution in the colonies reaches a critical stage. At that juncture Communism will be more easily able to attain world-dominion, either by making war on a weakened enemy or by taking control without any war, because Communism will by then have secured so much of the leadership in the national

liberation struggle in the colonies. The article also stressed Stalin's saying that one of the Communist Party's primary tasks is the strengthening of national liberation movements. It is easy to see that Communists have faithfully carried out these instructions from Lenin and Stalin.

If, then, we compare the directives given by Lenin and Stalin for this sphere of action with the authoritative reports and statements of leading Communists today, we are bound to give up the illusion that Communists have nothing to do with the leadership of otherwise legitimate liberation movements in various countries. Many democrats find it difficult to face this. They are not in sympathy with the Communist ideology. But if they admit that Communism is keenly interested in the liberation movements and that it strongly influences them, they will be apt to feel that they are guilty of condemning even the legitimate desire for independence that they see in colonial countries. If, however, we genuinely want such aspirations for liberty to have good and lasting results for the colonial countries and the rest of the world we must be quite clear about the Communists' motives in supporting liberation movements and about the effects their influence on these liberation movements will have upon democracy. For Communists the support of liberation movements is a means of promoting inner discord and weakness in the non-Communist countries, and this, they are convinced, is a necessary preliminary to the world victory of Communism. Moreover they wish to secure future influence and control in the different countries, as they are liberated and begin to play an increasing rôle in world politics.

When democrats so often raise the question whether Communism has become "better" or "worse" it simply shows that the true character of the ideologies is not understood. A comfortable and uncommitted "bourgeois"

liberalism is no good preparation for understanding and assessing Communism. Communist world policy can only be understood as a consistent application in practice of an underlying, total ideological principle. Therefore the psychological warfare waged against non-Communist countries in the form of ideological propaganda, disruptive tactics, and infiltration, is not the normal political offensive by which a Great Power seeks to get the better of other Powers, capture new markets, and so on. It is rooted in a totalitarian philosophy of life aiming at world-domination. And its shock-troops fight in the firm conviction that in practice their philosophy will make an end of war, poverty and oppression, and create the classless society.

If, then, our object is to strengthen the defensive power of a country, it is not enough to draw the nation's attention to the dangerous, foreign ideologies, to warn people against their activities, or perhaps to prohibit them. The banning of Communist parties is no solution. Nor does it represent a decisive victory over Communism if, for example, an election reduces the number of its representatives in the national assembly. Notwithstanding such accidental setbacks, Communism as an ideology will still remain as active as ever in the pursuit of its ends.

What then has our present-day democracy that it can set against the great ideologies?

No one can say that the democratic countries have any such clearly formulated and uniting ideology as the Communist bloc has. True, there has grown up since the last war, and despite all their mutual difficulties, a stronger international solidarity between all the democracies of the West than we have ever had before. Certain organs of the United Nations have also helped to strengthen the unity of principle, and the fellowship in knowledge and

sentiment, among the democracies. But there can be no question here of any real ideology.

Increasing numbers of people in the democracies are beginning to grasp the nature of Communism, and how it works. But that is not enough. Unless we have something better to put in its place, something that can give ourselves and others a deep inner security, hope for the future, and an objective to work for, then this increased knowledge of Communism and of its activities is liable to create fear and hopelessness. And to create such fear is directly dangerous. For it has two different results, both of which are injurious.

In some people this fear makes them try unconsciously to keep the seriousness of the situation at arm's length by endeavouring to persuade themselves and others that the danger is not so great after all and that the facts are only biased anti-Communist propaganda. They wish to believe that it is the Communists who feel themselves threatened, and that the sole reason why they are aggressive from time to time is out of sheer desperation. Such people quite forget that the Communist attitude is very far from being indicative of desperation and uncontrolled aggression, and that on the contrary it bears witness to purposeful action and a cool and confident conviction that they have made impressive progress, and that the future is theirs. In other people, again, fear leads to various forms of hysteria. We know from psychology that both animals and human beings, when confronted by a difficult or dangerous situation they wish to evade, and are unable to see any satisfactory way out of it, readily react with some hysterical and senseless behaviour, which often takes an aggressive form. Moreover this behaviour may be directed against people or things which are by no means the causes of the difficult situation. The reaction of some people against

the situation today takes the form of hysterical anti-Communist activity. They see a dangerous situation which they often assess clearly and correctly; but they see no clear alternative. At the same time they feel bound to do something, so they direct the aggressiveness inspired by their fear against the people whom they happen to feel it easiest at the moment to attack. This is often the underlying reason why a good deal of the anti-Communist activity we see today displays a hysterical character.

Both of these attitudes—fear endeavouring to minimise the advance of Communism or fear leading to hysterical anti-Communist activity—are typical of the democracies today. And both attitudes show only too clearly that democracy has not succeeded in giving people any clearly defined and strong alternative to the ideology of Communism. Had it been able to do so, these two attitudes would not have been so common in democratic nations as they are.

The Communists cannot be won for democracy by means of anti-Communism. The inherent moral and ideological strength of democracy is the only weapon which can stop the onward march of Communism and win Communists over to a democratic way of life. But if democracy lacks this inherent strength, it will neither deserve nor be able to do this. We must therefore regard the progress and strength of Communism as the great and decisive challenge to the quality of democracy.

The only thing which can enable democrats to react in a wise and expedient way to the propaganda and advance of Communism is an ideology which gives inner security and fearlessness and a clear alternative to the Communist system; an ideology which gives an assured faith in the future and an objective embracing the whole world, and which commits us all to a personal share in the pursuit

of this end. An ideology with such far-reaching aims as Communism cannot be met with lesser aims. Our ideological alternative must be of such a nature that it enables us to take the offensive in the war of ideas. Our basic convictions must be so strong that they will win other people and nations. Failing that, they will not provide an adequate alternative in the critical struggle before us, and our fear will bring about our defeat. Ideological defence must therefore take the form of an ideological offensive which will turn our enemies into friends. If we fail to do this, democracy will lose in the battle for the world.

What does an Ideology mean for the Individual and the Community?

SINCE ideologies have become such a tremendous force in our day, it must mean that, in some way or other, they satisfy deep-seated needs in modern people. If, then, the democracies are to withstand the fierce onslaught of the non-democratic ideologies, democracy itself must become capable of satisfying these needs in a better way.

Many people react negatively to the thought that democracy must have a clear ideology. In part, this negative attitude is due to the circumstance that what Norwegians know about ideologies is chiefly derived from their experience of Nazism during the war—memories of Press censorship, terrorism, torture, arbitrary treatment, concentration camps, etc. Very naturally this has created a negative, emotional reaction to the concept "ideology." In addition, our experience of Nazism has given many people the erroneous conviction that an ideology must necessarily be a hard and fast, massive system of ready-made political and social doctrines or principles. In view of these misconceptions it is necessary to point out that the word "ideology" is an important scientific concept which has long had its accepted place in the social sciences.

In itself it expresses neither a positive nor a negative evaluation.

In the joint publication *Tensions that Cause Wars* Professor Arne Næss gives the following possible definitions of the concept "ideology": "Ideological doctrines consist of clusters of (1) ethical or social norms or principles and detailed codes of behaviour; (2) politically relevant hypotheses, especially means-end hypotheses; and (3) verbal stereotypes with no fairly precise meaning, but influencing controversies within and between nations."¹ These definitions indicate that several forms of ideology are conceivable. A short, simple definition of the concept is given by the psychologists Krech and Crutchfield: "A unified totality of beliefs and attitudes is an *ideology*, or *life philosophy*."² A theoretic-philosophical system is not necessarily an ideology. It only becomes an ideology when this system of ideas determines the total behaviour of a person, i.e. his thinking, his emotions and his will.

We may take it as a fact that there seems to be a strong desire in man for a coherent and unified meaning in life and existence. Krech and Crutchfield speak of the insistent nature of man's "strivings after meaning,"³ and maintain that "a man searching for an ideology or a life philosophy is also driven by an explicit need for understanding."⁴

Such an ideology or life philosophy has immense significance for the creation of a harmonious personality. Man has many different needs and therefore seeks to attain many ends—ends that are often so mutually opposed that they come into conflict. To take an example that is familiar

¹ Cantril, Hadley (ed. by): *Tensions that Cause Wars* (Univ. of Ill. Press, Urbana, 1950), p. 271.

² Krech, D., and Crutchfield, R. S.: *Theory and Problems of Social Psychology* (McGraw Hill, 1948), p. 162.

³ *Ib.*, p. 153.

⁴ *Ib.*, p. 154.

to all: On selfish grounds we may wish to do something which is a breach of generally accepted standards, while at the same time we want to retain the social respect of our fellow men. If our personality is to be harmonious, these needs or aims must somehow be organised and mutually reconciled. This is brought about first and foremost through a unified totality of convictions, a life philosophy which is so deeply compelling that it can direct our energies: in other words, exactly what we have understood by an ideology. It singles out certain needs and aims as primary, and sets up certain ideals or values as central and governing. This, indeed, is absolutely necessary if the personality is to function harmoniously. A harmonious personality is no chance constellation of needs, aims and attitudes. All these factors are interdependent and form a collaborative whole. Thus a harmonious personality may be said to consist of a number of needs, attitudes, etc., which have acquired a definite *structure* by means of an ideology. The manner in which the various factors of personality collaborate, and the weight and value given to the separate needs in this collaboration, will be decided according to the values that the ideology stresses as central.

In the joint publication *Tensions that Cause Wars*¹ the psychologist Gordon W. Allport speaks of the two types of personality that are most easily worked up and carried away by aggressive nationalist emotionalism. One of these types is the unintegrated "many-minded person". . . "Being unsure of his own values, he will yield to the demagogue, follow the prevailing fashion." The unintegrated person is precisely the man without an ideology, i.e. one in whom certain overriding values have not helped to bring the different sides of the personality into stable and harmonious collaboration. He possesses no clear system of values which

¹ *Ib.*, pp. 66-67.

will enable him to see through and evaluate demagogic and misleading propaganda. On the contrary, he will often feel that such propaganda gives him just what he needs at the moment. He will feel that he gets "opinions" that he can express forcibly, and for a short time he will receive into his life something that is able to create a kind of coherence in his needs and aims, which are usually in conflict with one another and therefore give him a sense of insecurity both in himself and towards others. A form of agitation which gives all the blame to *others* for whatever is wrong, seems only too easily to gain control over persons who are insecure; such agitation can even give them for the time being an increased sense of their own value and importance. Thus we see that "unintegrated, many-minded persons" usually fall easy victims to the form of agitation which puts the blame on others rather than themselves.

As the second type, Allport mentions "the individual whose fears are such that he has himself developed a 'totalitarian' character structure. He needs a safety island in his group, his nation. Beyond the ingroup he feels helpless. He suspects, rejects, hates the stranger . . ." There are many persons who are so much dominated by fear that they dare not come to grips with problems or with other people. They keep life at a distance from them. Either they submit to an absolute authority by entering a group which always "is right," or else they develop a domineering attitude which always insists on rights—the right to unchallengeable opinions and the right to do as they like. When one always "is right" in this way, or when one is a member of a group that is sure it always "is right," it is possible to despise and look down upon other individuals and groups, and so to keep at a distance whatever might threaten the conception one has of oneself. For

the fear which drives such a person is first and foremost the fear of discovering how weak and pitiable he really is. But in the group he joins, the individual gains a certain degree of security against this unpleasant discovery, and the members of the group increase one another's feeling of security by making constant accusations and attacks on other groups. They lack a system of values that can give inner security and endow life with such meaning that a man can also have the courage honestly to see his own mistakes and weaknesses.

In contrast with these two types there is a third: the one owning such a system of values that he can naturally feel the whole world to be his neighbour. His ideology gives him a security which does not depend upon his always being right. His system of values helps him to have a realistic opinion of himself, to detect his proneness to find scapegoats, to show tyrannical behaviour or submissiveness; and this again enables him consciously to withstand these tendencies. He can openly and freely give and accept inspiration, because he has an ideology that makes it possible for him to evaluate the impressions he receives, while making it unnecessary for him to defend himself against them by categorical denunciations.

We have mentioned earlier that there are many people in the democratic states who are uncertain of their own values, and who are without a fixed yardstick or fixed standards of evaluation. War and interment camps, famine and suffering, homes broken up, fresh threats of war, and an uncertain future have filled many with fear. We have shown how fear often expresses itself in aggressiveness and hysteria, and frequently fosters the development of an authoritarian character. All these are factors that can easily be utilised by demagogues and subversive agitators, factors that seemingly give people a temporary sense of

security and an antidote to fear, a meaning to existence, hope for the future, and something to live for.

An ideology is a philosophy of life that a man must personally make his own. It is important to realise that such an ideology is not first of all dependent upon the possession of knowledge. Modern educationists have consistently laid great stress upon imparting knowledge, to give the individual every available means of using life to the best advantage. But the belief that this in itself will ensure human happiness is founded on an outdated intellectualist conception of man. We have now left behind the psychology which taught that man thinks with his brain and feels with his heart; we know now that brain and heart, thought and feeling, cannot be separated from each other and function apart. In laying such stress upon imparting knowledge and skills, we have to a large degree neglected to instil a deep consciousness of the ends that should be attained by these means, of the values that are worthy to be accepted as vital and unconditional. So long as a person has no conviction with regard to the vitally important values that all knowledge and technology must subserve, he will not have sufficiently strong motives to make him exert every effort to attain such ends. The psychologist Allport says that there is a great difference between purely intellectual knowledge and knowledge which also captures our emotion. If book-learning is to play its part in creating international understanding, one must have the sound mind, free from cramping complexes. He maintains that a man can be a learned scholar familiar with all ethical systems, and himself be the author of an altruistic doctrine of ethics, yet be blatantly egoistic and aggressive in his personal life. He can also know the weaknesses of human beings and be well schooled in the modern technique of propaganda, as Goebbels was, and still use

this knowledge to harm his fellow men. Allport holds that this suggests that moral and religious leaders may be right in what they say about these things. For, as he argues, knowledge can only be socially effective when it is deeply rooted in values that we ourselves accept. And man's moral inclination is still a decisive factor in bringing about war or peace.¹

One can safely say that only the mind free from cramping complexes is able to employ the vast scientific knowledge and highly developed technology of today in a way that is really of benefit to society. But before we can create such complex-free persons we must above all be able to create the deeply convinced sense of values that will direct the individual's behaviour, satisfy his deepest needs, and furnish absolute objectives for his life and work.

Owing to the fact that everyone lives his life in some kind of group, with certain external conditions of life in common, and with a common historical, cultural and religious background, systems of values or ideologies will tend to be common to such groups. This has become especially evident in our day, when the disposition to form groups is, as already stated (pp. 13-14), stronger than ever before.

A group will be strong ideologically to the same degree that the single individuals in it feel personally committed to its ideology, and to the same degree that this ideology can permanently satisfy the deepest needs of each individual. The group will be weak if the individuals only feel themselves committed in a slight degree to the ideology; or if the ideology is of such a nature that it is without significance for their deepest personal needs.

¹ From Cantril, Hadley (ed. by): *Tensions that Cause Wars* (Univ. of Ill. Press, Urbana, 1950), p. 65.

Some groups of this kind can be further divided into sub-groups. A nation is a large group, but within it may be found such sub-groups as farmers and industrial workers, different political parties, etc. A still larger group can be formed of a number of countries with the same fundamental social outlook, for example the Western democracies, or all the countries with a social system based upon the fundamental idea of Communism. But it is clear that within a large, composite group each of the smaller groups will often have its own special ideology, because these smaller groups have rather different needs and interests. If these special ideologies conflict with the ideology of the group as a whole, the large group will be ideologically weak and easy to disrupt. And if one of the small groups within a larger ideological group has special interests that are stronger than the interests which hold the larger group together, it will not be difficult to sever this little group from the larger one.

Such group-ideologies will work in different ways. Some sociological studies have been carried out in this field. The results suggest that an ideology which is hard and unyielding and essentially one-track in tendency, which is restricted to a particular group and dependent upon the security enjoyed within a strongly organised, restricted group of this kind, is prone to foster an aggressive and militant attitude.

This is in complete agreement with what has previously been said about persons with a "totalitarian" structure of character. The sense of security that a totalitarian ideology gives to such persons is due in large measure to the manner in which the individual's feeling of insecurity is repressed by adopting an aggressive, militant and denunciatory attitude to other groups. An ideology which demands a rigidly one-track type of thought and emotion will

also create disharmony in the individual's personality and such a feeling of disharmony will be very apt to increase his aggressive and denunciatory attitude and behaviour.

An ideology will accordingly have dangerous effects if it is of the kind which only appeals to one group, class, nation or race, and which is not subordinated to a greater and more comprehensive ideology.

An ideology which is strictly one-track will produce personal problems of adjustment and aggressiveness. This is because such an ideology always makes heavy demands upon the individual and creates difficult external conditions to which he cannot easily adapt himself. We see, therefore, that such ideologies lay themselves out to transfer these aggressive feelings to external objects or persons looked upon as enemies of the ideology. When people's emotions are canalised in this way, with the aggressiveness directed outwards, it becomes easier for the individual to live in socially and personally uncongenial conditions. We have seen this demonstrated both by Nazism and Communism. An ideology which creates disharmony in the personality of individuals must constantly provide the people with scapegoats, so that their aggressiveness and bitterness may be directed against something which is neither the ideology nor its representatives. This is easiest to manage when the ideology has an external enemy that can be the scapegoat. This is not always possible, however. Therefore we see that such ideologies have very often to sacrifice somebody of *their own*, to seize upon one or more individuals in their group, represent them in their propaganda as enemies of the ideology, and deliver them to the masses, so that the latter can have an outlet for their aggressiveness which is not directed against the ideology. The men who lose in the struggle for power that is continually going on between

the topmost leaders of such a group are frequently used as scapegoats. The Nazis took the Jews as their special victims; Russian Communism made use of the Moscow trials to give their faithful adherents a number of convenient scapegoats. More recently there has been the "liquidation" of Beria and his faction.

In the democratic countries people live in varied conditions, with different personal, religious, social and cultural backgrounds. Obviously this must set its stamp on their whole attitude to life, with the result that we find a great many different ways of thinking in the democratic world. If a group-attitude of this kind becomes more important than the common democratic ideology this will tend to weaken democracy. It will give authoritarian ideologies the chance to develop within the democracies themselves. Now it is clear that, on the one hand, we do not want the politics and the mentality of our democratic states to become uniform, as it has in states dominated by a political ideology. On the other hand it is necessary to create a common *democratic attitude*, if we are to have any chance of withstanding the undemocratic ideologies which promise people the fellowship and the sense of purpose for which they long. A democratic attitude can only be created by giving tangible expression to *fundamental ethical principles*. This will not lead to any one-track mentality in thinking or political activities, but will create a strong sense of loyalty and solidarity, and give common motives and values for a democratic interpretation of existence—or philosophy of life. It can only be achieved by means of a moral ideology. It is vital, therefore, to discover the underlying moral principles of democracy, and realise them in practice throughout the whole democratic world.

More and more people have come to see that the future of democracy will depend upon our clarity with regard to the moral values upon which our pattern of society is founded. In the booklet *Socialism. An Evaluation of its Principles*, issued by a group of members of the British Labour Party calling itself the "Socialist Union," we read:

"Today this confusion must be cast out. No particular method must be deified; each must be re-examined to see how far it can be trusted to lead us towards our goal. But there is no way of doing this without first being certain what exactly our purposes are. What sort of a society, embodying what values, do we as socialists hope to build? This is the leading question, and it can be answered only in terms of ethics."¹

Modern social science also maintains with increasing emphasis that improvements in the social and economic conditions of the people do not in themselves suffice to satisfy every human need. Man has deep needs which produce dissatisfaction and a profound sense of unrest. Of this the above-mentioned booklet says:

"These deeper discontents often lead to irrational demands quite unrelated to their real cause. But at bottom they express a desire to fill empty lives with a meaningful content, a longing for human values which our society fails to satisfy. The unrest needs to find expression in constructive change—that is the traditional task of the socialist movement. If this can be done, a new dynamic will be released. The material values no longer provide satisfaction, or incentive, or social purpose. They can no longer even provide a political programme. For a basis of material welfare is only a condition for the enrichment of the

¹ *Socialism. A New Statement of Principles* (Lincolns-Prager Ltd., London, 1952), p. 23.

human personality; it is not the decisive cause. An empty belly is a wretched possession, but a full one can go with an empty life.”¹

Where common needs exist which remain unsatisfied, there will always be a weak point in the defence against ideological divisive manœuvres and psychological warfare. In an article entitled “Politics and Ideology,” the Secretary-General of the United Nations Organisation, Dag Hammarskjöld, at that time in the Swedish government, has some important observations on this subject:

“In European politics today one wonders why the great improvement in the economic circumstances of the nations which has been or is being effected, has not been sufficient to combat destructive political forces. The need of economic and social security, as a presupposition for progress in this work, is so obvious that it is unnecessary to discuss it. But bread alone does not satisfy the universal needs which are the psychological cause of the formation of personal ideals and a collective ideology . . .

“... It has already been stated above that a nation may need to feel that it stands internationally for what it represents or wishes to represent in its national life. The context showed, but it must again be emphasised, that the values must in both cases be of a nature to give the individual members of the nation a feeling that their life has significance. Material welfare can satisfy this need, as long as it is conceived as one aspect of the development of a society that is in conformity with the demands of the ideal. When the point has been reached where this is the case—i.e. when material progress has become an end in itself or when it has reached a stage of temporary satis-

¹ *Socialism. A New Statement of Principles* (Lincolns-Prager Ltd., London, 1952), p. 57.

faction—the prosperity of society will depend upon the ability to find other ways of meeting the ideological need for a plan for the future that will give perspective to the cares of daily life. Failing that, there are possibilities of collective hysteria and destructive political idealism even in a community which enjoys social and economic security. A destructive ideology which satisfies an ideological need can in the end only be combated by ideological means.”¹

A man whose speeches have given a particularly clear diagnosis of our time, Dr. Frank N. D. Buchman, has expressed a similar view:

“The truth is that our problem goes deeper than economics or politics. It is ideological. Divisive ideologies strive for the mastery of men’s minds. Thousands follow their banners only because they see no convincing alternative. Not all governments have grasped the paramount importance of ideological preparedness. A nation which is materially strong may be ideologically divided against itself, and therefore in danger. Leaders who ignore this fact will sell us short.”²

The statements quoted here clarify the position in which democracy finds itself today. A destructive ideology which satisfies certain needs on a superficial level can only be combated by a superior ideology that will wholly satisfy man’s deepest needs. The first task of democracy today is, therefore, to see clearly what this moral ideology consists in; and then to realise it in every sphere of national life. For such a moral ideology to be of any value it must be personally binding upon the individual and inspire everyone to make his personal contribution to the life of the

¹ Hammarskjöld, Dag: *Politik och ideologi* (Tiden, I, Stockholm, 1952), s. 16-17.

² Buchman, Frank N. D.: *Remaking the World* (London, 1953), p. 151.

community. This is a task in which every member of a democracy must play a part. And that is why such an undertaking as, for example, our psychological preparedness, can only be organised up to a certain point by the state; the most important part rests with the individual, who, acting from his own deep personal conviction, must do his utmost to realise the normative moral principles both in his life and his environment.

The Ideology of Democracy

FROM what has now been said in a general way, regarding the characteristics of ideologies, we can draw certain conclusions as to the distinguishing marks of an ideology of democracy. Here the political institutions and forms of democracy are not the essential consideration. They are merely a superstructure resting on that which is the sustaining and central feature of democracy, namely, certain simple moral ideals to which people are committed and by which they are inspired to action. The world situation today is such that it is a hopeless task to defend the institutions and social amenities of democracy without first defending democracy's basic ideas.

But let us first consider our democratic institutions. Free elections and majority decisions are the rule in state and municipal government, in political societies and trade unions. It goes without saying that this institution must be retained. Merely as an institution, however, i.e. as a form, this affords no guarantee that democracy will survive. We have frequent examples of elections and majority decisions in various groups, where a purposeful minority have made a point of attending and prolonging a discussion until they alone are left, after which they can vote and put through some decision at variance with the convictions of the greater part of the members. In this way a small clique

has again and again been able to use a democratic institution to promote undemocratic ends, in the interests of an authoritarian ideology. Only when the form is given its due content—when the individual citizens use their influence to ensure that the moral principles are practised in public life—can free elections be any guarantee of the preservation of democracy.

We see also how a majority can misuse a democratic institution in order to further ends that are undemocratic. This happens when the majority carries through something that is not in conformity with the principles for which the democratic institution stands; or when a majority forces a minority to do something that is a breach of these principles. Even a majority decision may be contrary to the idea of democracy when the majority is not committed to the underlying moral ideas.

When the social benefits of democracy are mentioned it is usually the material standard of living that is stressed. We say that we must defend and preserve our standard of living, and on this there will be general agreement. Yet a high standard of living is not in itself any safeguard of democracy. It is quite possible for an undemocratic ideology, in certain regions and at a certain time, to create as high or even a higher standard of living than that existing in democratic countries. Those who live in a state with a low standard of living cannot in any case use the standard of living as an argument in defending themselves against authoritarian ideologies. If we consistently adopt the standard of living as the decisive measure of value we should be ready to place ourselves under a state with a higher standard of living than our own even if its ideology is politically anti-democratic. The same thing holds true if we take such social amenities as education, public assistance, health insurance, etc. All

these things are important and valuable. But if we take them as central democratic values we may be cutting the ground from under our feet ideologically. *These social amenities have their value in democracy first and foremost because they are the expression of a moral principle. The purpose of all of them is to develop the individual into a morally and spiritually complete personality.* In democracy good social conditions have a purely moral *raison d'être* in the principle of the absolute value of the individual human being. Whenever this foundation disappears, it involves the disappearance of that which makes democracy's struggle for a higher standard of living different from similar endeavours in a dictatorship.

When we so strongly emphasise that the ideology of democracy must be based upon moral ideas, some may perhaps ask: What about the authoritarian ideologies—have not they their own morality?

To this question it may be answered that no doubt the authoritarian ideologies have a kind of morality, i.e. there are certain things which are right, and other things which are wrong, according to their fundamental doctrines. But the moral sanction has here no universal human validity. It has reference only to specific groups of people, "right" meaning whatever is in the interests of *my* race, *my* class, *my* nation, etc. Therefore the "morality" is not universal or absolute, but a means used in pursuing the ends of a limited group.

Lenin says this quite explicitly:

"In what sense do we deny ethics, morals?

"In the sense in which they are preached by the bourgeoisie, a sense which deduces these morals from God's commandments. Of course, we say that we do not believe in God. We know perfectly well that the clergy, the landlords, and the bourgeoisie all claimed to speak in

the name of God, in order to protect their own interests as exploiters. Or, instead of deducing their ethics from the commandments of morality, from the commandments of God, they deduced them from idealistic or semi-idealistic phrases which in substance were always very similar to divine commandments.

"We deny all morality taken from superhuman or non-class conceptions. We say that this is a deception, a swindle, a befogging of the minds of the workers and peasants in the interests of the landlords and capitalists.

"We also declare openly that our morality is wholly subordinated to the interests of the proletarian class war."¹

The democratic way of life must have a moral sanction which is absolute and universal; with validity for everyone everywhere. In itself democracy is only a means for attaining an end, namely, the creation of individuals with a morally and spiritually integrated personality. Accordingly democracy, and all its institutions, is subordinated to the absolute moral ideal for human beings. So long as we prefer to live in a democracy it is absurd to discuss whether the moral ideas which form the groundwork of democracy and give it meaning are serviceable or not. But what we can discuss is whether the democratic institutions we have now are those best fitted to develop people in the direction of the moral ideal that is the goal of democracy.

If moral ideas are subordinate to other values or ends, they can be rejected by the individual and the community in any situation where morality is thought to stand in the way of attaining the ends men have set themselves. Moral ideas must be of such a nature that they not only foster personal harmony in the individual, but make definite demands upon him. Often they will require the individual to give up his own plans when these conflict with what is

¹ Lenin: *Religion* (Lawrence and Wishart), p. 55.

for the good of others. At times they may even require us to surrender personal advantages when we cannot at the moment see that this will be particularly to the advantage of the general public. We can all recall the kind of situation in which we are tempted to think "It won't matter to anyone if I do this. Nor will it give anyone any pleasure if I refrain from doing it." This applies, for example, to questions of sexual habits and behaviour—a realm in which it is particularly easy to regard actions as private and as having no relevance to wider spheres of the country or the world. If we pause to reflect, we can agree that compromise in these matters, or softness and wrong relationships in the lives of thousands or millions of citizens, may have a cumulative effect on the moral fibre of the nation.¹ Nevertheless, being what we are, we know that whenever there is an inner conflict between some strong personal desire and a moral standard, all our mental activity will be mobilised to make our own desire acceptable, and make it seem as if the moral ideal is inapplicable in the present case. All of us are like that, and we all react in the same way both when we have to make decisions for ourselves and when we have to decide things on behalf of industrial concerns, associations, parties, or nations. Most of us will claim that we have moral principles. And because our morality is relative, we ourselves control it. Thus we have a certain right to assert that we never go

¹ "Take purity. You may say that it is just a personal matter. But what is happening to the nation? They tell you that in some war plants impurity is so common that it is even organised among the workers, and especially among the subversive groups who use it as a weapon. They know that when people's morals are confused their thinking becomes confused. People say, 'That's too bad,' and keep on going to church on Sunday, but nothing happens. Too few try to bring a great, cleansing force to the nation. What is going to happen to a nation when nobody brings a cure any more? Broken homes, unstable children, the decay of culture, the seeding plot of revolution." (Buchman, *op. cit.*, p. 162).

beyond the limits of our moral principles, because we are always in a position to push the limits a bit farther in front of us!

When the moral ideas are not accepted as being absolute, the whole foundation of democracy will give way, and we shall be left with a morality which is subordinate to *my* people's interests, *my* party's interests, *my* personal interests. In any situation it will then be merely a matter of asking ourselves whether morality will serve our ends or not. And the more tempting it is in a particular situation to disregard the dictates of morality, the more vigorously will our thinking be mobilised to make these dictates seem unreasonable. The psychologist Murphy recalls, in his book *Personality* the following observation of Nietzsche: "My memory says that I did it, my pride says that I could not have done it, and in the end, my memory yields."¹ Murphy then shows why and how memory, and our whole intellect, "yields," allowing itself to be used and guided by far deeper unconscious and emotional strata in our personality than our intellectual faculties.

If individuals do not regard the moral standards as absolutely obligatory, we shall always be tempted to subordinate morality to the selfish motives which blend at all times with our thinking, while at the same time conducting a most convincing intellectual defence of our actions. Acceptance of an absolute moral standard means that we are willing to admit that we have a natural tendency to subordinate morality to self-interest, and to see this quite concretely in the situation of the moment. Granted this, the dictates of absolute honesty and love will prove a marvellous moral corrective of our own motives

¹ Murphy, Gardner: *Personality. A Biosocial Approach to Origin and Structure* (Harper & Brothers, 1947), p. 362.

in any important situation. A theoretical, intellectual discussion of such concepts will seldom lead to valuable results. The main point is that, if we apply the standards to ourselves, they will tell us something valuable and essential about ourselves and our motives. They can shed fresh and searching light upon our relationship to our fellow men; and they can show the parties in a conflict new and unexpected things—in matrimonial discords, in labour disputes, in controversies about our written Norwegian language or about price-control or the Church's place in temporal affairs. They will show both parties their moral shortcomings, and demand a changed attitude in both of them. In face of absolute moral standards neither party can claim to be perfect.

In view of the fact that such moral ideas must be absolute, it is only natural to regard them as being, from the Christian standpoint, an expression of the will of God.

The above outline does not attempt to be a complete statement of democracy as an ideology. Its content derives from Christianity. The absolute value of the individual is an idea fostered by centuries of Christian teaching. It carries with it the belief that the individual is valuable not just for himself alone, but because he has a part ordained by God, in this world, and in the realm which lies beyond the limits of time and space. A man's "strivings after meaning" can only find fulfilment in a philosophy which accepts such transcendental values, endowing with significance the lives of everyone—not only of himself—with whom he comes in contact. Thus, also, it endows with significance the society in which he lives, and impels him to play his part in reconstructing it in accordance with these values. [Ed.]

But may not absolute moral ideas be harmful to people?

Will they not lead to feelings of guilt and to complexes? And will they not be apt to make people hypocritical and censorious?

Let us take the last point first. In a country with an authoritarian ideology the state stands above morality, so it is always right. "The others" are always in the wrong—other ideologies, other states, those who oppose the rulers, etc. Those who represent the authoritarian state are invariably in the right, and have invariably full right to judge others. In a democratic country, on the contrary, morality stands above the state. This means that the state or the rulers may be wrong and do wrong. But if the moral ideas are not living and obligatory upon democracy the rulers will have great difficulty in seeing or admitting that they are in the wrong. Those who represent the opposition will also have difficulty in seeing where they themselves are in the wrong; instead of that they will always see what is wrong with the people who are in power at the moment.

This will easily happen in every situation, when we fail to accept absolute standards and prefer relative ones which will always allow us in some degree to draw the line ourselves between right and wrong. A person who makes decisions and carries them through will have difficulty in seeing that he has "transgressed the limits" and for this reason will defend his actions to the last, while the mere spectator may find an outlet for his censoriousness in self-righteous indignation. This happens in family life, at school, in the work place, in the forces, and in politics. When I myself set the limits I am bound to be "right," at any rate in matters which concern me and where my own prestige is of primary importance. Thus relative standards of morality foster self-righteousness and censoriousness.

Some will perhaps say that they have come across people who are self-righteous and censorious although they

accept absolute standards. Not infrequently this objection springs from some cause of a quite personal nature in the objector. One who lives by relative standards will unconsciously feel that he is attacked and challenged by people who accept absolute standards. The best way of defending oneself against this attack is to resort to what our subconsciousness so well assists us in, namely, the assertion that the other party is self-righteous and censorious. In some cases, however, it cannot be denied that persons who say they base their lives on absolute moral standards do exhibit self-righteousness and censoriousness. This is due to their not having grasped what is meant by accepting absolute standards of living, for oneself and the community.

Absolute moral standards mean : I must strive to attain a moral ideal. That implies also that I have not attained it, and that I must always be willing to admit that I may have been mistaken or have acted wrongly. Even in a situation where I think I did the right thing, I must realise that I may have been wrong and that others may be right or may have seen what is morally right. One who thinks he is always right in his moral estimate of himself or of other people, because he has accepted moral standards that are absolute, is sure to become self-righteous and censorious. A man's ability to see and admit his *own* shortcomings is developed by accepting an absolute ideal—an ideal he has not attained.

How far a government, a superior, an industrial leader, a father or a mother set morality above or in subordination to their personal interests is revealed by their ability and willingness to see and admit their own shortcomings.

Will such absolute moral ideals create a sense of guilt and complexes? In education, there is no doubt that parents who give their children the impression that they are morally perfect are likely to create a sense of guilt and

complexes in them. But this is a misunderstanding and misuse of moral ideals, as shown above. An absolute ideal is as far above parents as it is above their children. A sense of guilt in children, and the complexes they may develop, will depend to a large extent upon the way in which parents influence them, morally, during the years of childhood. At the same time it is primarily the relationship between children and their parents that can give them a sense of security and a harmonious personality. Anything which separates and creates a feeling of distance between children and parents is apt to make the children insecure and put difficulties in their way. Moreover, parents who give their children the impression that they are living immeasurably nearer to the moral standards than their offspring, create a feeling of distance between the children and themselves. They forget that they are as far from the goal as their children. In the words of a fourteen-year-old girl with whom we discussed this point, "The parents who pretend to be better able to be absolutely honest than their children, are not absolutely honest."

Absolute moral standards, then, place parents and children on an equality. Though parents may possess more knowledge and insight than children, they nevertheless have a more highly developed capacity to disguise, gloss over or explain away their moral lapses. Therefore absolute moral standards are more effective than anything else in creating firm fellowship between parents and children. It is not the ideals in themselves that give children complexes and an unhealthy sense of guilt. The decisive factor is the way in which the parents practise the ideals in their life with their children. In a right relationship between parents and children, based upon their relation to the Absolute, to God, children will acquire a strong sense of security. Here it is not the children only who do wrong,

but the parents also are constantly guilty of the most elementary and "childish" moral lapses; this they admit to their children, and apologise if the children have been the sufferers. As we have said already, a father or mother not infrequently pretends to be morally perfect. The children try hard to live up to the ideal their father and mother represent, but they fail, and are compelled to admit their failure. The oftener a child does something wrong, the greater will be the feeling of distance between the "perfect" parents and himself; the anxiety and sense of guilt will then increase in proportion to this feeling of distance, and will be associated with the ideal that the parents represent. Sooner or later the child will arrive at the stage of intelligence where he will see through his father and mother. He will then be in danger of losing the ideal. And even if he does lose his faith in the ideal, the anxiety and the sense of guilt will retain their hold on him for life. This can be avoided if parents and children jointly, and with complete mutual confidence, help one another to judge their actions by absolute standards which they are all equally far from attaining. Further confidence is gained if parents and children come to share a common faith, tested experimentally, in seeking guidance from the Source of all spiritual power, not only when special difficulties arise or important decisions have to be made, but in the ordinary course of everyday life at home. In this way a child experiences a firm and genuine fellowship with his parents and grows into the kind of life at which democracy aims, namely a development in the direction of a spiritual and moral ideal. A firm and genuine fellowship between children and their parents is a safeguard against unhealthy feelings of guilt. It is the dishonest relationship between parents and children that produces harmful forms of guilt feelings.

The home and the child's relations with the parents undoubtedly signify most for the development of personality. It is these factors which decide whether the child will receive the impress of anxiety and unhealthy feelings of guilt or of security and a healthy sense of responsibility. And what has been said of the home applies also to the development of guilt feelings and anxiety in schools, offices, factories, etc. Absolute moral standards will place everybody on an equality with regard to morality, enlisting them in the pursuit of a common ideal in a spirit of confidence. But where the "boss" is always "right" and has no absolute standard above himself, he spreads anxiety and insecurity around him.

A morality that is absolute forms the basis of that relationship of confidence between government and citizens, and between the citizens themselves, which is so vital if a democratic form of society and life is to function at all. It gives the community and the individual an ideology, that is, it places certain values and objectives in the foreground as central and overriding, all other values and objectives being subordinate. By so doing it can create a sound and well-balanced co-ordination of all the different interests and motives in the community and the individual. But it can only do this in so far as the moral values are a living reality to which the individual members of the community are committed.

Here democracy signally fails. Because a moral ideology of this nature is not a living reality to the democracies or the individual citizens we cannot unify and subordinate our different interests and motives to absolute values that we jointly accept. Thus it happens that when two persons or two groups or two nations within our democracy have interests that clash, the usual expedient is merely to find out which party will have to make most concessions and

yield to the other party. As a rule, therefore, the settlement takes the form of some compromise: both parties must be got to go as far as they can without sacrificing their prestige. The compromise which, regarded objectively, may be a reasonable solution, will often be reached from morally unworthy motives. Neither party is fully convinced that the ideal solution has been reached, both retain their self-righteousness, and not seldom both remain dissatisfied and bitter. The practical solution that has been found has neither brought the parties nearer to each other nor to the basic moral ideal of democracy.

This tendency towards impoverishing the content of democracy could be avoided if the motives which prompt men in public life could be habitually scrutinised in the light of absolute moral standards, and if an honest search for God's highest plan for all parties could be substituted for compromise decisions. If we are to prevent democracy from being swallowed up by the non-democratic ideologies we must make the absolute moral standards a living reality in the lives of individuals and communities. Or, to quote from *Remaking the World*:

"Until we deal with human nature thoroughly and drastically on a national scale, nations must still follow their historic road to violence and destruction."¹

A moral and ideological clarification will take the form of an offensive that is first of all directed inwards, against the shortcomings of democracy itself. If carried out in the right way such an ideological offensive will not increase tension in the world; on the contrary, it will reduce the danger of war. When we are clear as to the values for which we stand, and when practical effect is given to these values, two important results will follow: in the first

¹ Buchman, Frank N. D.: *Remaking the World* (London, 1953), p. 157.

place it will make the population more immune to psychological attacks, strengthen the sense of fellowship, right social wrongs, remove mistrust, and thus strengthen the weak points which an ideological opponent generally assails. In the second place it will give the population a feeling of security, preserving them from the forms and expressions of aggressiveness which are due to inner insecurity and fear, and which are so dangerous in any critical situation.

In the field of sex we witness only too clearly today the tragic results of a morality that is relative and fluid.

One may safely say that in the last few decades "sexual information" has been given through books, pamphlets and articles to a greater extent than ever before. There will probably be general agreement that this information has in part been scientifically correct, in part unscientific, tendentious, and unreliable. But that is not the main point. What is so serious is that people seem to have forgotten the important truth which the psychologist Allport has stated in the sentence: "Only when knowledge is deeply rooted in acceptable values does it become socially effective." In other words, increased knowledge implies increased responsibility; the more we get to know about a thing, the stronger should be our moral obligation. "Information" which does not have such anchorage, which does not commit us, may be directly destructive, or else be misused. Where certain forms of information or knowledge are concerned, we moderns have been forced to look these facts in the face. Science has in recent decades given us a knowledge of nuclear physics which has enabled us to master completely new fields of technology. We have acquired fresh and dangerous knowledge which can be exploited for good or evil. Progress towards still greater knowledge, greater technical mastery, cannot be stayed.

But we all see that it must be directed by moral obligation. Many have suggested that physicists, the representatives of this new and dangerous knowledge, ought to take a solemn oath that they will only use it in the best interests of humanity! The knowledge and scientific study which have produced our modern sexual information cannot be stayed either. In itself it is neither evil nor good. But this field of knowledge and the field of nuclear physics have studied and liberated two of the strongest forces in human life. There is a danger now that these forces may destroy our entire civilisation.—Our knowledge, our teaching, must be subordinated to moral standards which are absolutely binding. This applies to the sexual as it does to all the other domains of life.

Many people in the West have wondered at the remarkable fact that Communism in different parts of the world seems to adopt quite different forms of sexual morality. The explanation is to be found in Lenin's axiom that the morality of Communism is "wholly subordinated to the interests of the proletarian class war." In non-Communist countries the Communists support all the existing tendencies to so-called "sexual freedom"; they are irreconcilably opposed to all attempts to subject the sexual life to any moral and spiritual obligation, and in the name of liberty and mental health they demand full "sexual information" for young people—simply because they know that sexual knowledge or information, severed from moral obligation, tend to undermine the foundations of democracy. In countries where Communism has secured full control, sexual morality is gradually switched on to strictly moralistic lines; this is exemplified by the Soviet divorce laws, which are now stricter than in any West European country. The Communist leaders know that the sexual drive is a force which can contribute in the

highest degree to give inner strength to a nation, when it is harnessed to an objective that is sufficiently great. To an ideology such as Communism it goes without saying that one of the most important motive forces in human life must be exploited in this way to promote ideological ends.

In the democracies we have largely been blind to this. That is why it was possible for the process of dissolution in the sexual field to continue so long before we began at last to understand what was happening. Many aspects of our culture seem deliberately to concentrate people's thinking and ideas upon sex, to foster and stimulate interest in sexual matters. Books and films, magazines and advertisements build up, as it were, the greatest possible demand, which they then proceed to satisfy and exploit purely as a matter of business. This cult of sex, with its one-sided biological information and approach to sexual problems, has created a demand for sexual indulgence which to a disastrous degree has been accepted as a matter of course. This has left its mark on the nation's way of life—many young people suffer fatal moral damage before they are twenty. Teachers in high schools are appalled at the extent to which their pupils live together sexually from a very early age; and anyone may well be shocked at the evidence revealed from time to time of the widespread homosexual activities. But we have little right to feel surprise or indignation. The conditions we experience today are merely the natural consequence of the fact that the generation who have lavished "sexual information" on our youth, have themselves to a large extent lived in moral defeat and without a clear moral sense of obligation, thus severing sexual life and sexual information from its connection with a high level of morality. Taking their stand on an outworn, intellectualistic view of mankind, they

have believed that the moral problems of the young can be resolved by "information" which commits no one. Parents who are unwilling to let their own sex life be decided by absolute standards, will speak in vain of a moral way of life for the younger generation. Our self-indulgence makes us into divided and weakened personalities; materialism in democracy exploits our sexuality as a matter of business—and materialistic dictatorship watches the process with glee, adding fuel to the fire when it can, and well satisfied to see that we are forwarding its own ends.

A nation that cannot find a clear answer to selfishness in the domain of sex will fail also to find an ideological alternative to Communism. It will lack the necessary spiritual power, moral clarity and discipline. It is quite natural, therefore, that just in regard to sex the demand for full moral commitment meets with more bitter opposition than anywhere else. Many are willing to agree to partial moral commitment, but where sex is concerned they are most unwilling to accept an absolute moral standard. In this field the egoistical forces in ourselves and in our democratic society co-operate directly with the external forces that undermine democracy.

The sex drive is one of the strongest creative forces in man. Hence it is of decisive importance that it be controlled by a morality which commits us absolutely. History tells of many attempts to discipline or subdue the energy of sex by external commands, for some limited objective or as a social duty. The results have not been encouraging, for the suppressed forces have broken out in other directions and in other forms, as hardness, criticism, hypocrisy, fanaticism, and ambition. This kind of disciplining for social or other ends of an external nature, without deep inner conviction, cannot be carried out

without harming the personality. It is very different when the energy of sex is employed in a life which is deeply committed to an end on the highest level—not some external social end. In such a case it becomes a creative force which finds full and harmonious satisfaction both with and without physical satisfaction. When a man pursues this aim, not as a *duty*, but as a personal and absolute *commitment* to let his life subserve the aim of realising an ethical ideal, he is liberated from being guided by his sexual needs. Instead, he gains freedom to employ the sexual force in harmony with the ethical aim of his whole personality. Duty without commitment results in a divided mind. Deep and absolute commitment is a necessary condition for harmonious personality, and it gives clarity and spiritual strength. Such commitment must include the sexual life. *Purity* really means that the sex drive is used in consonance with the absolute moral commitment of the whole personality. Consequently purity is a necessity for man's harmonious and ideal development—and it is perhaps also the most decisive factor in the war of ideas in which we are engaged.

The moral foundation of democracy can be expressed in various ways. It will, however, be generally agreed that certain ethical principles are a necessary presupposition of the democratic way of life. All our social and humanitarian institutions are the expression of these principles and have their value as means of realising them.

We will briefly consider here certain of the principles which form the groundwork of a democratic society.

The Demand for Absolute Honesty

This requirement forms the groundwork of mutual confidence between nations and also between the political

leadership and the people of each individual country, both being necessary conditions for a democratic world. Without honesty, confidence is impossible. In point of fact this principle has markedly characterised the democratic form of society, and to a large extent it is really accepted. The state gives its support to the objective *science* which seeks truth and reality without considering whether or not this suits the state. Similarly, the state maintains an objective *judicial system*, though fully aware that this can be and often has been used to test the legality of the state's own enactments and dispositions, and even to abrogate them. The state supports a *Church* which is able and bound to uphold Christian morality both in public and private life—and which by its very nature constitutes a moral challenge. In our *schools* we try as far as possible to give the children and youth of the country an objective education, even if this education may conflict in some respects with the individual teacher's own views.

We may also say that absolute honesty is presupposed even in fields where it is not wholly practised, and where democracy is undermined by great numbers of supposedly good democrats. The most obvious example of this is in the system of taxes and personal returns of income, etc. In such fields as the payment of taxes, foreign exchange regulations, and the like, a certain amount of dishonesty is so general that the state has had to make supplementary regulations and control arrangements which may actually put difficulties in the way of those who still try to be absolutely honest. Because as individuals we have failed to fulfil the demand for absolute honesty we have helped to call forth these ordinances and regulations which none of us like. And the small tax-dodger who does not put his additional earnings in his income-tax return has no right

to be indignant with the big tax-dodger who operates with large sums. They are both of a piece.

It is interesting to compare the conditions in a democracy with those in a country where morality is not only neglected privately, but officially subordinate to state policy, and therefore relative as a matter of principle. In such a state an objective judicial system, for instance, is in the long run impossible. An article by N. N. Polyansky in the Moscow University Herald for November 1950 gives clear expression to this point:

"The policy of the Communist Party exerts its influence upon the activity of the judicial institutions by means of Party directives and by means of the various organs of the Soviet régime. . . . The picture of the judge whose position is above politics belongs to bourgeois mythology in the same way that the goddess of justice herself belongs to the mythology of the past. . . . In our Soviet state the court of law is always regarded as one of the levers by which the Soviet régime is operated, and measures are taken to ensure that the court of law really implements the policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet régime."

Respect for the Dignity of Man

In this sphere we see an equally clear contrast between the outlook of the democratic and the totalitarian state. We have seen, for example, how a totalitarian state can liquidate persons who, on account of bodily or mental weaknesses or defects, are considered unserviceable to the state. And if the efficiency of the state machine is the highest goal, this is clearly a sensible procedure. But the democratic state cannot permit itself to take any person's life on grounds of expediency. In this respect the democratic view represents the absolute love which assigns to

the individual his own value, irrespective of his abilities or efficiency as a member of society. This standpoint is reflected, moreover, in a number of fields, as in the care of the insane, in child welfare, etc. The same principle also underlies the immense work of social reform that has been accomplished during the last hundred years.

Our democratic concept of liberty has its ground in the idea that what is valuable in each individual ought to be developed by allowing him to take part freely in public and political life, giving it the impress of his outlook and his opinions, to the common advantage.

The Principle of Collaboration

Democracy holds that all men should be given the same opportunities to develop and use their whole personality. This does not happen where a single individual or a small group of people dominates—in a home, an industrial concern, or a house of parliament. It only happens where individuals make it their aim to practise absolute unselfishness, and therefore seek to help others to use their abilities and develop their possibilities in a collaboration where all can contribute fully and nobody is hampered by the domination of anyone else. In recent years this has become a recognised principle more especially perhaps, in education, where great efforts are being made to achieve the right form of democratic collaboration. But it is of fundamental importance that this principle of collaboration should be living and practised in the home, in public life, and in the relations between the democratic nations.

This kind of teamwork is of the greatest significance for democracy. And it presupposes that mutual confidence which is only possible in a group or society where no one is penalised for his opinions.

The Principle of Individual Responsibility

Democracy safeguards the fundamental rights of the individual. This implies, however, that the individual also has certain obligations, that the individual citizen is responsible for the realisation of the democratic principles in his society, and that he himself will maintain and defend these principles. The individual citizen can take responsibility in various ways for ensuring the application of these democratic principles in the government and administration of his country. He can exercise the right of free and secret suffrage, voting without any form of control or direction for the candidates he considers best fitted for the position of trust in question.

National service is an expression of the citizen's obligation to defend democracy.

Similarly, freedom of speech in public discussion, in the Press, in broadcasting, etc., gives an opportunity for the individual citizen to see that the principles of democracy are realised as far as possible. Freedom of speech is not just an opportunity to say whatever one likes. It is primarily an opportunity to assume responsibility as a democratic citizen.

Where these principles are lived out, this will result in a moral and ideological awakening of the whole nation. In practice it will mean that we shall habitually judge every social and personal question by fundamental ethical principles, applying these principles effectively to the concrete situations confronting the individual and the various groups within the community. In the same way that ethical values of this kind make personality harmonious by giving it structure, they can react upon society as a whole by giving it a democratic structure. The various factors and

situations in the community acquire coherence and meaning, and are related to one another in accordance with the basic values of democracy. It is of the greatest importance that individuals and groups within the democracies should learn to judge the community and themselves by democratic, moral ideas.

An ideological clarification of the issues along these lines must to a large extent take the form of educational measures of various kinds. But it is important to understand that the mere dissemination of theories does not grip and activate people. Purely theoretical considerations cannot make democracy stronger than the alien ideologies which know how to capture men's deep-seated emotions and exploit the strong personal needs of those who are frustrated and unstable. Only such knowledge and theory as will move and take possession of the whole personality, including mind, will, and feelings, can give us ideological strength. Moreover it is only when we ourselves are deeply and personally committed to such knowledge that we can pass it on to others. A theoretical or philosophical system is an *ideology* only when it so profoundly possesses our personality that it determines our whole way of life. The absolute standards must be binding upon every aspect of our lives. Ideological understanding, then, does not begin with the spreading of information. It begins with moral commitment on the part of each one of us.

Can we take the Offensive?

DEMOCRACY cannot content itself merely with defence. If we are to get rid of the tension in the world today we must also win over the non-democratic countries to a democratic way of life. But have we the power? On this Dr. Frank Buchman says:

"Our task is to set our own house in order. We waste energy and time trying to persuade the other person and the other nation to change first. We generate so much steam in the process that we become almost apoplectic in our righteous indignation. But events do not change, other nations do not change, because we do not change. So much of our steam never gets to traction."¹

The psychologist Dollard points out that it is a mistaken policy to concentrate wholly upon telling other nations what democracy is, and forget that educative and other measures are needed, to build up the power of resistance at home. If we make this mistake, the population will become an easy prey to foreign agitators and nerve campaigns.²

These two utterances draw attention to a matter of decisive importance. Democracy must first of all secure the

¹ Buchman, Frank N. D.: *Remaking the World* (London, 1953), p. 126.

² From Kay, Lillian Wald: *Civilian Morale and Civil Defence* (J. soc. Ps., 1952-53), pp. 185-194.

loyalty of the citizens by building up a strong democratic morale. A convincing moral ideology in the democratic states is the only thing that has any prospect of winning non-democratic individuals and nations for democracy. We do not win a convinced Communist for democracy by showing him up as a Communist. Nor do we win Communists by any form of anti-Communism. A loyal Communist has an ideology, a conviction for which he stakes everything. We have no moral right to attack Communists if we cannot give them a better ideology to which we are totally committed and for which we stake everything. That is why Communism is the great challenge not only to the democratic countries, but to each one of us.

Gordon W. Allport defines "national morale" as follows :

"(a) the healthful state of the convictions and values in the individual citizen that endows him with abundant energy and confidence in facing the future; (b) his decisive self-disciplined effort to achieve specific objectives that derive from his personal convictions and values; and (c) the agreement among citizens (especially in times of crisis) in respect to their convictions and values and the co-ordination of their efforts in attaining necessary objectives."¹

This definition stresses three main points: (1) Clarity as to values. (2) Giving effect to the values in personal and social life. (3) Agreement on values between the individuals of a nation.

Can we say that our democracy has a high morale in this sense of the word?

A high democratic morale will manifest itself in a clear and serene grasp of the values underlying democracy, and in the appeal to these values as decisive for dealing with the important questions of our time. It will also manifest itself in successful resistance to attempted infiltration and

¹ From Kay, Lillian Wald: *Civilian Morale and Civil Defence*.

attempted smokescreen tactics because the people will know what values are at stake, and therefore understand where democracy has its true line of battle. Moreover it will make it difficult for undemocratic forces to utilise the moral weaknesses of individuals as means of bringing pressure upon them to act against their convictions. For it is a frequent occurrence today in the democratic countries that undemocratic forces exert pressure upon men in influential positions to serve undemocratic interests, by threatening to reveal their marital infidelities, financial dishonesty, homosexuality, and the like.

Similarly, a high democratic morale will be manifested in the way elections to positions of responsibility form a true and adequate expression of the popular conviction. At the same time it will make it impossible for small groups to exploit the slackness of other people and thus manipulate elections to attain their own undemocratic ends. Further, a high democratic morale will make it difficult for undemocratic groups to secure the election of candidates with views that are unrepresentative of the section of the people they will represent.

In a democratic state we can never adopt any form of one-track policy to give practical expression to our democratic principles. This is why we retain, for example, the system with several political parties. No single party has a monopoly of the true democratic policy in all its aspects. Similarly, divergent opinions on questions of defence, social or educational reforms, and the like, are both natural and necessary in a democratic society. This variety of different viewpoints will strengthen democracy so long as it is based upon objective and complete information, and provided that the divergent views spring from a genuine desire to preserve the fundamental values of democracy. Nevertheless, we must realise that differences

of opinion in our democracies *may* be due to a lack of moral or ideological clarity and to inadequate factual knowledge. And differences of opinion due to these causes will readily divide us at home and weaken us abroad. In a nation with a high democratic morale there will not be that lack of moral and ideological clarity which produces antagonistic differences of opinion. But obviously, full information regarding the problems under discussion at any particular time will also help to create unity at home and abroad.

First and foremost, however, the high democratic morale will be manifest in a way of life—the way people in a democracy carry out their common tasks and resolve the conflicts that arise in their midst. People who cannot preserve any unity in their home life will not be fit to keep the whole community united in face of ideological attacks from within and without. A democracy which cannot resolve political, social or cultural problems without bitter dissensions which divide the population into hostile groups, will have little power to shake the convictions of loyal Communists. Such groups all believe that they are a hundred per cent right, and that the opposing party is wrong or acting from sinister motives. A democratic solution of a conflict presupposes that the conflict can be raised on to a moral level, i.e. that the parties are willing to judge the case in point and their own motives by absolute moral standards which everyone accepts. Neither party can then triumph over the other or feel humiliated; both will be ready to learn and to change.

The readiness *to change*, the individual's willingness to experience personal change in every situation, is the factor which in the last resort determines the moral strength of democracy. Therefore it can truly be said that we have the choice between change and dictatorship. This is

true of each one of us, as it is true of democracy as a whole.

A democracy is not static. It is dynamic and always in process of change, because it has a goal which is always far ahead of us, namely, the development of human beings into individuals of high moral worth. If we are willing to commit ourselves to this task, we shall gradually discover better ways of carrying it into effect. In this way the outer forms and institutions of democracy will constantly improve. A democracy which has this clear objective and is committed to absolute moral standards will be able to challenge the non-democratic ideologies by showing them more harmonious men and women, happier homes, and a national life that is richer and freer.

It will be able to show them a way of settling conflicts which does not cause division and at the same time does not suppress anyone's convictions. It will have an ideology which can give us the moral right to try to win the Communists. And it will possess the qualifications for succeeding.

But all this is dependent upon the willingness of the individual to recognise that there are absolute values to which his own will is subject, and upon his willingness to be committed to these values in the whole range of his life and work.

NOTE

The thoughts I have put in writing in this little book are of a kind that are certainly exercising the minds of increasing numbers of people who see the seriousness of the situation in which, as democrats, we now find ourselves. But my conviction that these ideas can be invested with such dynamic force that they can create a new approach and mentality, both in individuals and nations, is derived from my knowledge of Dr. Frank N. D. Buchman's work for Moral Re-Armament. This work has furnished countless practical examples of the way in which absolute moral standards, and a willingness to change, create harmonious men and women, conquering the mistrust, dishonesty, bitterness, and aggressiveness which make it so difficult to find satisfactory answers to the problems of our time. Those of us who have been privileged to participate in his work have not only gained life-values which are valid, irrespective of our own or democracy's fate; we have also been confirmed in our faith in the future of democracy in its power to emerge victorious from the present war of ideas. This book is written, therefore, in deep gratitude to Dr. Frank N. D. Buchman.

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